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Preface 
This report aims to assist the Sino-Australian bilateral relationship adapt to meet China’s 
new low carbon emissions policies and to facilitate a smoother transition to a low carbon 
future.  Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE), Chengdu, China and 
the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia held a workshop at SWUFE to develop a 
guide to China’s low-carbon policies and their implications for the Sino-Australian energy 
trade and sectors.  This report results from the workshop.  Chapter 3 contains the guide to 
China’s low emission policies and discusses market-based experiments within China’s 
command-and-control electricity sector.  Chapter 4 discusses Australia’s poorly implemented 
neoliberal policies within its energy sector and provides an informative market-based case 
study for China on what to avoid.  Chapter 2 discusses the implications of Australia and 
China’s low emission policies. Chapter 5 discusses barriers to the transition to a low 
emissions economy. 
 
Climate change is one of the world’s major challenges.  Others include increasing inequality 
and poor economic growth, creating a decline in inclusive growth.  Declining inclusive growth 
and climate change are interrelated wicked problems.  Their solution is technically and 
economically viable given appropriate investment but the absence of a price on carbon in 
Australia is a major obstacle to directing investment consistent with a low emissions future 
and government infrastructure investment calculations use a frozen high 'discount rate' when 
interest rates are at historical lows and underemployment rates are at historical highs.  
 
Australia is transitioning from a mining to a more service orientated economy.  However, 
Australia’s uncoordinated growth and climate change policies are hindering inclusive growth 
and the transition to a lower emissions economy.  Growth and climate change policies need 
bringing together to engender confidence and direct investment compatible with a low 
emissions future.  Notably, Infrastructure Australia has gone some way to address this issue 
at the national level but the lack of transparency and independence in other jurisdictions and 
the frozen high 'discount rate' undermine Infrastructure Australia’s effectiveness to address 
climate change and inclusive growth. Remarkably, the organisation Drawdown provides a 
ranking of the top 100 technologies that can reverse global warming and many can also 
promote inclusive growth. 
 
Similarly, Australia’s uncoordinated energy and climate change policy and poorly 
implemented neoliberal policies in the energy sector are undermining investment confidence 
and hindering both inclusive growth and the transition to a lower emissions economy.  
Energy and climate change policies need bringing together to restore investment confidence 
within the electricity sector.  The Australian Energy Market Operator’s Integrated Systems 
Plan has gone some way to address this problem but there is a requirement to write climate 
change objectives within the National Energy Objectives to integrate energy and climate 
policy to enhance coordination. 
 
Poor policy coordination is also hindering solutions to a host of other interrelated wicked 
problems.  These wicked problems include massive increases in retail electricity prices, 
private school fees and private health insurance, the inability to undertake major tax reform, 
such as introducing a tax on sugar or carbon or introduce road user charges to replace the 
declining revenue from fuel excise duty.  There is ample and sound evidence-based 
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research to solve these wicked problems but there is an inability to enact policy in the 
interest of the electorate. 
The key findings of this report are four common barriers to enacting policy to solve these 
wicked problems. 
 
(1) Political donations present a conflict of interest. 
 
(2) Adversarial politics and political wedging reduce the ability to address complex 
problems. 
 
(3) There is an absence of academic economists informing the public debate to provide 
impartial advice. 
 
(4) Unrealistic models of the economy and human behaviour are misinforming policy. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses methods to address these barriers. 
 
Doctor William Paul Bell 
Energy Economics and Management Group  
The School of Economics 
The University of Queensland  
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Executive Summary 
The report investigates barriers to inclusive growth and climate change adaptation and 
mitigation in Australia and China.  Chapter 2 discusses inclusive growth and climate change 
adaptation and mitigation issues in Australia and related trade with China.  The transition to 
a low carbon economy requires that the electricity sectors take the pivotal role within the 
economy. To that end, Chapters 3 and 4 discuss Australia and China’s electricity sectors, 
respectively.  Chapter 5 discusses four barriers to inclusive growth and climate change 
adaptation and mitigation. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 The biggest problems facing the world are climate change and declining inclusive 
growth.  Both climate change and inclusive growth are interrelated wicked problems 
because the cost of climate change adaptation falls disproportionately on the poor, 
the cost of climate change mitigation falls disproportionality on the wealthy and well-
directed climate change action could increase inclusive growth. 
 China is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases and Australia is one of the 
world highest greenhouse emitter per capita.  The electricity sectors in China and 
Australia are the largest emitting sectors within both countries.  The electricity sector 
is best placed to transition the economy to zero net emissions and transitioning the 
Australia-China trade relationship is part of the solution to zero net emissions. 
 Factors contributing to increases in inequality in Australia include the mining boom, 
property investment tax breaks and property market boom, privatisation and 
deregulation of the electricity sector and austerity measures.  Reversing these trends 
requires an inclusive growth agenda that includes universal healthcare and education 
and removal of economic rents. 
Chapter 2: Inclusive growth and climate change adaptation and mitigation 
 The international decline in inclusive growth sees the benefits of economic growth 
going mainly to the top quintile, stagnate wages in the lower quintiles and a decline in 
the lower quintile’s wages in some countries.  Exacerbating inequality, climate 
change increases the risk of loss of assets that the top quintiles can easily insure 
against but the lower quintile is less able.  As climate change increases, the risk of 
loss of assets and the cost of insuring against the risk also increases.  The cost of 
climate change adaptation falls more heavily on the bottom quintile. 
 Inclusive growth and climate change mitigation and adaptation are wicked problems 
to solve because there are numerous stakeholders with often-conflicting priorities.  
For instance, mitigation costs are directly born by a firm or country but the whole 
world benefits and powerful fossil fuel entities are able to fund lobbying and political 
donations against mitigation.  Adaptation costs are born internationally and unevenly 
and those adapting have a little power domestically or even less internationally. 
 The disproportionate growth of income going to the top quintile eventually 
undermines economic growth.  Investment aimed at climate change adaptation and 
mitigations can provide for inclusive growth via energy efficiency and renewable 
energy both reducing the cost of living and creating jobs. 
 The property market boom has exacerbated inequality with a growth in the number of 
renters unable to buy a property and landlords able to purchase more investment 
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properties using tax breaks.  The tax breaks reduce revenue for government to 
provide services, further exacerbating inequality.  Stakeholders benefiting from the 
property boom can use lobbying and political donations to perpetuate the property 
boom, further exacerbating inequality.  This tax break fuelled building boom lead to 
an oversupply of apartments that represents unnecessary emissions exacerbating 
climate change. 
 Australia’s exposure to financial risk from fossil fuel asset ownership is extreme as 
the world transitions away from fossil fuels.  There is a need to diversify exports and 
obtain as much revenue as possible from the fossil fuel within the remaining limited 
carbon budget available.  There is a requirement to address tax dodging by fossil fuel 
companies to maximise the revenue from the remaining burnable fossil fuels.  These 
extra government revenues will enable Australia to invest in the transition to zero net 
emission and simultaneously improve inclusive growth. However, the fossil fuel 
companies are in a powerful position to lobby and pay donations to reduce the 
royalties and taxes they pay to government.  
Chapter 3: China’s electricity sector and climate change mitigation policies 
 Like Australia over the last 30 years, China’s electricity sector has undergone major 
institutional and regulatory reform and their environmental and energy policies are 
separate.  These policies need bringing together to smooth the transition to low 
emissions economies as both countries are experiencing problems coordinating the 
integration of renewable energy into their electricity sector.   
 Unlike Australia, China uses ‘The five year plan’ (FYP) to coordinate changes within 
the economy where the Chinese Communist Party provides a broad description of a 
new direction.  This description is interpreted in a cascade of layers of government 
and institutions to provide an increasing prescriptive interpretation.  The FYPs have 
progressively more ambitious renewable energy targets and coal reduction targets. 
 China’s electricity sector uses a command-and-control approach with an egalitarian 
equal-dispatch method.  This method has coal generators of differing efficiencies 
dispatching equally as a proportion of their capacity and coal generators filling the 
role of ramping up and down to match demand.  This equal-dispatch results in 
relatively high emissions.  Gas generators usually fill this ramping role in other 
countries.  China has had experimental trials of market-based approaches. In 
comparison, Australia extensively introduced neoliberal policies to privatise and 
deregulate its electricity that uses an energy only market.   
 Interestingly, Australia was the first country to abandon an emissions trading scheme 
(ETS) and China was the country to initiate the world’s largest ETS.  ETSs use a 
market-based approach to reduce emissions.  In a contrary position, Australia has a 
market-based electricity sector but lacks a matching market-based emissions 
reduction scheme and China has a market-based emissions reduction scheme but 
lacks a matching market-based electricity sector.  China’s ETS could theoretically 
become much cheaper if matched with a market-based electricity scheme but in 
practice Australia’s implementation of neoliberal policies saw Australian energy 
prices go from some of the cheapest in the OECD to the some of the most expensive. 
The poorly implemented neoliberal policies in Australia provide a useful case study 
for China of what pitfalls to avoid in any plans to implement a market-based approach 
to their electricity sector.  
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Chapter 4: Australia’s electricity sector privatisation and mitigation policies 
 Australia and China’s electricity system have similarities in the physical geography 
they traverse.  Both their land areas are extremely large and cover many climatic 
zones, which provides for opportunities and challenges.  The opportunity is that 
Australia and China are among the top three countries for renewable energy 
resource as the large geographic terrain enables a more consistent flow of energy 
from the cheaper variable renewable energy to ensure more consistent and stable 
energy supply with lesser need for more expensive dispatchable energy.  This 
situation will allow Australia and China to more cheaply transition from their heavy 
reliance on coal generation.  However, the challenge is that the transmissions lines 
are incredibly long and go through some harsh terrains with increasing severe 
weather events from climate change, making transmissions more susceptible to 
failure. 
 The electricity sector is pivotal in the transition to zero net emissions and promoting 
inclusive growth but Australia’s poor implementation of neoliberal polices had 
exacerbated the growing inequity and undermined productivity. Privatisation and 
deregulation destroyed Australia’s competitive advantage in energy.  The poorly 
implemented neoliberal policies and lack of coordination between energy and climate 
polices is increasing the cost of transition to zero net emissions. 
 The Australian Government commissioned the Australian Commerce and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) to investigate the price rises in Australia’s energy sector.  The 
ACCC identified key failures of the neoliberal implementation that allows economic 
rents and the excessive transfer of wealth from electricity users to utility owners 
exacerbating inequality.  There are misaligned incentives and inappropriate 
regulations in the network sector.  There is the market power of three vertically 
integrated retail-generators whose synergies between retail and generation arms 
amplify market power.  The half-hourly settlement period allows gaming of the market.  
Unpredictable outages in the ageing coal generators are causing price volatility that 
is profitable for existing generators.  There is a requirement to move to a five-minute 
settlement period and extend the frequency control market to include shorter 
response times to moderate the price and electricity instability effect of these 
unpredictable outages. 
 The privatisation and deregulation of the retail sector embodies “power of choice”, 
which assumes the more choice available to customers then the greater likelihood 
that competition will align with the public good.  However, the “power of choice” 
belies a faith in a theoretical economic model of human behaviour that is at odds with 
empirical findings.  This presents an issue of using theory beyond its domain of 
applicability. Similar issues appear in Australia’s private health insurance and private 
school systems that are undergoing considerable price rises and under investigations. 
Chapter 5: Removing barriers to solving wicked problems 
 Australia is failing meet its Paris commitment and inequality continues to increase.  
However, climate change and inclusive growth are only two of a host of outstanding 
wicked problems that Australia is having problems addressing.  There exists 
extensive research on climate change and inequality with the technologies already 
available to for the transition to zero net emissions.  Additionally, there exists 
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extensive research into the other wicked problems.  The unique findings of this report 
are that there are four common themes to Australia’s inability to address wicked 
problems.  Removing these four barriers to solving wicked problems would ease the 
way to solve future wicked problems.  The first two barriers are unique to Australia 
and the latter two more applicable to both Australia and China. 
 Barrier 1: Political donations are a mechanism to allow powerful interests privileged 
access to politicians and decision-making process and to circumvent the public 
debate.  The donation system is undermining the public’s confidence in Australia’s 
institution and politicians to act in the electorate’s interests. 
 Barrier 2: Adversarial politics and political wedging diminishes the ability to develop 
complex debate over the intricacies of solving wicked problems.  This behaviour 
emerges from Australia’s hybrid US Federal and UK Westminster system that is over 
a hundred years old and built for a slower less interconnect world when the didactic 
process was most probably more suited.  Notably, the USA and Australia standout as 
countries regressing in climate change commitment.  Additionally, Australia is 
following America’s trend toward an increasingly inequitable and violent society.  The 
use of a similar decision-making system in both countries helps explain the 
convergence in outcomes.  It is time to perform an international comparative 
performance appraisal of Australia political system with a view to upgrading 
Australia’s political system to best practice.  The premise is that putting the same 
politicians in a different system would enhance the overall system’s performance to 
solve wicked problems in the electorate’s interest. 
 Barrier 3: Disengagement of the academic economic profession from the public 
debate reduces impartial informed debate.  In its stead, the debate is formed by 
powerful vested interests via their think tanks and consultant economist or guns for 
hirer.  A similar trend is occurring in science and social sciences where there is an 
increasing requirement for industry-funded research.  The “tobacco science” era 
provides a reminder of how unethical and misleading industry-funded research can 
become.  Tobacco science led to unnecessary delays in implementing policies to 
reduce avoidable deaths. 
 Barrier 4: Unrealistic models of the economy and human behaviour help inform the 
policy decision-making process.  Any polices informed by such models are likely to 
be misguided.  Australia’s neoliberal policies implemented in the electricity and 
private health insurance sectors provide examples of using unrealistic models of the 
economy and human behaviour.  Similarly, the failure to predict the global financial 
crisis provides an international example of the application of unrealistic models of the 
economy and human behaviour.  Importantly, the property market boom in Australia 
and China requires the use of realistic models for each country to simulate policy 
options to select economically stable and equitable options. 
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1 Introduction 
Combating climate change and fostering inclusive economic growth are two of the most 
pressing priorities for policymakers in the 21st century. An inclusive growth agenda provides 
opportunities and distributes the benefits of economic growth equitably across society. 
Mitigating and adapting to climate change seeks to safeguard the very survival of the society 
in which economic activity unfolds.  OECD (2017e) recommends bringing together the 
growth and climate agendas, calculating that integrating measures to tackle climate change 
into regular economic policy will have a positive impact on economic growth over the 
medium and long term, and claiming the transition to zero net carbon dioxide emissions can 
produce inclusive growth (OECD 2017a). This report investigates whether a transition from 
fossil fuels to renewable energy sources can promote inclusive growth in Australia. It 
highlights Australia’s trading relationship with China, compares policy settings in the two 
countries, and recommends ways in which the twin objectives of inclusive growth and 
climate change agendas be brought together. We discuss making the transition from fossil 
fuels to renewable energy as a way to promote inclusive growth in Australia and make 
recommendations to remove barriers to the transition to zero net emissions and inclusive 
growth. 
Australia’s climate challenge involves both mitigation of the sources of climate change and 
adaptation to its unavoidable impacts. As Australia is one of the largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases per capita and one of the largest exporters of fossil fuels in the world, 
mitigating climate change entails a substantial reversal of existing trends and sources of 
economic value. Compounding this, adapting to climate change is a particularly acute 
challenge for Australia, which is already one of the hottest countries on earth. 
China faces similar challenges of mitigation and adaptation, as the world’s largest 
greenhouse gas emitter. However, China’s energy transition also has a profound effect on 
Australia’s climate challenge, as both Australia’s major supplier of renewable energy 
technologies and the largest importer of Australia’s non-renewable energy resources. 
While climate change poses a monumental challenge for environmental sustainability, the 
way in which economic growth is generated and distributed poses risks to economic and 
social stability.  To combat this, the OECD (2017b) proposes an ‘inclusive growth’ agenda, 
which includes such measures as affordable and universal education and healthcare, 
alongside the elimination of economic rents.1 The OECD suggests that the accumulation of 
economic rents, as manifested in highly polarised distributions of income and wealth, is 
partly responsible for the deceleration in productivity growth in most developing countries. 
For Australia, the OECD (2017d) links suggests that the mining boom of the early 2000s also 
contributed to the increasing concentration of income and wealth distributions. Reversing 
these trends is the key to pursuing an inclusive growth agenda, which both provides for 
sustainable economic growth and enables a swifter adaptation to climate change. 
Both inclusive growth and climate change are wicked problems to solve for four reasons (1) 
incomplete or contradictory knowledge, (2) the number of people and opinions, (3) the large 
                                               
1 The World Economic Forum (WEF 2017) provides a measure of inclusive growth called the 
Inclusive Development Index (IDI) that combines measures of growth, development, inclusion, 
intergenerational equity and sustainability, such as GDP per capita and the Gini coefficient. 
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economic burden and (4) the interconnected nature of these problems.2 Crucially, vested 
interests whether they benefit from climate policies that favour fossil fuel technologies or 
from economic policies that increase the income and wealth of those at the top of these 
distributions, are a major but unavoidable obstacle in both addressing climate change and 
promoting inclusive growth. For instance, there is consensus among climate scientists that 
climate change is occurring and the main driver is anthropogenic but there still exist climate 
change deniers.  Additionally, there are economists advocating government expenditure on 
infrastructure, education and health to promote inclusive growth using revenue from 
economic rents and eliminating base erosion and profit shifting.  Others promote tax cuts 
and government austerity to promote economic growth, as part of trickledown theory 
description of the economy despite the evidence to contrary (Baker 2016; OECD 2013a; 
Ostry, Loungani & Fureceri 2016) . 
The structure of the report follows. Chapter 2 discusses Sino-Australian trade and Australia’s 
transition through the mining boom and the mechanisms that helped concentrate wealth in 
the two top quintiles during the mining boom, including the property market bubbles and tax 
avoidance within the fossil fuel industry, which impede inclusive growth and climate change 
adaptation and mitigation.  
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on climate change mitigation in the Chinese and Australian 
electricity sectors, respectively.  The electricity sector is pivotal in the transition to zero net 
emissions and as such needs to lead the economy in the transition for the following five 
reasons (TAI 2017b). (1) The fossil fuel electricity generators in both countries are 
responsible for the largest proportion of the countries emissions. (2) Fossil fuel generators 
within the electricity systems are amenable for replacement with renewable energy whereas 
technologies to displace emissions in other sectors such as iron and cement production are 
less advanced.  (3) In both countries, the transport sector is also a major source of 
emissions where there is a convergence of the transport and electricity sectors as electric 
vehicles and trains become wider spread.  (4) Electricity is a widely consumed commodity 
and the transition to a low emissions electricity system requires special consideration to 
promote inclusive growth. (5) The Australian ‘energy only market’ and Chinese command-
and-control approach contrast but informatively the transition to renewable energy is proving 
difficult for both systems albeit for differing reasons. 
Chapter 5 identifies four barriers to solving wicked problems and discusses options to 
remove these barriers. The role of improving government productivity (McKinsey 2017) 
provides part of the solution to these wicked problem.  Government productivity’ is important 
because governments can do ‘more with less’, but we also argue that governments need not 
be content with ‘less’ if governments crack down on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, this 
means they can get ‘more’, amplifying any productivity gains in government. 
Chapter 6 concludes the report and discusses policy recommendations. 
  
                                               
2 https://www.wickedproblems.com/1_wicked_problems.php 
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2 Inclusive growth and climate change adaptation and mitigation 
This chapter discusses the interrelationships between inclusive growth and climate change 
adaptation and mitigation to identity inadequate policies and inform policy recommendations. 
It is important to make a clear distinction between climate change mitigation and climate 
change adaptation. Mitigation focuses on eliminating the cause of climate change. 
Adaptation focuses on making changes to ameliorate the effects of climate change.  Early 
and rapid mitigation will reduce adaptation costs, as we will not need to adapt so much. Two 
examples crystallise the difference between adaption and mitigation.  (1) Building higher 
wharfs to enable Australia to continue the export of coal in the facing of rising sea levels is 
an adaption to climate change that undermines mitigation efforts.  (2) In contrast, relocating 
people from islands being overcome by the rising sea level is an adaptation but does little to 
mitigate climate change. 
As it currently stands, mitigation is not in the interest of fossil fuel companies (and some 
shareholders, lobbyists, and employees), as the cost will be borne by them. Any country, 
company or individual contributing to mitigation is unable to capture the full benefit of their 
mitigation efforts, making mitigation an issue of international public good.  Additionally, 
mitigation requires both improving energy efficiency and transitioning from fossil fuels to 
renewable energy3. The provision of renewable energy provides a public good in displacing 
emissions, which requires a strong public response and support.  Mitigation presents a 
discord between the public good and mining vested interests.  Hence there are vested-
interests in preventing the transition including the fossil fuel shareholders, companies and 
employees facing wealth and income losses and politicians facing political donation losses 
(Evershed 2017; Hanrahan et al. 2017).  Notable is the political instability and lack of 
direction over climate change policy (Turnbull 2009). 
Some adaptation is inevitable, as we will be unable to limit global climate change 
satisfactorily.  Adaptation costs fall on the entire population; the rich can more readily afford 
adaptation and the poor are less able to afford adaptation costs.  Adaptation costs are borne 
disproportionately by the poor, in the absence of redistributive or progressive inclusive policy, 
but vested interests are content with status quo, and see climate change adaptation by the 
less financial able as ‘someone else’s problem’.  Adaptation becomes an issue of wealth and 
income distribution which inclusive growth can address.  We discuss methods to address the 
mitigation discord and promote inclusive growth. 
Climate change adaption and mitigation is only one wicked problem faced by both Australian 
and China, others include the property market bubbles, population ageing and obesity 
epidemics. These problems impede inclusive growth and climate change adaptation and 
mitigation.  A common theme to addressing these wicked problems is the public good versus 
vested interests that use political donations and lobbying to gain tax subsidies and tax 
breaks. 
                                               
3
 The nuclear and clean coal options have proven financial unviable.  The levelised costs of 
renewable energy are about the same as a new coal fire plant even without considering the cost of 
the carbon emissions (Finkel 2016). Concurring detail discussions of the unviability of nuclear include 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/02/04/commentary/world-commentary/dream-cheap-clean-
nuclear-power/ and clean coal https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/05/science/kemper-coal-
mississippi.html 
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Australia benefited greatly from the commodity boom induced by China’s industrialisation, 
but with the mining boom ending, we find the benefits mainly going to the top 40% of the 
population. Compounding this concentration in wealth problem are record-breaking and 
growing underemployment, a housing bubble, underinvested in non-mining infrastructure, 
and declining economic growth and government revenues. Meanwhile total emissions 
continue to increase. (ABS 2017a; OECD 2017b; Smith, MH & Nwagbara 2017). 
It is important to distinguish between unemployment and underemployment.  Figure 1 
shows the commonly advertised unemployment rate in light grey at a minimum of 4% just 
before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008 and oscillating about 6% subsequently. 
Noting the ABS defines an employed person in a reference week as worked for one hour or 
more for pay, profit, commission or payment in kind or worked for one hour or more in a 
family business or on a farm.  However, the unemployment rate used in isolation ignores the 
underemployment rate that is now at its highest since records began in 1978 and growing, 
shown in dark blue.  Vandenbroek (2017) provides a guide to Australia’s employment 
associated rates and the ABS defines them as follows. 
 Unemployment rate: for any group, the number of unemployed persons expressed 
as a percentage of the labour force in the same group. 
 Underemployment rate: the number of underemployed workers expressed as a 
percentage of the labour force 
 Underutilisation rate: the sum of the number of persons unemployed and the 
number of persons in underemployment, expressed as a proportion of the labour 
force that is the sum of the unemployment and underemployment rates. 
Figure 1: Moderate unemployment rate hiding growing underemployment and underutilisation 
(Source: ABS 2017 6202.0 Labour Force, Australia - Table 23. Underutilised persons) 
The structure of the chapter follows.  Section 1 discusses declining demand for thermal coal 
and increasing demand for rare earth elements, disappointingly small fossil fuel royalties and 
the loss of a carbon price and resource rent tax. Section 2 discusses the decreasing full-time 
employment and exports from the Australian mining and manufacturing sectors and the 
increasing underemployment and exports from the service sectors. Notable is the growth in 
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Chinese tourists and students.  Section 3 discusses potential economic instability contagion 
linkages between the Australian and Chinese property market bubbles and their role in 
hampering inclusive growth.  Section 5 discusses areas for further research. 
2.1 Australia’s trade in fossil fuels and minerals with China  
We discuss the importance of coal to Sino-Australian trade and the sensitivity of Australia’s 
coal exports to any changes in Chinese policy or demand.  The decreasing price for 
renewable energy generation is reducing the demand for Australian thermal coal exports.  
Foreign owned mining companies are using thin capitalisation and base erosion and profit 
shifting to avoid paying company and resource rent taxes.  The demise of fossil fuels 
requires Australia to make plans to diversify its exports and maximise its revenue from 
resource rent taxes and royalties. 
Table 1 compares the world coal energy flows with Australia and China in 2014. China 
consumed just over 51% of the world’s production of coal with 18% of the world’s population, 
making China the world’s largest emissions country. In contrast, Australia consumed about 
1% of the world’s production of coal with 0.32% of the world’s population, making it one the 
world highest emissions per capita countries. Furthermore, coal is a huge part of Australia 
export base; Australia exported 85% of coal produced and its coal exports comprised 28% of 
the world’s exports. China imported about 8% of coal consumed and its imports comprised 
18% of the world’s imports, indicating China’s reducing coal consumption by 1% would 
reduce world imports by 2.4%4, assuming the 1% reduction came from imports only. This 2.4 
multiplier indicates the sensitivity of world demand to changes in China’s coal consumption.  
Determining sensitive multipliers for metallurgic and thermal coal would be informative. 
Table 1: Comparing Chinese, Australian and world coal energy flows in 2014  
Peta Joules China Australia World 
Produced 79,113 11,951 166,473 
Imported 6,468  35,259 
Exported  10,167 36,138 
Consumed 85,581 1,784  
(IEA 2017). 
Factors affecting coal consumption include (1) China’s new pollution and climate change 
policies, (2) decreasing energy intensity due to Chinese coal fired power stations’ higher 
energy efficiency and China transitioning from a manufacturing economy to a service 
economy and (3) decreasing economic activities induced by population ageing and 
deceleration in the historically high property asset prices or housing bubble.  All these factors 
contribute to a large downside risk in demand for the export of Australian coal to China.  
Chapter 3 discusses factors affecting coal consumption in more detail. 
Factors affecting coal consumption with China include both direct curtailment of coal 
generation and increasing investment in renewable energy. For instance, the China’s 
National Energy Administration (NEA) has suspended plans to build 85 coal plants5. The 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of China issued a new policy 
document targeting a share of 20% of non-fossil fuels in total energy consumption by 2030 
                                               
4
 The 2.4% is calculated from the figures within the paragraph 85,561 * 0.01 / 35,259 * 100 
5
 http://news.bjx.com.cn/html/20170116/803648.shtml 
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and of more than 50% by 2050. The NDRC expects CO2 emissions to peak by 2030 and 
aims to cap total energy demand at 6 Gt of coal equivalent (6 Gtce) by 2030, which would 
represent a 4.4 Gtce increase over the 2017 demand forecast (Enerdata 2017). China’s 
National Energy Administration (NEA) recently announced investment of 2.5 trillion yuan 
(US$361 billion) into renewable energy by 2020 6 . This investment will accelerate the 
learning curve effect to reinforce the “more for less” and marks a significant shift from coal 
generation that will help drive the increasing penetration of renewable energy to address 
climate change and displace coal generation (FS-UNEP Collaborating Centre 2017). 
Factors affecting coal consumption internationally include improving energy intensity also 
direct curtailment of coal generation and increasing investment in renewable energy. The 
Economist (2017) reports a consistent pattern across Asia of improved energy intensity, an 
increasing number of renewable energy installations, the decreasing capacity-utilisation of 
existing coal generators, the closure of old inefficient coal fired plant and the suspension or 
delay in building new coal plants.  In 2016 new investments in renewable fell from the 
previous year but the overall installed capacity increased, reflecting the decline in price per 
unit of electricity generated. Similarly, the cost of battery storage is falling rapidly, enabling 
higher penetrations of variable renewable energy (VRE) (Pinho 2017a; Turner, de Pee & 
Murphy 2017). The renewable energy price declines provide developing countries the option 
of bypassing a system of centralised coal and gas generation with large transmission and 
distribution investments to go for a system of distributed renewable energy. In a similar way, 
the introduction of mobile phones enabled developing countries to bypass the expensive 
infrastructure required for landline telephones.  The surge in the supply of cheap LNG from 
Australia and elsewhere is also competing with Australian coal exports.  This situation 
provides diminishing alternative export markets for Australian thermal coal. 
Limiting global warming to 2 degrees entails putting a limit on the amount of fossil fuels burnt 
or imposing a carbon ‘budget’ (TCI 2017).  Meeting this budget will affect coal more strongly 
than oil or gas for the following reasons. (1) Coal contains less energy per tonne of carbon 
dioxide emitted than oil or gas.  (2) Electricity from renewable energy has already reached 
parity with coal generators. (3) Electric vehicles (EVs) have yet to reach parity with internal 
combustion engine (ICE) vehicles to displace oil.  (4) Renewable alternatives for aviation 
and maritime vehicles are even further away from displacing oil.   
Helping meet this carbon budget UK and France have announced plans to eliminate the sale 
of petrol and diesel passenger vehicles by 2040 and China is working on a similar timetable 
to eliminate these vehicles. 7   The following quota system announced by the Chinese 
Government will help accelerate the price convergence of eVs with the ICE.  The planned 
2018 quota system for EVs in 2018 is for 8% of all new vehicles sales to be EVs (Clover & 
Ju 2017). Companies failing to meet the 8% quota are required to buy certificates from those 
companies that overshoot 8% target with the quota system expected to grow. This quota 
system will help accelerate EV price parity convergence with ICE vehicles, promote the 
deployment of eVs and reduce demand for oil. This quota system provides a way for the 
Australian Governments to promote eVs without the need for subsidies.  Reducing oil 
imports for Australia has both energy security and economic advantages since Australia 
                                               
6
 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-energy-renewables-idUSKBN14P06P 
7
 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-petrol-diesel-car-ban-gasoline-production-sales-
electric-cabinet-official-state-media-a7938726.html 
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lacks oil-refining facilities; Australia exports its crude oil and is dependent on value-added 
imports. Chapter 4 discusses the requirement of a 5-minute settlement period to help 
coordinate energy storage, demand side management, electric vehicle recharging and VRE 
and promote inclusive growth (Parkinson 2017). 
More than half the assets in the global coal industry are now held by companies that are 
either in bankruptcy proceedings or don't earn enough money to pay their interest bills, 
according to data compiled by Bloomberg (Fickling 2016). The bankruptcy of Peabody, the 
world’s largest publicly traded coal mining company, early in 2016 indicates the financial 
fragility of coal assets.  The Climate Institute (TCI 2017) discussed how different countries 
meeting their commitments to reduce emissions puts Australian coal assets at risk of 
becoming stranded.  In agreement, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA 
2017) identified the transition towards a zero net emissions economy as one form of climate-
related financial risk.  Figure 2 shows the value of Australia’s Economic Demonstrated 
Resources (EDR)8.  Consistent with world trend, there is the collapse of Australian black 
coal as an EDR. 
Figure 2: Value of Selected Minerals and Energy Sources, Current prices, 2005-06 to 2015-16 
 
(Source: ABS 2016a) 
During the commodity boom, the Adani Group developed plans to open a new coalmine 
called Carmichael in the Galilee Basin in Queensland, which if completed, would be 
Australia’s largest coalmine and one of the world’s largest coalmines.  Both Federal and 
Queensland Governments pledged financial support for the project, however, these plans 
ignore decreasing renewable energy prices, lower world coal prices, other countries meeting 
their emission reduction commitments and Australia’s own emission reduction commitments.  
If completed, the output from the Carmichael coalmine would put downward pressure on 
international coal prices, which would reduce the asset value of Australia’s existing coal 
mines and put them under further financial stress (Long 2017a).  The refusal by Australia’s 
                                               
8
 EDR measures the physical extent of a given resource. EDR is a measure of the resources that are established, 
analytically demonstrated or assumed with reasonable certainty to be profitable for extraction or production 
under defined investment assumptions. Classifying a mineral resource as EDR reflects a high degree of 
certainty as to the size and quality of the resource and its economic viability. 
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four major banks to finance the proposed Carmichael coalmine confirms the high risk 
associated with coal assets. There is a major disconnection between the vested interests 
promoting the coalmine and the mitigation requirement to displace coal and the economic 
transformation occurring, as renewable energy becomes cheaper than coal.   
Additionally, going ahead with the Carmichael mine bears parallels to the debacle occurring 
in the Australian gas industry induced by overinvestment (Verrender 2017a).  Australians are 
paying more than the international price for gas to subsidise overinvestment in export 
infrastructure and the gas prices for industrial users has nearly tripled in 3 years.  These 
inflated gas prices are inducing Australian electricity generator to bypass using gas as a 
transition fuel between coal and renewables because the inflated gas prices means that 
renewable energy and battery storage combinations become relatively more competitive 
than new gas generation (Vorrath 2017). This induced accelerated uptake of renewable 
energy puts further downward pressure on coal prices, which reduces the return on 
investment for all thermal coalmines in Australia.  
Lastly, Australia supporting coal exports for short-term gains is destroying Australia’s largest 
and major tourism attraction, the Great Barrier Reef. Section 2.2 discusses the increasing 
and much larger importance of tourism, education or health in terms of employment and the 
much smaller and declining importance of mining as an employer in Australia.  Given 
Australian employment is already adapting to the declining mining sector, the remaining 
question arises ‘how important is the loss of government revenue from fossil fuel royalties 
and taxes?’ 
2.1.1 Government revenue from natural resource royalties and taxes  
Figure 3 shows combined natural resource royalties and rent tax expenses for companies as 
a percentage of sales of goods.  Note the ABS “Natural Resource Royalties” definition 
includes both resource rent taxes and royalties payments under mineral lease arrangements, 
payments under quarrying lease arrangements9.  When considering revenue from rent taxes 
and royalties, one must consider government subsidies to the resource companies, including 
the reimbursement of excise duty on fuels and funding or subsidies for their other 
operational costs.  ABS (2016b) provides incomplete data on these reimbursements, but the 
two years with complete data for the coal industry shows the reimbursements are about a 
quarter of the rent taxes and royalties paid. 
                                               
9
 http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/8415.0Glossary12011-12 
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Figure 3: Natural Resource Rent Taxes and Royalties as a percentage of sales of goods 
 
(Source: ABS 2016b)  
Figure 4 shows the natural resource rent taxes and royalties as a percentage of total 
taxation revenue for all levels of government.  As discussed, these percentages 
overestimate revenue as the mining sector receives large subsidies.  The fossil fuel rent 
taxes and royalties decreased as a percentage of total taxation from about 1.4% to 1% 
between 2011-12 and 2014-15. For comparison in absolute terms, the fossil fuel rent taxes 
and royalties from oil and gas extraction and coal mining was $4.7b in 2014-15, which is less 
than the $5bin tax breaks given to housing investors, including negative gearing and capital 
gains tax concessions each year (ABS 2016b).10   This indicates the government could 
easily accommodate the loss of fossil fuel rent taxes and royalties by withdrawing these tax 
breaks.  Conversely, the fossil fuel rent taxes and royalties allowed the government to 
provide tax-breaks that mostly benefit the wealthy. The mining boom has passed and 
government revenue is declining, so the Turnbull Government is having problems sustaining 
these tax breaks and looking elsewhere to reduce government expenditure. This process 
forms a ratchet effect consisting of tax breaks in boom times and expenditure cuts in 
recessionary times to reduce the size of government (Denniss 2015).  Section 2.3 discusses 
the role of these tax breaks in exacerbating the housing bubble, impeding inclusive growth 
and reinforcing the ratchet effect.  
                                               
10
 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-25/research-calls-for-abolishing-income-tax-deduction/7356270 
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Figure 4: Natural Resource Rent Taxes and Royalties as a percentage of total taxation revenue all levels 
of government 
 
(Source: ABS 2016b; ABS 2017c) 
There is general concern that natural resource rent taxes and royalties paid by resource 
companies is inadequate compensation for the rights to sell Australia’s resources (Garnaut 
2013; Kraal 2017; McHugh 2017; Ong 2016; Verrender 2012).  Comparing tax rates for 
petroleum companies in Australia and Norway is instructive, as Norway and Australia are 
comparable and unique in belonging to a small set of countries that are developed with 
relatively small populations and heavily dependent to fossil fuels exports. Both countries are 
fortunate to have the institution stability of developed countries to reduce the corruption 
found in less-developed countries with large fossil fuel deposits.  Additionally, they are 
fortunate in having small populations to distribute intact revenues. Australia’s Petroleum 
Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) of 40 percent and company tax rate of 30 percent produce a 
combined rate of 58 percent. Norway has a combined rate of 78 percent.  Australia is in the 
fourth quintile of PRRT rates. This is incredible low by international standards. Even more so, 
when one considers Australia’s physical and institution infrastructure and peaceful 
environment compared to other developing countries with fossil fuel resources. 
So, the Turnbull Government commissioned the Australian Treasury (2017) to undertake a 
partial review on gas and oil resources.  They found that a resource rent tax (RRT) is 
theoretically more efficient than using resource royalties, as RRT only applies when a 
company is making a profit, so will not deter companies from exploration or investing in new 
marginal projects.  The downside is a delay in revenue for the government or in some cases, 
there is never any RRT revenue.  In contrast, resource royalties, based on output quantity or 
value rather than profit, provide a much earlier and consistent source of revenue for 
governments but may deter companies from developing marginal resources.   
Submissions to the Australian Treasury (2017) PRRT Review included a number of 
arguments. (1) Royalties are better than RRT because they prevent the development of 
marginal resources, so avoid exhausting Australia’s resources without revenue for the 
Australian public and prevent environmental damage with marginal economic benefit. (2) 
Supplementing royalties with RRT provides a better structure for revenue.  Extending 
argument 2, RRT transfers the financial risk of exploration from the resource companies to 
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the Australian public. See McClure, Lanis and Govendir (2017b) for discussion of RRT and 
‘uplift rates’.  (3) Australia’s existing RRT rate is too low by international standards.  
Extending Argument 3, compared to most resource rich countries, both Australia and 
Norway are secure peaceful developed countries with highly educated work forces 
supported by strong health systems and developed transport infrastructure, and both exist in 
pirate free regions of the world. Resource companies are free riding without contributing to 
these infrastructures.  Norway’s RRT rate of 78 percent rate is more appropriate for Australia. 
Furthermore, both RRT and company taxes are based on a company’s taxable profits. 
Companies are becoming increasingly adept at minimising taxable income using base 
erosion and profit shifting, including debt loading and thin capitalisation (McClure, Lanis & 
Govendir 2017a, 2017b; OECD 2013a).  These techniques are easier to arrange for 
international companies.  RRT provides added incentive for resource companies to minimise 
taxable profits.  The Australian Tax Office (ATO) reported that in 2014-15 almost 60% of 
large resource and energy companies paid no tax, in comparison 36% of all large companies 
paid no tax (Janda 2016; Liddy 2017).  The ATO initiated law suits against ExxonMobil and 
Chevron for excessively using debt loading (McClure, Lanis & Govendir 2017b).  The 
Federal Court upheld ATO’s $300 million tax bill for Chevron, which sets a precedence for 
similar debt loading tax minimisation schemes (Long 2017b).  The OECD (2013a) provides 
extensive policy recommendations to minimise base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) that 
Australia could implement to strengthen the ability of the ATO to capture tax avoidance.  
McClure, Lanis and Govendir (2017b) compare the effectiveness of different international 
royalty and rent tax regimes in addressing debt loading, using the Australian ExxonMobil and 
Chevron tax avoidance as case studies.  Their comparison provides guidance on developing 
a more robust tax regime.  Relatedly, the United Nations have developed a specialised unit 
to help countries with resource companies avoiding taxes called ‘Tax Inspectors without 
Borders’ (TIWB).11  TIWB provides an avenue for Australia to share intelligence on resource 
companies avoiding taxes and help the international community to strengthen co-operation 
on tax matters.  One of the consequences of company tax avoidance is a larger share of the 
tax burden is falling onto individuals as income tax shown in Figure 5.  This increasing 
burden has fallen mainly on the middle-income earners as the richer income-earning 
individuals can reduce their taxable income through housing investments, including negative 
gearing and capital gains tax concessions, and voluntary superannuation contributions.  The 
extremely rich can further reduce taxes using BEPS.  Consequently, the Australian tax 
system badly leaks at the top and needs repairing to ‘reduce the burden’ on individuals, and 
on those enterprises currently paying the statutory rate. 
                                               
11
 Tax Inspectors Without Borders (TIWB) http://www.tiwb.org/ 
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Figure 5: Commonwealth government tax revenue 
 
(Source: ABS 2017c) 
Political instability in resource rich countries is a well-established phenomenon (Garnaut 
2013). There are at least three notable negative aspects to the rise of the resource sector as 
a political force during the commodity boom (1) the decline in the integrity of Australia’s 
democracy, (2) reduced quality of public debate and undermining of scientific information 
and (3) the curtailment of the government’s ability to tax the resource sector.  Example 1, the 
resource sector funded a $22 million advertising campaign opposing the Mineral Resource 
Rent Tax (MRRT) plan by Labour Prime Minister Rudd. The mining donations provided the 
Coalition12 with an advantage over Labor before the election (Davis 2011).  The resource 
sector’s advertising campaign helped install the Coalition Abbott/Turnbull Government that 
repealed both the price on carbon and MRRT (Garnaut 2013).  
The resource sector’s advertising campaign was quite a cost-effective way to avoid paying 
royalties and taxes but weakened Australia’s ability to mitigate climate change, the credibility 
of the Government and its financial integrity. Consequently, the Coalition Government finds it 
difficult to balance its cash flow budget.  Example 2, the parliamentary member for Pilbara, 
Brendon Grylls, proposed increasing royalties in iron ore when the WA mining lobby spent 
up to $5 million to depose him (Dempster 2017).  Example 3, the resource sector’s major 
sponsorship goes to Coalition through political donations (Evershed 2017; Hanrahan et al. 
2017).  Turnbull (2009) described the Coalition’s climate change policy was to disguise a 
determination to do nothing.  Given about four fifths of the mining companies are owned by 
foreigners investors or companies (RBA 2011), this makes the questionable practice of 
companies making political donations even more dubious, raising questions over whose 
interests the politicians are working.  Example 4, think-tanks funded by vested-interest 
groups shape public opinions (Garnaut 2013), including the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) 
                                               
12
 The ‘Coalition’ refers to the Coalition of the Liberal and National Parties at the Federal level. 
Unfortunately, the word ‘liberal’ has a multitude of interpretations, making the title ‘Liberal Party’ 
ambiguous. See https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/liberal-meaning-origin-history. For 
reference, the Liberal Party’s philosophy bears many similarities to the American Republican Party. 
The ‘Nationals’ traditionally represented the interests of farmers. See 
http://www.parliament.curriculum.edu.au/pol_parties.htm. 
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and the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) funded by fossil fuel and tobacco companies. 
These organisations masquerade as advocates of the public good but cast doubt about 
climate change and argue for fossil fuel and tobacco’s interests (Oreskes & Conway 2011). 
Like in Australia, Carreri and Dube (2017) found the pattern of the natural resources sector 
undermining democracy by distorting elections to support right-wing governments in 
Colombia. 
In addition to government revenue from company and rent taxes and royalties, there was the 
employee income tax revenue from the mining sector during the mining boom but one has to 
compare this with the probable income tax generated without the mining boom.  The boom 
induced a rise in the exchange rate which displaced employees from other export industries, 
particularly in manufacturing, and the higher exchange rate also restrained growth in 
education, tourism and agriculture (Gittins 2016; Grudnoff 2012). Noting, the education and 
tourism export industries are relatively labour-intensive compared to mining. Section 2.2 
discusses the relative labour intensities in detail. Manufacturing is still recovering from the 
boom induced high exchange rate. As discussed, the housing investment income tax breaks 
to the wealthy would have not been possible without the surplus revenue from resources 
boom.  In summary, the difference in total Australian income tax revenue with or without the 
resource boom may be slight but the boom-time tax breaks lead to the middle-income 
earners shouldering more of the tax burden, so reducing inclusive growth. 
Furthermore, the quality of employment outcomes needs consideration.  The boom induced 
overinvestment in gas export infrastructure, tripling the domestic price of gas with 
Australians paying more than international prices for gas. These gas prices are hampering 
manufacturing’s recovery from the commodity boom. The boom induced underinvestment or 
crowded-out investment in transport infrastructure to relieve congestion in the cities to allow 
people to commute further distances to work and effectively improve the housing supply. 
Investment in transport infrastructure would improve the efficiency of Australia and provide 
for inclusive growth.  There have been some public-private-partnerships (PPPs) in the 
provisions of toll roads and tunnels. However, the PPPs road and tunnel utilisation rates 
were consistently well below forecasts.  This bias towards over forecasting enabled 
consultants and bankers to “upfront” fees before any revenue from the tolls on roads and 
tunnels that may well have failed the requirement for investment criteria if accurate forecast 
were provided.13 This situation undermines inclusive growth, both exacerbating inequity and 
undermining Australia’s productivity.  Additionally, the situation highlights problems with 
government outsourcing decisions making to private companies to obtain some perceived 
arm’s length ‘transparency’.  Problems include the misalignment between the public good 
and the objectives of consultants and bankers to maximise fees and a loss of capability 
within government to research and assess its own projects.     
2.1.2 Maximising Australia’s Government revenue from fossil fuels in the 
transition to zero net emissions and maintaining export diversification 
Australia needs to put in place plans to maximise government revenue from its remaining 
fossil fuels assets in the transition to zero net emissions and provide a pathway to diversify 
employment away from fossil fuels to renewable energy or other industries.  In the transition 
to zero net emissions, the risk of bankruptcies of fossil fuel companies will increase and 
given the large foreign ownership and use of thin capitalisation and BEPS, this will require 
                                               
13
 http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=pib 
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careful consideration for creditor liabilities and mine rehabilitation costs.  We consider the 
effects of the demise of the fossil fuel sector for Australia and Australian exports transitioning 
from being part of the climate change problem to climate change solution. 
Fossil fuels consist more than 20% of Australia’s goods and services exports, including coal 
11.6%, natural gas 5.4% and crude petroleum 3.2%.14  This is a significant part of Australian 
exports, and it is prudent putting in place pathways to diversify Australia’s exports. Currently, 
the lower exchange rate is helping to expand tourism and education exports but China 
dominates the expansion in these existing industries, which ameliorates the ability of the 
tourism and education sectors to provide diversification to moderate export risk.  Section 2.2 
discusses the transition to tourism and education that contribute 5.2% and 4.4% of 
Australia’s good and services exports. The Queensland State Government has already 
identified priority industries for development that can increase diversity of exports and import 
substitution, including advanced manufacturing, aerospace, biofuels, biomedical and life 
sciences, defence and mining equipment, technology and services. 15  Three specific 
recommends that aid Australia’s transition to zero net emissions and fall within these priority 
areas include: (1) The transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy will require the 
increasing use of rare earth elements (REE) for the electronics in the renewable energy, 
smart grids and batteries to mitigate climate change.  Australia has proven resources in 
REE.16 Investing in REE exploration and extraction, rather than supporting the dying coal 
industry responsible for climate change, provides an opportunity for the mining industry to 
support the next economic transformation and mitigate climate change. However, Australia’s 
skills and knowledge require developing in this area.17 Research and development in the 
non-renewable natural resources sector include (2) improving iron ore refining without 
metallurgic coal and (3) reducing the heat and emission in the production of cement. 
The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA 2011) estimates slightly more than four fifths of coal 
and LNG companies are foreign owned.  Foreign investment enabled Australia to develop 
the infrastructure to extract the fossil fuels quickly.  However, foreign ownership subsidiaries 
operating in Australia are unable to access imputation tax credits, so motivated to engage in 
tax minimisation, including debt loading (McClure, Lanis & Govendir 2017b). This presents 
problems for creditors who bear the solvency risk, as there is less contributed capital from 
the owners to cover debts. The solvency risk also includes failure to pay employees and 
restore the environmental damage created by fossil fuel extraction. As discussed, debt 
loading presents a problem for Government Revenue through excessive interest deductions 
for tax purposes and reliance on RRT rather than royalties, which exacerbates this situation.  
Consequently, Australian Government Revenue from fossil fuels is a tiny part of total 
Government Revenue, as shown in Figure 4, and 60% of resource companies declare no 
taxable income (Janda 2016; Liddy 2017).  Two other factors contribute to the poor revenue, 
(1) the depressed state of the fossil fuel industry and (2) the Government providing generous 
depreciation on assets and uplift rates to promote exploration and development. 
The depressed state of the global prices for fossil fuels are unlikely to recover, making it 
imperative for the Australian Governments to extract as much wealth from the resources for 
                                               
14
 http://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/trade-at-a-glance/Pages/top-goods-services.aspx 
15
 http://statedevelopment.qld.gov.au/industry-development/priority-industries.html 
16
 http://www.australianminesatlas.gov.au/aimr/commodity/rare_earths.html 
17
 http://www.abc.net.au/news/rural/rural-news/2015-09-22/rare-earth-miners-face-tough-market/6786970 
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Australians in the short term rather than provide royalty or tax holidays to fossil fuel 
companies. We have already discussed the drivers for the decline in coal prices. The decline 
in gas and oil prices is in large part due to two aspects (1) physically, the large reserves 
available in the USA from fracking for gas and shale oil and (2) legally, the USA lifting a ban 
on the export of crude oil in December 2015 and gas in 2016. On the oil supply side, OPEC 
traditionally used its cartel power to restrict supply to maintain high oil prices but the USA will 
supply the global market with shale oil once prices begin to rise.  This shale oil reserve in 
effect has destroyed the market power of the OPEC cartel (Pinho 2017b). Oil is trading at 
free market prices.  On the oil demand side, the introduction of electric vehicles will weaken 
demand for oil. The increasing demand from developing countries will offset this decline in 
demand from developed countries over the medium term. Initially, the international gas price 
linkage to oil prices caused the decline in international gas prices. Additionally, there has 
been a convergence in the four major global prices of gas, USA’s Henry Hub, UK’s National 
Balancing Point (NBP), Japan Korea Marker (JKM) and JCC/Brent oil index, toward the 
lowest priced Henry Hub in the USA (Wyeno & Chowdhury 2016).  This increasing gas 
supply from fracking in USA is constraining gas prices. As the USA develops its export 
infrastructure, there will be three major suppliers shipping LNG to East Asia, including Qatar, 
Australia and USA (Salameh 2016). Joining the shipping supply, there is supply to East Asia 
via pipeline from surrounding countries. Existing pipelines include from Turkmenistan to 
Shanghai.  Under construction pipelines, include one from Russia to Northeast China and 
Korea for completion 201918 and one from Myanmar to Yunnan, China’s twin gas and crude 
oil pipelines.19 There is a proposal to build another gas pipeline from Russia to North West 
China. Chapter 3 discusses China’s plans to expand its gas generation fleet, which will 
increase demand for gas but the additional new large sources of gas supply coming online 
both by sea and overland will suppress any price increases. 
Regarding the financial liability incurred by the mining sector for mining site rehabilitation, an 
early study estimates that 50,000 abandoned mines require rehabilitation in Australia.20  A 
more recent estimation puts the number of abandoned mines at 60,000.21  Poor data makes 
establishing the exact figures difficult but the rate of successfully rehabilitated mines in 
Australia is extremely low.  During the mining boom, the focus was building mines, with less 
consideration or inadequate consideration paid to rehabilitation. As discussed, the 
coalmining companies holding these rehabilitation liabilities are financially fragile and the thin 
capitalisation leaves little capital for rehabilitation costs that are often underestimated 
(Campbell, R et al. 2017). This situation potentially leaves Australia to pay for the 
rehabilitation of the mines and in effect provide the mining industry with another subsidy.  As 
the mining boom ends, the Australian Governments are assessing the adequacy of 
rehabilitation legislation and financial reserves held by mining companies for rehabilitation 
shown in the following list. 
 Federal Senate inquiry into the rehabilitation of mining and resource projects due 23 
August 2017. 
 Victoria is reviewing its financial assurance policy for coalmines. 
                                               
18
 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-03/16/content_28581640.htm 
19
 https://www.ft.com/content/21d5f650-1e6a-11e7-a454-ab04428977f9 
20
 https://theconversation.com/what-should-we-do-with-australias-50-000-abandoned-mines-18197 
21
 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-15/australia-institute-report-raises-concerns-on-mine-
rehab/8270558 
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 South Australia has an ongoing comprehensive review of mining laws that started in 
2016. 
 Queensland is reviewing its financial assurance mechanisms and related 
considerations of the rehabilitation framework (Queensland Government 2017). 
 New South Wales is conducting as audit of the adequacy of mining rehabilitation 
security deposits. 
 Northern Territory is developing mine closure guidelines. 
 Western Australia is reviewing its Mining Rehabilitation Fund regulations. 
 
Five recommendations to maximise Government Revenue from fossil fuels in the transition 
to zero net emissions include: 
 
 examining other countries’ legislation for best practice (McKinsey 2017), 
 switching from RRT to a combined RRT and royalties like Norway’s 78 percent RRT 
regime,  
 reducing asset depreciation and ‘uplift rates’ to transfer the risk of investment from 
the Government to the fossil fuel companies,  
 eliminating political donations from the mining sector and related entities, and 
 banning advertising by the mining sector prior to and during any elections. 
 
 
2.2 The employment market adjusting to the end of the commodity 
boom 
We discuss the destructive effect of the commodity boom on fulltime employment in the 
manufacturing sector, the initially low and declining employment in the mining sector, the 
expanding employment in the service sector and the increase in the underemployment rate 
impeding inclusive growth. 
Figure 6 shows Australia’s world breaking record of non-recessionary growth or increase in 
GDP for 104 quarters, but this growth in part is due to population growth, including an 
increases in births over deaths and net immigration (Verrender 2017b).  GDP per capita 
shows Australia in negative growth in 2009 and only a modest recovery since the Global 
Financial Crisis.  The low and negative GDP per capita growth is partly the result of 
underemployment or reduced wage rates and inadequate infrastructure expenditure to 
match the increase in population (Productivity Commission 2016; Verrender 2017b).  The 
increased construction employment induced during the investment phase of the commodity 
boom is over and the minimal employment sustained by the operations and maintenance 
phase of the boom has begun (EABER & CCIEE 2016).   
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Figure 6: Australian percentage change in GDP and GDP per capita (Chain volume measure) June figures 
(Source: ABS 2016 5204.0 - Australian System of National Accounts, 2015-16) 
Regarding the lack of capital investment, Coalition recently changed its interpretation of the 
budget deficit from “Underlying cash balances” to “Net operating balance” on the national 
accounts reflecting change from cash flow to accrual basis to interpret the deficit (Stiles 
2017b).  The “Underlying cash balances” approach equates to “austerity” measures that 
Ostry, Loungani and Fureceri (2016) found in an international comparative study to 
exacerbated inequality and hamper economic growth. The “deficit” redefinition allows 
investment in infrastructure without increasing the deficit and is consistent with long standing 
calls from the RBA and Labor for investment in infrastructure.  The redefinition also brings 
Australia into line with New Zealand and Canada. However, Coalition’s recent redefinition 
merely reverses an older decision made by the former Coalition Treasurer Costello who 
defined the deficit in terms of cash flow (Hutchens 2017). In addition to restricting 
government investments, Costello’s cash flow definition or austerity measures put in place a 
process to shrink the size of the government, a ratchet effect of tax cuts in boom times and 
expenditure cuts during recessions (Denniss 2015).  Section 2.3 discusses the tax cuts and 
infrastructure expenditure in more detail.  These budget definitions and tax cuts are 
important if the government is to lead an inclusive growth strategy based the elimination of 
economic rents and investments to mitigate emission as suggested by the OECD (2017e).   
Both the Australian and Chinese economies are transitioning from manufacturing to service 
focused (EABER & CCIEE 2016).  Contrastingly, China had a rapid increase in the size of 
manufacturing sector during the boom, while the size of the Australian manufacturing sector 
continued its pre-boom decline.  Figure 7 shows Australian employment by industry in 
thousands; manufacturing is steadily declining shown in blue; three service sectors shown in 
dashed lines are steadily increasing, mining shown in black is declining after peaking in the 
commodity boom; construction shown in brown is oscillating reflecting both the mining boom 
and housing bubble. Note Figure 7 shows the total mining employment of which coal mining 
comprises 23% and oil and gas extraction comprises between 9% and 12% from 2012 to 
2015 (ABS 2016b).  Importantly in the transition to zero net emissions, the employment in 
the fossil fuel component of mining comprises about one third of total mining employment. 
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Figure 7: Australian employment by industry in thousands of people as at the end of June each year 
(Source: ABS 2016 Cat. No. 81550DO001_201415 Australian Industry, 2014-15, table 6) 
The result of the mining boom for Australia was a reduction in full time jobs in the trade-
exposed manufacturing sector and increase in part-time and casual job in the service sector 
or underemployment (EABER & CCIEE 2016; Gittins 2016).  WEF (2017) ranked Australia’s 
underemployment as 25th of 28 countries in its assessment of employment productivity.  
OECD (2017c) and WEF (2017) state that Australia’s growing underemployment is one 
factor inhibiting inclusive growth and recommend training and education to address a skills 
mismatch 
The tourism industry plays an important and growing role Australia’s economy and to its 
communities but this role is at risk from assets compromised by climate change.  Tourism 
employs 15 times more people than coal mining and can help transition Australia to a low 
carbon economy (Hughes et al. 2018).  The rapid rise in tourism numbers, particularly from 
Mainland China proffers scope for further employment but the lack of trained people with the 
soft and hard skills necessary to fill these roles, the casual employment with low pay and 
perceived low status of jobs in the tourism industry are issues that require addressing (Chai 
et al. 2017). We discuss the transition dynamics in Australia and the potential role for the 
tourism industry in the transition to zero net emissions. 
As the demand for Australia’s commodities decreased, Australia’s floating exchange rate 
depreciated, providing an automatic adjustment mechanism to encourage import substitution 
industries and alterative export industry such as the tourist and education industries.  Figure 
8 shows the relatively flat tourism number during the commodity boom while the Australian 
exchange rate was high and the dramatic increase in tourism number after the commodity 
boom.  Gittins (2016) discusses the automatic processes in place enabling Australia’s 
economy to adapt to declining coal demand from China and elsewhere.  The Australian 
economy is already adjusting to the loss of coal exports and tourism provides more 
employment than mining per unit of GDP.  The Great Barrier Reef is one of Australia’s major 
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tourist attractions supporting the tourism industry.  Australian Governments subsidising the 
dying coal industry to build further mines is subsidising the destruction of the Great Barrier 
Reef.  The subsidies are impairing the development of a sustainable industry for an 
unsustainable industry. Section 2.1 discussed the Federal and Queensland Government 
financial support for the Carmichael coalmine.  
Figure 8: Total monthly short-term visitor arrivals to Australia seasonally adjusted – ABS 3401.0 
Figure 9 shows linear growth trend in the number of short-term visitors from NZ and an 
exponential growth trend in visitors from mainland China. The monthly number of Mainland 
Chinese visitors has most probably already surpassed those from NZ.  
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Figure 9: Monthly Australia short-term visitor arrivals seasonally adjusted – ABS 3401.0 
 
As discussed, major issues facing the expansion of the tourism industry include the lack of 
trained people with the soft and hard skills, the casual employment with low pay and 
perceived low status (Chai et al. 2017). 
Technical and further education (TAFE) tourism courses already exist to train people. 
Heavily subsidising the courses would help to encourage people into tourism but a review of 
the courses would be required to ensure they are meeting the soft and hard skills identified 
by Chai et al. (2017). Developing foreign language skills is a new requirement, as 
traditionally many visitors came from English speaking countries, such as, NZ, UK, HK, 
Singapore, Canada and the USA. Foreign language skills really take many years to develop, 
so a language component of a tourism course at TAFE would ideally be an extension of skill 
already built in high school. 
Advertising could alter the perceived low status of tourism employment but the low pay and 
casual employment remain an issue.  Factors that are or will amplify the negative aspect of 
low pay and causal employment include at least two factors. (1) The housing bubble is 
making it difficult for median income Australians to buy housing, as discussed in Section 2.3.  
(2) The push for privatising health, education and retirement income makes reliance on 
quality of publicly funded health, public schools and pensions uncertain.  These aspects 
need considering by anybody entering the tourism profession. Alternatively, the governments 
could pursue inclusive growth policies that would allow people to enter lower paid 
occupations without becoming part of the working poor. 
The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) could further aid the transition from coal to tourism and 
other industries by reducing interest rates.  This would help increase company investment 
and employment generally and help depreciate the Australia dollar to further aid the tourism 
industry.  However, the RBA is reluctant to reduce the interest rate further as it would 
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exacerbate the Australian housing bubble, blunting RBA’s use of interest rates as a policy 
instrument to ameliorate the underemployment. 
The casualization of employment or shift from fulltime to part-time employment, usually in 
the service sector, is hampering inclusive growth.  The usual solution of training or education 
by the OECD (2017c) and WEF (2017) in isolation will be insufficient to address this issue. 
2.3 Property market bubbles reducing inclusive growth 
Commercial real estate became the largest target of Chinese Overseas Direct Investment 
(ODI) in Australia at 36% in 2016. Chinese Overseas Direct Investment in Australia or 
Foreign Direct Investment from China to Australia.  Residential developments made up 51% 
of the commercial real estate ODI; other real estate ODI includes tourism and retail. NSW 
received 53% of Chinese ODI.  The Chinese Government is increasingly concerned about 
excessive capital outflow and the lack of due diligence in purchases of foreign investments 
that are over leveraged (Ferguson et al. 2017). Both Australia and China are experiencing 
asset bubbles in their property markets. The following two mechanisms link the Chinese and 
Australian property market bubbles.  (1) Chinese properties are built using Australian 
metallurgic and thermal coal and iron ore. (2) Chinese people who own real estate or mining 
investments in Australia and own real estate investments in China.  These linkages have the 
potential for contagious market instability as both Chinese and Australian property markets 
are highly leveraged. 
We could use the working definition of a bubble as prices above some agreed definition of a 
‘fundamental’ value or the repayment obligations exceeding capacity to repay.  A 
fundamental value perhaps based on the rental income exceeding the sum of the interest 
rate payments and deprecation.  However, one factor of interest repayments is the market 
value of the property based on the market value of surrounding properties. This fundamental 
value becomes self-referential within the bubble. Regarding the other definition, the 
repayment obligation exceeding capacity to repay is contingent on capital gains.  This 
definition only identifies a bubble when capital gains cease that is when buyers cease 
purchasing at ever-higher assets prices because they no longer expect capital gains to cover 
the costs of the asset purchase.  This housing bubble definition bears many similarities to 
pyramid marketing where the pyramid collapses only when there lack new buyers.  The first 
definition is self-referential and the second definition only identifies a bubble in hindsight.  
The Global Financial Crisis provides an example of the hindsight definition of a bubble that is 
the inadequacy and difficulty of government and financial agencies and the public in 
predicting or identifying a bubble during the bubble but consensus after the bubble.  More 
usefully, Professor Steven Keen was the first to predict the Global Financial Crisis based on 
credit expansion via the financial sector.22 Importantly, making the bubble difficult to identify, 
the credit expansion occurs in both the primary and secondary markets, consisting newly 
built and previously owned housing, respectively, but the national accounts only record 
newly built houses and are oblivious to a major source of inflation in the secondary market.  
We define a bubble as an unsustainable capital gains expectation fuelled credit expansion 
with special reference to the secondary market. 
Tackling these asset bubbles is important for two reasons. (1) The asset bubble is creating 
landlord and tenant classes, preventing the less financially able from buying their own home. 
                                               
22
 https://rwer.wordpress.com/2010/05/13/keen-roubini-and-baker-win-revere-award-for-economics-2/ 
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Both factors undermine inclusive growth and social stability. (2) Both the Japanese asset 
price bubble collapse and the more recent Global Financial Crisis provide examples of 
property market collapses that disproportionately affect the most financial vulnerable within 
prolonged recoveries.  
In Australia, there are vested interests in perpetuating the housing bubble including: 
 Property, Construction, Finance and Insurance industries 
 96% of politicians own property versus 50% of the general population 
 50% of politicians own investment properties versus 10% of the general population 
and the investment properties are predominately owned by members of the Coalition 
(McGhee 2017a) 
 Political donations from the Property, Construction, Finance and Insurance industries 
to both Coalition and Labor but predominately Coalition (Evershed 2017; Hanrahan 
et al. 2017).  The Coalition currently forms the government. 
 Landlords with negative gearing and capital gains tax concessions, predominately 
with Coalition voter profiles 
 State Governments receiving stamp duty as a percentage of each sale, see Figure 
10. Taxes on property are becoming an increasing proportion of State revenue. 
Figure 10: State Government Revenue – Comparing increasing taxes on property with other taxes 
 
(Source ABS Cat. No. 5506.0 - Taxation Revenue, Australia, 2015-16) 
There are at least six drivers perpetuating the housing bubble, including: 
 Population increase due to more births than deaths and net immigration 
 Trend toward more single people living alone and single parents 
 Two tax breaks, negative gearing and capital gains tax concessions 
 Increase in untenanted residences both for capital gains and as second residences 
 Breakdown in government provision of affordable housing 
 Irrational exuberance (Schiller 2000) 
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Regarding irrational exuberance and tax breaks, house prices have risen much more quickly 
than rental prices and the rate of addition of new housing stock is greater than population 
growth.  If there really were a housing supply shortage, rents would also be skyrocketing, as 
they did in mining towns during the minerals boom. This indicates that the housing bubble is 
driven largely by capital gains speculation and irrational exuberance (ABS 2007; Holman 
2017; Janda 2017a; Murphy 2017).  While policies addressing supply side constraints are 
important over the long-term, the immediate and addressable issues are the policies driving 
the speculation. Two tax breaks, negative gearing and capital gains tax concessions, help 
explain both the unnecessary policy induced component of the property market bubble and 
the concentration of wealth in the richest two quintiles in Australia during the mining boom 
found by the OECD (2017b). Concurring, Australian Tax Office data shows that negatively 
gearing benefits the rich the most and the number of negatively geared properties owned per 
landlord has increased from 2013 to 2015, showing accelerating concentration of wealth 
(Burgess 2017; Jericho 2017a). The two tax breaks present a mechanism for wealthy 
Australians to concentrate wealth.  The deregulation of the banking sector allows investors 
to access interest only loans to help them leverage their current property housing 
investments to buy more properties.  The induced higher property prices, which benefit the 
investor class, have trapped an increasing proportion of Australians as tenants.  Who will 
enter retirement as tenants and for those managing to buy a property, the higher property 
prices make it difficult to pay their mortgage and reduce their ability to save for retirement. 
The tax breaks make Australia’s tax system extremely regressive and reduces government 
revenue. Both factors undermine inclusive growth. Key solutions to reducing the bubble 
pressure include removing the two tax breaks for landlords. These solutions are 
straightforward but the vested interests mentioned make implementation intractable.  
Nevertheless, the Australian Labor Party took these solutions to the 2016 federal elections. 
Further reducing inclusive growth are political donations and corruption in the property 
market (Murray & Frijters 2016; Taylor, L 2016), compounding the situation are political 
donation laws that are easily circumvented  (McGhee 2017b).  Politicians are estimated to 
gift $11 billion a year to well-connected and lobbyist-hiring property developers (Murray 
2017).  This huge gift incentivises political donations and the gift destroys inclusive growth 
by concentrating wealth among property developers and depleting government revenue for 
infrastructure development to help productivity. Of course, the politicians required to 
eliminate the political donations would lose their political donations, presenting a problem of 
lock-in. Hence, there has been little progress in eliminating political donations. Eliminating 
political donations would improve both the perceived and real integrity of Australia’s 
democracy to make decisions for the public good rather than for vested-interests (Lewis, C 
2016).  Additionally, adopting the ACT’s method of land rezone can reduce the size of the 
gift where councils sell property development rights to property developers. Reducing the 
size of the gift reduces the incentive for property developers to engage in political donations, 
lobbying and corruption. 
In addition to the elimination of political donations, ideally, those politicians owning 
investment properties would exercise fiduciary integrity over conflict of interest and excuse 
themselves from voting or drafting policy regarding investment properties (McGhee 2017a). 
Chapter 5 discusses political donations further. 
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Population increases from natural growth and immigration, currently about 1.5%23 , is a 
further driver for the housing bubble.  Reducing immigration provides another policy lever to 
reduce the housing price bubble and increase inclusive growth within Australia but 
eliminating the tax breaks provides a primary policy to control the bubble and increase 
inclusive growth.  If Australia is to benefit from immigration, Australia needs to provide 
adequate infrastructure including housing; otherwise, immigration serves only to depress 
wages and fuel the housing bubble to provide increasing capital gains and economic rents 
for those already owing investment properties (EABER & CCIEE 2016; Productivity 
Commission 2016; Verrender 2017b).  The absorptive capacity of Australia at any time 
requires consideration to determine the optimum number of immigrants. As discussed in 
Section 2.2, Australia’s world breaking record of non-recessionary growth for 104 quarters is 
due to immigration masking the recessions in GDP per capita.  The recessions in GDP per 
capita indicate underemployment or reduced wage rates and poor infrastructure and 
immigration policy (Productivity Commission 2016; Verrender 2017b). 
A more streamline way to determine the optimal number of immigrants requires development. 
The recent ad-hoc changes to replace the work Visa 457 with visas specifying stricter 
requirements for only highly skilled people unavailable in Australia would help relieve both 
underemployment and the housing bubble (Probyn 2017) but serves to distract attention 
away from the two tax breaks. The original intent of Visa 457 was to allow for temporary 
immigration of people with skills matching shortages in the Australia labour market but these 
temporary visas were often used as step towards permeant residency.24  The passing of the 
mining boom requiring specialist workers, Australia’s record underemployment and general 
decline in absorptive capacity justify suspending the 457 Visa.  However, these changes are 
too late and driven by populist motives rather than a concern for sustainable growth, or a 
moderation in property prices.  Developing some rules to determine the optimal number of 
immigrants each quarter based on economic conditions would remove the contentious 
nature of immigration and help the newly arrived immigrants find jobs and accommodation 
when each segment of the labour market is more absorptive.  For instance, extending the 
RBA’s remit to set quarterly immigration quotas would enable better management of 
economic growth and inflation in conjunction with the Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection. Prospective immigrants would require ranking to target specific labour shortages 
in occupations such as nursing and teaching and target occupations extracting economic 
rents such as medical specialist. 
However, even with zero net immigration, there is still natural population growth of about 
0.7% per annum driving property prices.  Notably, Australia’s major cities are the focus of the 
housing bubble and (Stiles 2017a).  These cities also attract the largest number of 
immigrants and foreign investors. Relevantly, the annual increase in residential property 
prices to the December Quarter 2016 in Sydney and Melbourne are 10.3% and 10.8%, 
respectively.25   
The following demand redistribution and supply constraints reduction methods could 
accommodate the increase of 1.5% increase in population growth include.  
                                               
23
 http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3101.0 
24
 https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/apr/18/australian-government-abolish-457-temporary-
work-visa 
25
 http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/6416.0 
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 Encouraging higher density accommodation in the inner-city areas using a tax on 
land rents rather than stamp duties. A tax on land rents would make land expensive 
to own, encouraging people to sell land of low population density within densely 
populated areas (Bentley & D'Cruz 2016; Ingles 2016).  Additionally, stamp duty is 
volatile and accounts for about one third of the State Governments revenue; a land 
tax would provide a steadier revenue stream. Importantly, the move to a tax on land 
rent would reduce the deposit gap for first home and improve liquidity in the property 
market as existing homeowners can more easily sell and buy houses without 
suffering a major capital loss from the stamp duty. The changes to higher density 
living would require appropriate changes to zoning and by-laws.  Figure 11 compares 
Australia’s land, timber mineral and energy assets per capital. In 2015-16, land 
accounted for 83% of the value of Australia's environmental assets, which would 
provide a substantial base for a tax. However, gaining support for a change to a land 
tax would be difficult in isolation and its acceptance would be more likely as part of a 
wider set of changes as promoted in the 2010 Henry Tax Review (Garnaut 2013; 
Ingles 2016).  Chapter 5 discusses the requirement for a land tax as part of wider tax 
review. 
Figure 11: Comparing Australia's land, timber, mineral and energy assets per capita 
 
(Source: ABS 2016a) 
 Improving transport infrastructure so people can live further from works, concurrent 
with the Grattan Institute favouring infrastructure expenditure (Galletta 2017). 
 Relocating work to less densely populated areas, examples include Queensland 
Government headquartering their amalgamated distribution network company in 
Townsville and the Korean Government relocating departments to outside Seoul. The 
Federal Government is also advocating moving departments to rural locations (Vidot 
2017).  In South Korea, many Government workers maintain a residence in both 
Seoul and the vicinity of the newly located department.  The Federal Department 
relocations could exacerbate the housing bubble in the short-term. In contrast, the 
Grattan Institute labelled the decentralisation push as inefficient and favoured 
spending more on infrastructure within the major cities to make the cities more 
liveable (Galletta 2017). 
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 Relocating military bases from cities to rural areas would allow the auctioning of land 
and military housing stock and promote rural economies (Holman 2017).  This move 
would also allow for improvement of the city infrastructure.  For example, Enoggera 
Barracks in Brisbane lies close to the central business district and two extremely 
congested commuter roads pass each side of the base between major residential 
areas and the central business district.  A road through the base connecting the 
Northwest Brisbane suburbs to central Brisbane would reduce commuting time for all 
the residence living in Northwest.  An analysis of all military bases for sale and 
relocation with the ability to improve city infrastructure and road structure requires 
implementing.   
Some Australians perceive foreign investors as a major source of housing bubble pressure 
but newer legislation restricts foreign investors to buying new properties.  This legislation 
ensures that foreign investment adds to the supply of housing stock. If Australia were to 
eliminate capital gains tax concessions and negative gearing, some of the speculative 
foreign investment for capital gains would evaporate.  The Federal Government released 
plans in the 2017 budget to remove the capital gains tax concessions for foreign owners 
(Tan 2017) and limit the investment by foreign owners to 50% of new property developments. 
As foreign investment is limited to new development, these changes will reduce the supply of 
new properties (Tan 2017). 
There is the issue of property buyers leaving properties untenanted, solely looking for capital 
gains. This would exacerbate the housing bubble by reducing effective supply. Unfortunately, 
there is a lack of statistics on untenanted dwellings and the issues of untenanted definition 
and misidentifying empty residences as untenanted dwellings when owners keep a second 
property for their own use. Again, if Australia were to eliminate capital gains tax concessions 
and negative gearing, some of the speculative investment for capital gains only would 
evaporate and property investors would more likely base their investment decisions on rental 
incomes. Additionally, if eliminating capital gains tax concessions and negative gearing were 
to fail to address the untenanted investment properties issue, introducing a surcharge or 
additional land tax for empty dwellings could help address this issue. This untenanted 
dwelling issue is a problem in other major cities around the world.  We leave the 
investigation of solutions to the untenanted property problem for further research.  The 
Federal Government released plans in the 2017 budget to introduce a vacancy tax of at least 
$5,000 for unoccupied dwellings but this is a token amount and unlikely to deter investors 
(Tan 2017).   
The Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute (AHURI 2017) provides a number of 
recommendations to improve the efficiency of government in providing low cost housing. 
Removing the two tax breaks would both allow the housing market to function more 
efficiently to provide lower cost housing and provide revenue to support government funded 
low cost housing. The Centre for Independent Studies (CIS 2017), a think-tank funded by the 
tobacco and fossil fuel industries, argued for no increases in support for the financially 
vulnerable via public housing and for the private sector to take over public housing. However, 
this argument ignores the fact that the private sector is in a housing bubble and channelling 
more money into the bubble would further consolidate the dynamics of negative gearing and 
capital gains tax concessions to exacerbate the concentration of wealth previously discussed.  
Public housing addresses market failure.  For instance, Anglicare in a major survey of rental 
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accommodation found only less than 2% were affordable for single households receiving 
government welfare and single people on a disability pension could afford only 0.87% of 
rental properties nationwide (Jericho 2017b). 
In addition to the problems discussed, the bubble has other adverse effects on inclusive 
growth. (1) The bubble diverts investment away from other more productivity enhancing 
investments such as infrastructure and renewable energy.  (2) The RBA is unable to lower 
interest rate to promote employment, as lower interest rates would further inflate the housing 
bubble. (3) The buying and selling of existing housing occurs outside the national accounts.  
Therefore, measures such as the consumer price index (CPI) fail to account for the increase 
in the cost of existing housings in the bubble.  This masks the increasing financial burden of 
the bubble and intergenerational transfers caused by the housing bubble (Janda 2017b).  
The RBA assumes there is zero net expenditure by the household sector in these 
transactions, so the RBA ignores these transactions in CPI calculations. This assumption is 
also a major flaw in a major economic model used to model housing bubbles called Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) that left many economists blind to the possibility of a 
Global Financial Crisis.  Chapter 5 discusses DSGE and a replacement model, Stock Flow 
Consistency/Agent-based Model (SFC/ABM) that incorporates the bubble inducing 
transactions outside the national accounts (Caiani et al. 2016).   
2.4 Further research 
The interrelatedness of inclusive growth and climate change adaptation and mitigation 
covers nearly every aspect of the economy and beyond the scope of this report, so we list 
the more important issues for further research. 
 Population ageing slowing economic growth and increasing fiscal pressure  
 Obesity epidemic reducing inclusive growth 
 Privatising education reducing inclusive growth and undermining democracy 
 Privatising health reducing inclusive growth 
 Trade agreements, economic rent and base erosion and profit shifting   
 Coalition’s direct action reducing inclusive growth 
2.5 Conclusion 
The transition to a low emission economy affects every part of the economy and acts as a 
major stress test on both Government and private sector’s decision-making to ensure 
investments are consistent with a low carbon future and avoid creating stranded assets.  The 
increase in inequality, underemployment and mediocre economic growth per capita requires 
addressing within the transition to a low carbon future.  That requires being together the 
climate change and inclusive growth agendas (OECD 2017d, 2017e). 
The increase in service sector employment is overwhelming the decline in mining sector 
employment.  The rapid rise in tourism numbers, particularly from China, represents further 
opportunity for Australia in this high employment sector.  There exist similar opportunities 
and trends in the education of overseas students.  However, Australia requires trained 
people and adequate infrastructure to make the most of these opportunities. 
Within the mining sector, the decline in employment in fossil fuel extract will be sightly offset 
with employment in rare earth elements extraction.  However, four larger issues than 
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employment arise with fossil fuels.  (1) Australia’s high exposure to fossil fuel assets and the 
financial risked associated with potential stranded assets.  The G20 Task Force on Climate 
related Financial Disclosures 26 , 27  is developing reporting standards for companies to 
disclose their climate change physical and transition risks, using scenario based analysis, to 
the market.  Adopting these reporting standards would improve the ability to price the risk.  
Chapter 6 discusses pricing climate change risk further.  (2) There is loss of revenue from 
royalties and resource rent taxes on fossil fuel extraction.  Putting this in perspective, the tax 
breaks within the building sector, including negative gearing and capital gains tax 
concession, represent a similar loss of government revenue.  Reversing these tax breaks 
would ameliorate the revenue loss from royalties and resource rent taxes on fossil fuel.  (3) 
By international standards, Australia has performed poorly at deriving royalties and resource 
taxes from the sale of its fossil fuel deposits.  The international carbon budget for burning 
fossil fuel is limited.  This situation presents the requirement to extract as much rent from the 
sale of Australia’s fossil fuels deposits within the given carbon budget and deferring 
investment in new fossil fuel extraction sites.  (4)  The loss of fuel excise duty requires 
replacing with road user charges to fund infrastructure investments and maintenance. 
The lax taxing in the mining and building sector and the political donations from these 
sectors presents a conflict of interest in making decisions in the best interest of the 
electorate.  The lax taxation also exacerbates inequality. Chapter 5 discusses political 
donations as a barrier to solving wicked problem. 
The increase in inequality and poor economic growth found in Australia is an international 
phenomenon.  The onset of increasing inequality coincided with the introduction of neoliberal 
policies.  Ostry, Loungani and Fureceri (2016) members of the IMF staff found that neoliberal 
policies were oversold with some polices setting up adverse loops that prominently 
increased inequality and hampered economic growth.  Ostry, Loungani and Fureceri (2016) 
called for a shift from faith in neoliberal policies to evidence-based policy development. 
Chapter 5 discusses the unrealistic models of the economy and human behaviour supporting 
the faith in the neoliberal policies.  These models act to misinform policies and form another 
barrier to solving wicked problems.  Chapter 4 focuses on the neoliberal policies in the 
Australian electricity market and electricity price rises that are exacerbating inequality and, in 
particular, the misguided model of human behaviour within the retail sector. 
The failure to address inequality and climate change is two of a host of interrelated wicked 
problems that Australian adversarial politics and political wedging is ill equipped to address.  
This failure is most apparent in coordinating infrastructure expenditure with the requirement 
to factor in climate change risk and mitigation.  Chapter 5 discusses adversarial politics and 
political wedging as one of the barriers to solving wicked problems.   
The requirement for adequate infrastructure for the increases in overseas visitors becomes 
more presenting with Australia’s population expected to rise rapidly.  Chapter 5 and 6 
discuss the requirement to bring together economic growth and climate policy together.  This 
combining of policy is particularly important in infrastructure expenditure.  To that end, 
Consult Australia (2018) recommends establishing an independent body to provide 
transparency to plan, assess, and prioritise infrastructure projects across all bodies in 
                                               
26
 https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/ 
27 
https://theconversation.com/the-g20s-new-guidelines-will-help-investors-tackle-climate-change-80612 
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Australia.  Acknowledging, Infrastructure Australia does provide independence but many 
legislatures lack independence, which in turn undermines the independence of Infrastructure 
Australia.  Similarly, there is a requirement to bring together energy and climate change 
policies.  To that end, the Integrated System Plan (AEMO 2017) also provides transparency 
and will help efficiently coordinate the separate state based renewable energy targets, 
transmissions requirements and the retirement of the coal generators across Australia’s 
National Electricity Market.  Chapter 4 and 6 discusses the requirement to integrate energy 
and climate policy.  The independence and transparency is important to reduce corruption 
and pork barrelling.28  
  
                                               
28
 http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/pork-barrelling-undermining-public-trust-says-
former-turnbull-minister-darren-chester-20180119-h0lf4f.html 
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3 China’s electricity sector and mitigation policies 
3.1 Introduction 
The coal generators in China’s electricity sector contribute a major part of China’s carbon 
emissions, placing pressure on emission mitigation efforts.29  For instance, in 2013, China 
generated 78.2% of its electricity from coal.  China’s goals of emissions mitigation and 
sustainable development involved both energy efficiency improvements and the deployment 
of renewable energy in the electricity sector. To achieve these goals, China applied various 
measures, including legislation, pricing mechanism, financial incentives, emission trading 
schemes and demand side management. 
There is a consensus that energy efficiency advancement and renewable energy 
deployment correlate strongly with effective policies and regulations and China faces many 
challenges in developing suitable policies and regulations (Jiang, Sun & Liu 2010; Li et al. 
2011; Wang, Zhao & Chi 2014; Zhang, S & He 2013; Zhao et al. 2011). Five key challenges 
include (1) the dominance of coal as an energy source due to China’s resource endowment, 
(2) a significant waste of renewable energy caused by the failure to connect to the electricity 
grids, (3) lack of innovation in regional policy, (4) incomplete financing system for renewable 
energy projects, and (5) inadequate investment in the technical research and development 
for renewable energy. 
Institutional shortcomings have also received some attention.30  Wang, Zhao and Chi (2014) 
discusses a lack of coordination and consistency in regulation and governance, and the 
enforcement of policies is incomplete as the regulatory system is weak. The dominance of 
state ownership is one constraint on the effectiveness of regulatory regimes via the conflict 
of interest between ownership and regulation. This situation calls for better separation of the 
regulatory and ownership entities.  Privatisation is one possibility but noting privatisation in 
the electricity has had many problems in Australia. Chapter 4 discusses the problems 
occurring in Australia’s privatised electricity sector. 
Another missing element in the Chinese electricity system is a market mechanism to provide 
pricing for time of supply (ToS) and time of use (ToU) to reward generators for meeting peak 
demand periods and to induce customers to reduce their demand during peak demand 
periods, respectively. The ToU pricing contributes to demand side management (DSM).  
Although, China has conducted pilot schemes that use command-and-control approaches to 
imitate ToU pricing for DSM and ToS pricing for the dispatch of generators in a scheme 
called ‘Energy Saving Power Dispatch’ (ESPD).  However, this lack of ToU and ToS price 
mutes the effectiveness of China’s emissions trading scheme or price on carbon. In 
comparison, Australia lacks an emissions trading scheme or carbon price but has ToU 
pricing in some limited areas and ToS pricing only in the wholesale market. 
The structure of Chapter 2 follows. Subsection 2 provides an overview of the Chinese 
electricity sector.  Subsections 3 to 6 discuss China’s energy efficiency and renewable 
                                               
29
 For instance, according to National Bureau of Statistics of China, in 2012, coal combusted in the electricity 
generation accounted for over 50% of China’s total coal supply. See 
http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01. 
30
 Through affecting information and transaction costs, institutions may facilitate or constrain reform 
performance and policy implementation (Erdogdu & Erkan 2013). In China, institutional environment is 
regarded as one of the crucial reasons for the incomplete implementation of policies (Taylor, RP et al. 2008). 
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energy incentives, including legislation, mandatory targets, pricing mechanism, financial 
incentives. Subsection 7 discusses three pilot schemes, including the energy saving power 
dispatch, demand side management and carbon emission trading. Subsection 8 summarises 
China’s 2015 electricity reform and Subsection 9 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 The Electricity Sector in China: An Overview 
China’s electricity sector has developed rapidly over the last two decades, surpassing the 
U.S. in electricity generation since 2011 to become the largest in the world. Total electricity 
generation in China reached 5245.1 Terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2013, an increase of over 
100% from 2005 levels, and 1.3 times the amount generated by the U.S in the same year.31  
China’s total installed capacity reached 1247.38 GW in 2013, an increase of 9.3% over the 
previous year, becoming the world largest.32 
This section surveys China’s electricity sector focusing on fuel mix, consumption, energy 
efficiency, industry structure and regulatory framework and institutions.  A myriad of complex 
arrangements govern China’s mammoth electricity sector. These arrangements often 
present different institutions and agents with conflicting incentives. Furthermore, these 
differing incentives and governance structures challenge the pursuit of environmental and 
energy efficiency objectives.  
3.2.1 Installed Capacity and Generation: Fuel Mix 
Both electricity generation and installed capacity in China are characterised by a high 
dependence on thermal energy, as demonstrated in Figure 12 and Figure 13. A notable 
feature of electricity sector is that coal’s share in the generation mix is higher than its share 
in installed capacity. Two factors help explain this relative share: (1) solar PV and wind are 
never utilised at their installed capacity and (2) the generation order of dispatch as follows. 
• Baseload served by nuclear, non-dispatchable hydro-generators, cogeneration 
plants and low marginal cost coal plants. 
• Shoulder load served by flow constrained hydro-generators and intermediate cost 
coal plants. 
• Peak load served by pumped-storage units, fully dispatchable hydro plants and 
the low marginal cost coal plants.33 
China uses coal plants to ramp up and down to meet peak demand as well as for baseload. 
This peak load role for coal contrasts with most other countries that use coal for baseload 
and other resources to meet peak demand such as natural gas.34  
                                               
31
 US Energy Information Administration: http://www.eia.gov/ 
32
 Chinese National Energy Administration: http://www.nea.gov.cn/ 
33
 The main reason that natural gas is not used as a flexible resource is its relatively high price (Dong et al. 
2012; Hu, J et al. 2013). The intermittency of wind power makes it unsuitable for meeting peak load demand. 
Nuclear power plants lack the flexibility to meet peak-demand, as they require operate at near full capacity to 
recoup their high capital cost and to operate safely. Coal plants operate in a peak-load role in response to 
command-and-control rather than price signals. 
34
 The lack of sufficient of grid connection is main cause of renewable energy electricity spillage. China solves 
the renewable energy’s intermittency and non-dispatchable problems by encouraging coal-fired plants into a 
fast ramping role to meet peak-load. Coal plants used for peak-load adjustment enjoy priority of utilisation, 
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
nuclear 9.08 10.82 12.57 12.57 14.66
solar 0.03 0.26 2.12 3.41 15.89
wind 17.60 29.58 46.23 61.42 76.52
hydro power 196.29 216.06 232.98 249.47 280.44
thermal power 651.08 709.67 768.34 819.68 870.09
increase rate of thermal 9.00% 8.27% 6.68% 6.15%
increase rate of hydro 10.07% 7.83% 7.08% 12.41%
increase rate of wind 68.05% 56.31% 32.86% 24.58%
increase rate of solar 924.81% 727.47% 60.88% 365.90%
increase rate of nuclear 19.23% 16.13% 0.00% 16.63%
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Figure 12: Share of Installed Capacity (GW) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Electricity Generation Mix (TWh) 
 
This high dependence on coal for generation, and the associated consequences in terms of 
emissions, has led to the adoption of a new dispatch approach, the Energy Saving Power 
Dispatch (ESPD). Section 2.4 discusses ESPD in more detail. Notwithstanding efforts to 
reduce the coal share in electricity generation, China’s electricity generated from coal in 
2035 is projected to reach over 5500 TWh, which approximates the total coal generation in 
rest of the world in 2014.35 
                                                                                                                                                  
providing an incentive for coal plants into a fast ramping role. See 
http://news.bjx.com.cn/html/20160803/758172.shtml. 
35
 See IEA (2013) and IEA (2016). 
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Despite a heavy dependence on coal, the share of renewable energy has expanded 
consistently over the last decade. As we can see from Figure 12, the rate of increase of all 
renewables exceeds that of thermal energy. Consequently, the share of coal in installed 
capacity has declined over the last few years as renewables displace coal. In a short period 
China has become the world’s largest renewables electricity generator (Dent 2015). The 
Chinese Central Government’s 12th Five-Year Plan (FYP), covering the period 2011-5, 
includes 2015 and 2020 targets for non-fossil generation’s share of installed capacity at 33% 
and 36.3% and electricity generated at 24.1% and 26.9%36 of total installed capacity targets 
of 1,437 GW and 1,885 GW, respectively. To achieve these targets, the Chinese 
Government has legislated pricing mechanisms and financial incentives including subsidies, 
preferential loans and taxes. 
This high dependence on coal and the rapid increase in renewables have two important 
implications for energy policy in China. (1) The high dependence on coal implies that energy 
efficiency initiatives (EEI) may have a higher return than demand side management (DSM) 
as the former can reduce consumption throughout the whole day while the latter typically 
only reduce peak consumption. (2) The high rate of expansion of renewables has 
implications for distribution and transmission regulation and investment. 
3.2.2 Consumption 
Figure 14 provides an overview of electricity consumption in China by sector. Unsurprisingly, 
the secondary industry is the major consumer at more than 70% of total consumption. In 
contrast, despite decades of economic growth, residential electricity consumption remains 
around 10% of total consumption. In contrast, US residential electricity consumption 
accounted for around 35% of total consumption over the last decade.37 
Figure 14: Electricity Consumption (TWh) 
 
                                               
36
 Section 4 discusses mandated targets in more details. 
37
 Calculations based on statistics from the OECD library. 
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The growth rate of electricity consumption in China averaged around 12% in the last decade, 
much higher than other countries (IEA 2014). However, as China’s economic growth slows 
and the service sector expands faster than the manufacturing sector, we expect China’s 
electricity consumption will follow similar trends found in other developed countries where 
the growth in electricity consumption will decelerate and services and residential users will 
account for a larger share of consumption. The increased adoption of electronic appliances, 
including air conditioners, washing machines and computers, would drive the increase 
growth in the services sectors and residential consumers demand for electricity. 
Accommodated by increasing income, their electricity consumption is expected to continue 
to grow over the coming decades. 
The extent of the potential for growth in electricity consumption by households becomes 
obvious once we compare per capita consumption with other countries. Currently, China’s 
per capita consumption of electricity falls between developed countries and other large 
developing countries such as India and Egypt in general. However, the residential electricity 
consumption per capita is lower than developing countries such as Brazil and Egypt (Hu, Z 
2014), and the disparity with developed countries is even larger, around one-tenth of that in 
the U.S., one-sixth of that in Australia, one-fifth that of Japan and France, and one-third of 
that of Korea in 2012.38  If the residential per capita consumption in China reaches that of 
Korea in 2012, this would add 1,103.95 TWh of demand to the system, necessitating an 
increase of over 10% in installed capacity. 
Importantly, both residential and service sector consumers are likely to be more responsive 
to changes in electricity prices than manufacturers39, implying electricity demand will become 
more amenable to both energy efficiency and DSM initiatives.  
3.2.3 Energy Efficiency and Demand Side Management Initiatives 
Conventionally, energy efficiency is defined as the physical service provided per unit of 
energy. More broadly, energy efficiency usually refers to ‘using less energy to provide the 
same service’.40  Thus, the measurement of energy efficiency varies with the context. 
In the context of white goods and electronic goods, for example, when comparing appliances 
that provide the same service, the most energy efficient is the one that uses least energy. In 
the context of power plants, energy efficiency is commonly measured by heat rate: the 
amount of energy used by an electrical generator or power plant to generate one kilowatt-
hour (kWh) of electricity. In transmission and distribution (T&D) of electricity, energy 
efficiency is measured by line loss: the disparity between the amount of electricity generated 
by power plants and the amount that is available for final consumption. 
                                               
38
 This comparison is based on the data from OECD, World Bank and China Bureau of Statistics, with residential 
electricity consumption of OECD countries from http://stats.oecd.org/BrandedView.aspx?oecd_bv_id=elect-
data-en&doi=data-00462-en, and the data of population from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL. 
39
 For instance, based on the computable general equilibrium model, (He et al. 2011) calculates the price 
elasticity of residential electricity consumers in China as -0.3, contrasted with that of industry and commerce 
which is around -0.018. According to (Shi, Zheng & Song 2012), high income group of residents in China are 
more price elastic than the low income group, while rural families respond more sensitively to electricity prices 
than urban families. 
40
 See http://eetd.lbl.gov/ee/ee-1.html. 
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Chinese policy makers see improvements in energy efficiency as a key component of 
meeting the increase in demand for electricity in a more sustainable way.41  There are a 
number of energy efficiency programs using different approaches. 
From the consumer’s side, there is a pilot DSM program in five major Chinese cities (Beijing, 
Suzhou, Tangshan, Foshan and Shanghai). Section 7 describes the program in detail. Two 
grid companies, State Grid Corporation and Southern Power Grid, implemented the DSM 
achieving electricity savings of 16.2 TWh and forestalling 3,440 MW of new capacity in 2013. 
All 30 provinces, autonomous regions and municipal cities covered by the two grid 
companies met their annual DSM targets in 2013. 42   During the 12th FYP period, the 
potential of accumulated savings could amount to 6.334 TWh of generation, forestalling 
capacity by 18,356 MW (Zeng et al. 2013). 
In the electricity generation sector, as depicted in Figure 15, the general thermal efficiency of 
plants over six MW in China has improved consistently since 2008. Energy efficiency 
exceeded 45% for the first time in 2014, with 28% of coal-fired power in 2014 applying 
supercritical and ultra-supercritical technology that use pulverised coal combustion systems 
to operate at higher temperatures and pressures to achieve higher efficiencies than 
conventional units.43  China’s coal-fired power plants are currently more efficient on average 
than the U.S. coal plants.44  
Figure 15: Energy Efficiency of Electricity Generation 
 
A combination of different policies and programs achieved this improvement in power plant 
energy efficiency, including the ‘Large Substitutes Small’ (LSS) program that aims to replace 
small and inefficient power plants with large and efficient generators.45  LSS became part of 
                                               
41
 See http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/. 
42
 See National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) at 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jjyx/dzxqcgl/201407/t20140731_620758.html. 
43
 See China Electricity Council at http://www.cec.org.cn/. 
44
 See http://theenergycollective.com/michael-davidson/251931/transforming-china-s-grid-will-coal-
remainking-china-s-energy-mix. 
45
 Small and inefficient generation units include those below 50 MW, those below 100 MW, which have been 
operating for over 20 years, those below 200 MW, which have been at the end of their design life, and those 
that fail to meet environmental standards, laws and regulations. See 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/200701/26/content_509911.htm. 
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the energy conservation and emission reduction project in 2007, which reinforced LSS.46  
The estimated total capacity of small thermal power generating units decommissioned from 
2005 to 2014 exceeded 95 GW.47    However, the LSS program will have achieved its 
maximum impact as it becomes increasingly difficult to find small, inefficient plants to 
substitute. 
Finally, China actively pursued energy efficiency in transmission and distribution, achieving 
similar levels as other geographically dispersed developed countries such as Australia and 
the U.S.  See Figure 16. Additionally, China lacks non-technical losses that result from as 
power theft found in other geographically dispersed developing countries such as India and 
Brazil (IEA 2014).  
Figure 16: Rate of Line Losses 
 
(Data source: World Bank) We calculated the global average based on the data from 165 countries. 
A combination of policies could reduce network losses, including active maintenance, 
efficient transformers, high voltage lines, smart grids and distributed generation.48  It is worth 
pointing out that each per cent point reduction in network losses amount to a gain of 54.64 
TWh, which is nearly equivalent to the amount of national consumption in some OECD 
countries such as Greece, Switzerland and Portugal.49  
                                               
46
 This program was launched in 1990s; however, due to the electricity shortage and the resulted necessity to 
encourage investment in generation, it had never received adequate attention before 2007. 
47
 See China Electricity Council at http://www.cec.org.cn/yaowenkuaidi/2015-03-10/134972.html. 
48
 The smart grid is an electrical grid that uses intelligent technologies to integrate information about 
behaviours of power generators, consumers and agents to improve economic efficiency and reliability of 
electricity production and distribution. Smart grids help integrate distributed generation that generates 
electricity closer to the point of consumption than central generator. 
49
 See IEA (2014). 
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3.2.4 Structure of the Electricity Sector 
A single monopoly vertically integrated utility operated by the central government dominated 
the Chinese electricity sector before 2002. 50   Subsequently, the central government 
dismantled the monopoly into 11 independent state-owned companies that include five 
generation-companies, known as the ‘Big Five’, two regional grid companies and four 
auxiliary service companies. 51   The auxiliary service companies are responsible for the 
design, construction and maintenance of the electricity system.  
Figure 17 shows China’s largest grid companies the State Grid Corporation of China and 
Southern Power Grid that manage the transmission grids in 26 provinces, five provinces 
respectively.52  These two grid companies control more than 90% of national transmission 
capacity (IEA 2006). Geng, Yang and Janus (2009) discuss the problems of these state-
owned enterprises, including low operating efficiency and industrial productivity, which are 
commonplace in the electricity sector. 
Figure 17: Geographic Distribution of Electricity Grid Companies 
  
In the generation sector, generators sell electricity to grid companies rather than to end 
users, at prices administratively predetermined under wholesale contracts. Since 2004, the 
contracted wholesale prices are set in reference to a benchmark price based on the cost of 
an efficient coal unit operating at full capacity for about 5000 hours per year (Hu, J et al. 
2013). Section 5 discusses how the wholesale price varies according to types of power 
plants.  
                                               
50
 The Ministry of Power Industry was responsible for the operation of the monopoly vertically integrated 
sector until 1997 when responsibility was transferred to the State Power Corporation until the monopoly was 
dismantled in 2002. 
51
 The ‘Big Five’ refers to Huaneng Group, Datang Group, Huadian Corporation, Guodian Corparation, and 
Power Investment Corporation. The two grid companies are the State Grid Corporation of China and China 
Southern Power Grid. The four auxiliary service companies include China Power Engineering Consulting Group, 
China Hydropower Engineering Consulting Group, China Water Resources and Hydropower Construction 
Group, and China Gezhouba Group. 
52
 Totally, there are six multi-provincial regional grids across China as presented in Figure 17. Five of them (i.e., 
Northeast, North China, Northwest, Central China and East China) are operated by the State Grid Corporation 
of China and one is owned by the Southern Power Grid. In addition, there are two provincial networks in Inner 
Mongolia and Tibet owned by local governments, not being part of any regional company. The western part of 
the grid in Inner Mongolia is managed by an independent company. 
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In 2003, the Chinese government introduced a trial of partially competitive wholesale market 
in some eastern and southern provinces, allowing generation prices to be determined 
through a competitive bidding process.53  These trials finished in 2006 without further trials.54  
Subsequently, the 2015 electricity reform reintroduced competitive bidding to set wholesale 
prices but bidding rule details still require defining. 
Grid companies in China control both transmission and distribution. Provincial/municipal grid 
companies operate the transmission and distribution within the boundary of each province. 
The 2015 electricity reform excluded separation of transmission and distribution despite 
discussion of separation leading up to the reform. The two regional grid companies control 
the development and operation of regional grids and regional electricity markets, as well as 
regional electricity dispatch. The State Grid Corporation of China is responsible for the 
interconnection and trading between regional grids, including the China Southern Power 
Grid. 
T&D prices are determined by the residual between generation prices paid to plants and 
retail prices charged to end users by the grid companies. Importantly, T&D prices are not 
based on T&D costs. 
However, Shenzhen and Western Inner Mongolia were chosen to be part of a trial, from 
2015, on setting T&D prices independently using a cost-plus-return basis.55  For example, in 
the case of Shenzhen, the first special economic zone in China, both total revenue of the 
grid company and electricity T&D prices are regulated through a revenue cap. In essence, 
total revenue, consisting of a fixed return on capital and taxes to decouple the grid 
company’s revenue from sales volume. T&D unit prices to customers are calculated as the 
quotient of total revenue divided by total T&D volume. 
Under the current system, grid companies sell electricity directly to final consumers. The 
‘National Development and Reform Commission’ (NDRC) provides guidelines on retail prices 
but local governments ultimately determine prices, so prices vary by provinces. Section 5 
provides more details on retail prices. Since 2015, private firms have been able to buy 
electricity from generators and sell electricity to final consumers. Moreover, a market is being 
established where large buyers will be able to buy directly from generators or traders.56  
The grid companies function as the system operators to determine the dispatch of electricity 
according to wholesale contracts and dispatch protocols. 57   The grid companies and 
generators sign annual contracts allocating the number of operation hours to generators. A 
dispatch protocol complements the contract stipulating dispatch timing, taking into account 
                                               
53
 A maximum of 10 to 20 per cent of the electricity generated by participating power plants could be 
transacted through the market. 
54
 The need for electricity generation to support the rapid economic growth in the last decade has likely 
influenced the decision to retain a centralised approach to price making. Such approach could ensure that 
investment was undertaken in a timely manner rather than subject to the vagaries of market forces. 
55
 Following Shenzhen and Western Inner Mongolia, four other provinces/autonomous regions (i.e., Anhui, 
Hubei, Ningxia and Yunnan) have also undertaken pilot programs entailing the separation of T&D prices. 
56
 See, more details, Document No. 9 issued by the State Council in March 2015 at 
http://www.escn.com.cn/news/show-225985.html. 
57
 See the details of the Interim Measures for Promoting the Transparency, Fairness and Justness of Electricity 
Dispatch at http://www.sgcc.com.cn/fgbz/dlfg/37302.shtml. 
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the demand and supply of electricity, the availability of generators and other conditions at the 
time of dispatch.58  
Electricity dispatch in China follows an ‘equal-share-dispatch’ convention that allocates equal 
operating hours to each contracted generator. However, this convention proves contrary to 
emissions reductions as high emission intensive generators operate for as many hours as 
the low emission intensive generators (Teng, Wang & Zhiqiang 2014). The convention also 
induces inefficient generation investment by encouraging overbuilding (Kahrl et al. 2011). 
As discussed in Section 2.1, the system operator trailed ESPD in an attempt to prioritise 
energy efficiency and emissions reduction. ESPD ranks generators in terms of energy 
efficiency and emission rates to determine order of dispatch, 59   dispatching the higher 
efficiency and less pollution generators until they are operating at full capacity before 
dispatching the next generator in the rank. This dispatch approach facilitates the full use of 
renewable energy and more efficient thermal generators. However, there lacks progress 
toward a nationwide ESPD implementation since its five-province trial in 2007. ESPD 
depends heavily on administrative orders and documents, which could partially explain the 
slow progress.  
Another feature of China’s electricity sector is the dominance of state-owned enterprises. As 
we can see from Figure 18, the ‘Big Five’ companies controlled by central government own 
about half of the nation’s installed capacity. Other generators administered by the central 
government and large generators administered by local governments control around 20% of 
the total capacity.  
Figure 18: Ratio of Installed Capacity by ownership 
 
(Data source: the Annual Report of Electricity Supervision published by the State Electricity Regulatory 
Commission (SERC) from 2009 to 2012) 
                                               
58
 See a sample dispatch protocol at http://www.mianfeiwendang.com/doc/4ed2a10a4a0c6efc6195cdc6/5. 
59
 There are seven classes of generation (1) single-sourced generators using renewable energy such as wind, 
solar, tidal and hydropower, (2) Flexible units fired by renewable energy like hydro-power, biomass and 
geothermal power and solid waste fired generators meeting environmental protection requirements, (3) 
nuclear power plants, (4) coal-fired cogeneration units running in terms of ‘electricity upon heat’ and units 
with comprehensive use of resources including residual heat, residual gas, residual pressure, coal gangue, coal 
bed/coal mine methane, (5) natural gas and coal gasification based generation units, (6) other coal-fired 
generators, including cogeneration units without heat load and (7) oil and oil products-fired generation. 
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3.2.5 Regulatory Framework and Institutions 
China has an extensive regulatory framework for the governance of the electricity sector, 
shown in Figure 19. Regulatory institutions exist in both the central and local governments. 
At the central government level, the key institutions include the State Council, the NDRC, 
and the National Energy Administration (NEA), Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) 
and the State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). 
Figure 19: Regulatory Institutions of the Electricity Sector 
 
The State Council is China’s top administrative authority for the economy and assigns 
responsibilities and tasks to central and provincial regulatory authorities. The State Council 
has the ultimate control over the decision making of development and operation of the 
electricity sector but remains uninvolved in directly regulating the electricity sector. 
The NDRC, a macroeconomic management agency to formulate policies for social and 
economic development and reform, is the leading regulatory institution to control prices and 
investments in the electricity sector. This institution reviews the costs of electricity 
corporations and controls prices through its Pricing Department. It also possesses the 
deterministic rights on the construction of large generation plants. In contrast, NDRC’s 
provincial-level counterpart, the Development and Reform Commission, undertakes the 
construction of small plants.60  
The NEA department under the jurisdiction of the NDRC is responsible for developing and 
implementing energy strategies, plans and policies, advising on energy system reform and 
regulating the sector. The NEA was established 2008 and restructured in 2013 to 
incorporate the functions of the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC), including 
                                               
60
 In recent years, more authorising rights of plants construction are granted to provincial Development and 
Reform Commission. 
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designing and supervising generation markets and implementing reforms in the electricity 
sector.61  
The MEP issues environmental policies and conducts environmental implementation and 
supervision. With respect to the electricity sector, the MEP assesses the environmental 
impacts of project construction and pollution from electricity production. 
The SASAC is a special commission, directly under the State Council, which oversees all 
public enterprises and is responsible for the maintenance and valuation of national assets. 
SASAC maintains microscopic supervision of state-owned electricity corporations, including 
the ability approve or refuse mergers and acquisitions within the electricity sector. 
These institutions regulate the entire electricity supply process, including setting electricity 
prices, dispatching existing generation and deciding on whether to invest in new generation. 
Institutions can affect information and transaction costs related to reform design and 
implementation. Institutions may reduce information and transaction costs or increase them 
to become a constraint on reform performance (Erdogdu & Erkan 2013). In China, many 
policy initiatives to increase energy efficiency investments and integration of renewable 
energy generated electricity fail to meet expectation in implementation. Taylor, RP et al. 
(2008) consider the institutional environmental a key reason for this failure. 
One prominent problem China’s electricity sector confronts is the competing interests 
between institutions at the same level and between central and local government levels. For 
instance, in most provinces, the state owns the large power plants while provincial level 
companies own the small and medium plants. The imposition of a carbon price gave an 
advantage to larger plants that can generation more efficiency.  These larger plant gained 
additional operating hours at the expense of smaller plants. This generation shift from small 
and medium plants to large units induces a revenue shift from provincial companies to state-
owned companies. Due to the disparity between the goals of central government and local 
governments, the implementation of these policies is not socially maximising. Section 2.7.1 
discusses the allocation of hours. 
3.3 Legislation Related to the Electricity Sector  
This section discusses how four major electricity sector legislations relate to electricity 
pricing, the dispatch principle, economic incentives and regulatory measures.  The four 
legislations are (1) the Electricity Law, (2) the Energy Conservation Law, (3) the Law on the 
Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution, and (4) the Renewable Energy Law.  
3.3.1 Electricity Law 
The milestone legislation in China’s electricity sector, the Electricity Law, enacted in 1996, 
predates other major institutional reform within the electricity sector. 
Electricity pricing includes key Articles 35, 36, 37 and 41. 
                                               
61
 SERC, the independent electricity regulator, lead electricity sector reforms, including breaking-up 
monopolies and promoting market competition and supervising policy implementation.  SERC was established 
in 2003 and dissolved in 2013. 
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• Article 35: ‘The rates of electricity – including the rates charged to the generating 
companies for incorporation into the power network, the rates of mutual supply 
between different power networks and the sales rates of electricity supplied to 
consumers – shall be based on a centralized policy, fixed in accordance with a 
unified principle and administered at different levels.’  
• Article 36: ‘Establishment of electricity rates shall be based on the principles of 
reasonable compensation of cost and reasonable determination of profits, legal 
incorporation of taxes, fairly shared burdens and promotion of electric power 
construction.’ 
• Article 37: ‘A principle of equal rates for equal quality of electricity supplied by the 
same power network shall be applied with regard to incorporation into a power 
network’.  
• Article 41: ‘China uses two systems for fixing electricity rates according to 
consumer type and time of use. A common rate applies to the same consumer 
type using same level of voltage on the same power network.’ 
• The State Council specifies formulates measures for the application of Article 41. 
The State Council also determines consumer type classifications and time of use 
periods. 
Dispatch principle includes key Articles 21 and 22. 
• Article 21: ‘Centralized dispatching and level-by-level administration shall be 
exercised in the operation of power networks. No units or individuals may illegally 
intervene in the dispatching of power networks.’  
• Article 22: ‘Requests by power-generating enterprises in the status of qualified 
independent legal persons to incorporate the power they generate into a network 
shall be accepted by the enterprise that operates the network’ 
These articles promote the grid connection of electricity generation and emphasize 
renewable energy. However, the regulatory framework is ambiguous about implementation, 
causing delays in connection. 
Since the enactment over two decades ago, the Electricity Law has undergone little 
amendment despite significant economic and technological change in the sector. The 
Electricity Law’s failure to accommodate or reflect significant changes has impeded adoption 
and promote of renewable energy, distributed generation and smart grids in particular.  
There is a requirement for amendments to the Electricity Law to (1) establish independent 
electricity trade centres at different levels and (2) introduce competition into the retail sector 
by splitting the existing monopoly retailer. However, among the many barriers impeding 
amendment two key examples include vested interests and multiple changes in the entities 
managing the Electricity Law over a short time.  
Vested interests include those of grid companies, some electricity generation companies, 
particular those with thermal power plants, and those of the government institutions that 
regulate the sector. 
Four entities have managed the Electricity Law (1) the Electricity Ministry before the 
electricity reform in 2002, (2) the National Electricity Corporation (NEC) after the electricity 
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reform in 2002, (3) SERC established in 2003 replaced the NEC during a revision of the 
Electricity Law and (4) the National Energy Bureau in 2013 replaced the dismantled SERC.62  
3.3.2 Energy Conservation Law 
The Energy Conservation Law enacted 1997 promotes energy conservation in the whole of 
society, enhancing energy utilisation efficiency, protecting and improving environment, and 
promoting comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable economic and social development. 
The 2007 amendment incorporates more industries within the spectrum of energy 
conservation and strengthens administrative enforcement. The amendment requires the 
major energy consumers to cut energy consumption, including construction projects, 
transport sector and government institutions and industries such as electricity, iron and steel, 
non-ferrous metals, building materials, oil processing, chemical and coal. 
The 2007 amendment also clarifies work allocated to different government departments. 
Article 11 states “The State Council and the local people's governments at and above the 
county level shall strengthen their leadership in energy conservation work in disposition, 
coordination, supervision, inspection and promotion of the energy conservation work”.  
Articles 13 and 14 stipulate that the respective administrative departments under the State 
Council shall set down national standards and industrial standards for energy conservation, 
and encourage provincial and lower levels government to set stricter standards.63  
The Energy Conservation Law also specifies energy conservation incentives and penalties. 
For instance, Article 59 encourages and supports the development of solar power, wind 
power, methane from biomass and other renewable energy in rural areas and the 
development of small-scale hydropower generation. Articles 60 to 65 stipulate incentives 
including financial subsidies, tax, government procurement, preferential loans and retail price. 
Article 66 specifies support for DSM, energy management contracts and voluntary energy 
conservation agreements through taxes deduction and pricing. Furthermore, the article 
encourages adopting rates for peak load, seasonal and interruptible load to encourage 
consumers to adjust their use in a rational manner. Article 66 also supports differential rates 
to eliminate, restrict, permit or encourage the enterprises of major energy-consuming 
industries. Section 3.7.2 also discusses Article 66. 
Regarding the dispatch of electricity, Article 32 states that grid companies are required to 
arrange grid connection for electricity generated by heat, cogeneration units and units using 
waste heat and pressure. This article also requires grid companies to connect electricity 
generated by other units that comprehensively utilise resources. Article 78 stipulates that if a 
grid enterprise fails to comply, the electricity regulatory authority shall order it to compensate 
any financial losses incurred by the electricity generating companies. 
The July 2016 amendment further facilitates energy conservation. Amended Article 15: 
“Fixed asset investment projects should be systematically evaluated and reviewed in terms 
of energy conservation. Projects must meet compulsory energy conservation standards 
before construction starts and projects failing to meet conservation standards are prohibited 
from operating. With respect to the government projects inconsistent with compulsory energy 
                                               
62
 See http://www.sinoergy.com/bianji1/10186/. 
63
 More details in English about the 2007 version of this law could be found at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=6467#menu1. 
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conservation standard, the competent examination and approval department shall not 
approve or verify the construction thereof”.  All fixed assets projects are required to meet 
compulsory energy conservation standards. However, only government projects need to go 
through the examination and approval procedure by related authority. In contrast, non-
government projects are excluded. This is one of the improvements made by the latest 
amendment. 
3.3.3 Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution 
China enacted the Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution in 1988 and 
revised the law in 1995, 2000, and 2015. The 2015 revision entered into force January 2016. 
The law aims to prevent and control atmospheric pollution, protect and improve the 
environment and the ecological environment, safeguard human health, and promote the 
sustainable development of the economy and society.  The 2015 revision comprises a 
number of improvements, including the following three key examples.  
1. It strengthens local governments’ responsibility to improve the quality of the 
atmospheric environment 30 of the law’s 129 articles are about the legislative 
responsibility. Article 3 states that the local government shall be responsible for 
the quality of the atmospheric environment in the area. The Ministry of 
Environmental Protection shall carry out the assessment on the performance of 
the provincial government. If the city government fails to meet the requirements, 
the higher-level environmental protection department shall carry out talks and 
regional restrictions on the subordinate government leaders who fail to complete 
the task. 
2. According to the actual situation of China's economic and social development, 
this law sets quality standards for products containing volatile organic compounds 
(such as coal, stone tar, biomass fuel, paint and other products), fireworks, fumes 
and filtration. This emphasizes the importance of preventing and controlling the 
source of pollution. 
3. The financial penalties have been increased to deter polluting firms. A firm can be 
fined 100,000 to 1,000,000 RMB under the following three conditions: (1) emitting 
pollutants to the air without permission, (2) exceeding pollution ceilings, and (3) 
polluting illegally by shirking the surveillance. The fines in the current version of 
the law are much higher than the fines in previous version of the law that were 
between 10,000 and 100,000 RMB.  The fines in the previous versions were 
insufficient to incentivise firms to install anti-pollution equipment.  
Other amendments include (1) promoting regional cooperation to prevent and control 
atmospheric pollution, (2) mandating a China wide total emission targets rather than limited 
control areas for acid rain and sulphur dioxide , (3) mandating targets for specific firms and 
(4) establishing platforms for data sharing and cooperation to promote efficient research on 
how to deal with smog. 
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3.3.4 Renewable Energy Law 
The Renewable Energy Law aims to promote the exploitation of renewable energy 64 , 
increase energy supply, improve the energy structure, ensure energy safety, protect the 
environment, and attain the sustainable development of the economy and society (Article 1). 
First formulated in 2005 and amended in 2009, the law establishes four key mechanisms to 
develop renewable energy, including (1) setting national renewable energy targets, (2) 
obliging connection and purchase of electricity generated from renewables, (3) building a 
national feed-in tariff system, and (4) arranging cost-sharing and fund allocation. 
The Renewable Energy Law employs a top-down approach for energy planning and 
mandating targets where the central government designs a national plan for the 
development and utilization of renewable energy resources and according to this national 
plan, the provincial governments design plans for their respective regions (Article 8). The 
provincial governments file their renewable energy development plans with the central 
government before implementation to enhance the central government’s supervision over 
provincial renewable energy planning (Schuman & Lin 2012).  
This law guarantees the connection of all electricity generated from renewable energy to the 
grids. According to Article 14, power grid companies are required to sign a grid-connection 
agreement with companies owning renewable energy generators provided the enterprise 
has legally obtained an administrative license or has submitted construction record for the 
project. Power grid companies are also required to purchase all the power generated by the 
grid-connected renewable energy within their power grid region, and provide grid-connection 
services for renewable energy. The 2009 amendments stress that grid companies should 
purchase all of the renewable power generated within their jurisdictions up to the amount of 
renewable energy set by regulatory authorities as proportion of total power. For the full 
implementation of these provisions, the renewable power must meet grid connection 
technical standards and renewable power generators have a responsibility to cooperate with 
grid companies to ensure grid security. Simultaneously, grid companies should implement 
measures to strengthen grid construction, to develop a smart grid and energy storage, and 
so on. 
Articles 19 and 13 provide pricing information. The State Council’s price administration 
department determines the electricity price for renewable energy generation considering the 
type of renewable energy and geographic regional conditions. The electricity connected to 
grids should be beneficial to the promotion of exploitation of renewable energy and 
economically reasonable. Moreover, timely readjustment should be made along with the 
development of technology for exploitation of renewable energy.  Article 19 stipulates that 
the price for grid-connected power should be publicly available and if biding used to 
determine the price of grid-connected power generated by renewable energy power projects, 
the winning bid determines the price.  However, the final price should not exceed the price 
level of grid-connected power of similar renewable energy generation projects.  Article 13 
paragraph 3 stipulates that the price of grid-connected power generated by renewable 
energy power projects decided by invited bid as follows. Where more than one person 
applies for the construction of the same project for grid-connected power generation with 
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 For instance, if a technological innovation reduces the generation cost of electricity from renewable energy, 
the related electricity price should be reduced accordingly. 
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renewable energy, requiring administrative license, the licensee shall be determined by 
invited bid.   
On expense sharing, Article 20 states that expenses incurred by the power grids from 
purchasing renewable energy generated power could be passed onto consumers in some 
sharing method. The prerequisite is that the purchased power generated from renewables 
should accord with the provisions of Article 19 that is the State Council’s price administration 
department shall formulate the specific cost sharing method. According to Article 21, other 
reasonable expenses related to power from renewable energy such as transmission costs 
can be recovered via increasing the retail price. Article 22 stipulates how to set retail prices 
for the renewable power generated by the independent power systems that are the power 
systems isolated from the nation’s main power system. Their retail prices depend on the type 
of renewable energy and their geographic location. If cost exceeds revenue from selling 
power, the grid company can pass the excess onto consumers using the sharing method 
stipulated in Article 20.  
Articles 24 to 26 detail economic incentives and regulatory measures using a special 
renewable energy development in five key areas: 
1. promoting scientific and technological research in formulating standards and 
demonstrating engineering for the exploitation of renewable energy 
2. promoting projects for the use of renewable energy in people’s daily lives in rural 
and pastoral areas 
3. promoting the construction of independent systems of power generated with 
renewable energy in outlying areas and on islands 
4. surveying and assessing renewable energy resources, and constructing of 
relevant information systems, and  
5. promotion of localized production of equipment for exploitation of renewable 
energy. 
Preferential loans with financial interest subsidy and preferential taxation may be offered to 
projects for exploitation of renewable energy that are listed in the national development 
guidance catalogue of the renewable energy industry and meet the requirements for granting 
loans (Article 25 and 26). 
Article 29 stipulates penalties for noncompliant grid companies if a power grid enterprise fails 
to purchase all power from a renewable energy generator and has caused economic losses 
to the owner of the generator, the power grid enterprise is required to compensate the 
generator owner. The power regulatory institution shall order the grid enterprise to rectify 
within a fixed period. If grid enterprise remains noncompliant, its maximum penalty is the 
amount of the economic losses suffered by the enterprise of power generated with 
renewable energy. 
The Renewable Energy Law stipulates that the grid companies must purchase all the 
electricity generated from renewable energy but lacks details on implementation.65  Given 
the higher on-grid tariff as well as the extra expenses for physical connection and the 
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 For instance, neither an explicit specification on the procedure of grid connection nor a clear stipulation on 
the compensation of the curtailment losses for renewable energy operators is provided (Hong et al. 2013). 
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variability, grid companies have little motivation to accommodate the electricity generated 
from renewable energy – particularly that generated from wind and solar.66  
The legislation provides principles and some frameworks for the development of the 
electricity sector but lacks explicit targets and details. The renewable energy development 
plans and regulatory documents supplement the Renewable Energy Law and include 
mandatory targets set by governing institutions.  However, these supplementary documents 
lack legal enforceability.  The next section discusses the mandatory target. 
3.4 Mandatory Targets 
China issued a list of mandatory targets to develop clean energy and renewable energy, 
reduce the proportion of fossil fuel, facilitate energy supply capacity, control the aggregate 
amount of energy consumption, and improve energy efficiency. We discuss these targets in 
the following subsections (1) renewable portfolio, (2) energy insensitivity and total energy 
use, (3) technology standards and (4) mandated target measurement. 
3.4.1 Renewable Portfolio 
The FYPs mainly determine renewable portfolio capacity targets. In addition to the General 
Economic and Social Development FYP released by the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
through the plenary sessions of the Central Committee and national congresses, there are 
FYPs created by local governments and by associations for the development of a specific 
sector.  Hence, there are many FYPs related to the electricity sector. We discuss two such 
plans. 
China Electricity Council comprises of electricity sector organisations, enterprises and 
institutions and makes the FYP for the sector.67   However, in 2016 the NDRC and the State 
Council released the 13th FYP (2015-2020) (FYP13) for electricity.68  Table 2 shows the 
FYP13 planned increase in electricity and cumulative capacity discrepancies between 
Energy Development (FYP13-ED) and State Council’s Energy Development Strategy Action 
Plan (EDSAP).  
                                               
66
 When a large amount of variable renewable electricity is connected to the grid, the stability of power system 
is put into risks and additional measures should be taken. Measures can help to improve the grid friendliness 
of renewables include better technical standards and more accurate forecast for electricity generated from 
renewables (Kat 2011). 
67
 Note the NDRC did not replace the CEC. 
68
 See http://energy.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1107/c71661-28841645.html. 
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Table 2: FYP for increasing electricity capacity and cumulative capacity discrepancies among Electricity, 
ED and EDSAP FYPs (GW) 
 FYP13-Electricity FYP13-ED EDSAP 
 Initially 
(2015) 
 
incremental Accumulated 
(2020) 
Accumulated 
(2020) 
Accumulated 
(2020) 
Wind 131 79 210 210 200 
solar 42 69 110 110 100 
Hydro-power 320 40 340 340 350 
Nuclear-power 27 30 58 58 58 
Natural gas 66 50 110   
Biomass 13 2 15   
Coal 900 200* 1,100   
Other fossil fuel 27 30* 37*   
Total installed capacity 1,530 500 2,000   
Share of non-fossil fuel 35%  39%   
(Source: NEA 2016 cited in Chinapower
69
)  *Estimates based on NEA (2016). Note the FYP13-
Electrcity accumulated target in 2020 is not the sum of the initial endowment in 2015 and the planned 
incremental target in all cases.  This provides scope for adjustments in case something unexpected 
may happen. The incremental column also incorporates the planned decommissioning of plant. 
Over the five years, the planned increase for installed capacity of electricity generators is 
500 GW and non-fossil fuel powered plants is 770 GW. FYP13 pays considerable attention 
to natural gas generation and proposes an increase in installed capacity of gas by 50 GW; 
the proposal would grow the total gas installed capacity to 110 GW or 5% of all install 
capacity. FYP13 also preferentially promotes hydropower and strives to raise safely the 
proportion of nuclear power in the electricity generation mix. The proposed increases in 
installed capacity of hydropower and nuclear power will be 40 GW and 30 GW, respectively. 
FYP13 particularly promotes distributed generation and proposes to increase wind and solar 
power by 79 GW and 69 GW respectively. In contract, FYP13 proposes to reduce the share 
of coal-fuelled plants by 20 GW. Meanwhile, coal-powered plants’ role will increasingly assist 
in meeting peak-load and managing volatility from increasing penetration of solar and wind 
power. 
FYP13 for Energy Development (FYP13ED) details the energy structure of installed capacity 
and electricity generation in 2020 at 39% and 31% for non-fossil-fuel powered plants, 
respectively. In contrast, the State Council’s Energy Development Strategy Action Plan 
(2014-2020) published November 2014 expects installed capacity by 2020 are 350 GW, 58 
GW, 200 GW and 100 GW for hydro-powered, nuclear-powered, wind-powered and solar-
powered plants, respectively. 
The FYP have become more consistent that is the inconsistencies between FYP12ED and 
EDSAP12 and between FYP13ED and EDSAP13 have narrowed, as shown in the Table 2. 
The NEA, a department of the NDRC, now makes both FYP13-Electricity and FYP13-ED 
with reference to the targets set by EDSAP. This contrasted with the past when different 
plans were made by different authority without reference to the State Council. 
3.4.2 Energy Intensity and Total Energy Use 
FYP13 for Energy Development (FYP13ED) also sets mandatory targets for energy intensity 
and total energy. FYP13ED mandates three 2020 targets, being maximums for (1) coal 
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equivalent consumption of thermal power plants of 310g/kWh, (2) rate of line loss in the 
electrical networks of 6.5% and (3) aggregate primary energy consumption of 4 billion tons 
of the standard coal equivalent with whole electricity consumption between 6.8 and 7.2 
trillion kWh. The Energy Development Strategy Action Plan (2014-2020) caps annual 
primary energy consumption at 4.8 billion tons of the standard coal equivalent by 2020. This 
means that the annual increase rate of primary energy use in China must be no more than 
3.5 percent by 2020. The plans aim to hold annual coal consumption below 4.2 billion tons 
until 2020.70   The central government allocates targets to provincial governments and target 
achievement provides performance evaluation crucial to the promotion of local officials.   
3.4.3 Technology Standards 
The National Energy Bureau develops FYPs for technology standard targets, including (1) 
National Energy Technology, which specifies the targets for technology development in the 
electricity sector, (2) the Development of Wind Power, (3) for the Development of Solar 
Power, (4) the Medium and Long Term Plan for the Development of Nuclear Power and so 
on.71  These technology standards place requirements or restrictions on the construction or 
operation of generation technologies. An example is the Large Substitutes Small policy, 
which requires the decommissioning of small, inefficient thermal power plants to allow the 
construction of larger, more economically efficient and less emission-intensive plants. 72  
Under this policy, there are plans to close more plants in the 100 and 200 MW range 
between the years 2011 and 2020 (Productivity Commission, 2011). 
3.4.4 Review of Mandated Target  
The mandated targets sent a clear signal promoting renewable energy to electricity 
generators, grid companies and governments at different levels. However, there exist 
implementation lags between policy formulation mandating the targets and construction of 
generators (Schuman & Lin 2012). 
Wang, Zhao and Chi (2014) examined the effectiveness of mandated target measures 
during FYP11 from the perspective of local governments’ responses to the obliged 
objectives set by the central government. They find that the central government’s credible 
commitment drove the initially disparate attitudes of provinces to a converged result. 
However, the outcome is significantly constrained by the initial energy intensity of each 
province. Thus, a more appropriate task division would make the mandated targets a more 
effective. To limit local governments’ strategic responses to the timeframe of the FYP 
obligatory targets, the local situation including local officials’ office tenure, usually three to 
five years, requires consideration. A more flexible way to assess the successful 
implementation of the policy implementation is required, for instance, by placing more 
emphasis on the quality and effort of policy implementation. For instance, local officials focus 
on the economic performance in the year their position expires and there is insufficient 
incentive for them to optimise their performance during their tenure or to be concern about 
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 In 2013, 3.6 billion tons was burned. This means that, in order to achieve this goal, China can increase its 
annual coal use by only around 17% from the 2013 level before 2020. 
71
 The collection of the 12th Five-Year Plans for development of the electricity sector is available at 
http://www.ce.cn/cysc/ny/gdxw/201302/06/t20130206_21334762.shtml 
72
 The policy focused on closing small plants (below 50 MW capacity), larger older plants (less than 100 MW 
and in operation for over 20 years), and plants of less than 200 MW that have reached the end of their design 
life. 
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the economic and environmental status after they leave. Local officials usually work in the 
same position for less than 8 years, 6 years for lower level official, comprising two contracts 
of about 3 or 4 years duration. 
Through a stylised investment model, Alzate and Garcia (2012) conclude that a renewable 
portfolio standard (RPS) cannot induce socially optimal investment in renewable capacity 
because RPS promotes investment in renewable energy technology but underinvestment in 
the conventional technology.73  
The planning and regulatory documents set mandatory targets, but leave the details of 
implementation. Thus, to put the targets into practice, incentive-based instruments such as 
pricing mechanism and financial incentives are widely applied in China. We discuss pricing 
mechanism to facilitate the development of energy efficiency and renewable energy in China 
in the next section.  
3.5 Pricing Mechanism 
China implemented substantial reforms addressing electricity-pricing issues over the past 
three decades, resulting in a complex pricing system. At the early stage of reform, a key 
means to attract investment into electricity generation was an on-grid tariff that is the price 
paid to the generator by the network operator. This price helped to develop a market 
mechanism and to create competition in the generation sector.  
In 2004, China introduced user type retail pricing to reduce energy intensity. These user 
types included residential, light industry, heavy industry, commercial and agricultural and 
based on their voltage requirements. Section 2.5.3 discusses retail prices in more detail. In 
2007, the policy in China for on-grid tariff aims to phase out aged and small-sized coal-fired 
electricity generation plants by lowering their on-grid tariffs. In recent years, the rising 
concern about environmental protection and the promotion of clean energy utilisation 
prompted progressive development of renewable electricity generation on-grid tariffs. 
In the current system, governments at various levels strictly regulate electricity prices, 
including generation prices (or on-grid tariffs), transmission and distribution (T&D) prices and 
retail prices. 
3.5.1 Generation Prices 
In most cases, the NDRC fixes wholesale contract prices for electricity sold by generators to 
grid entities. These fixed wholesale contract prices differ for each generation type. The 
exception was in 2003 when the Chinese government introduced a trial of partially 
competitive wholesale market in some eastern and southern provinces, allowing generation 
prices to be determined through a competitive bidding process. The participating power 
plants could transact a maximum of 10 to 20 per cent their electricity through the market. 
However, there has been no further competitive bidding since the trials terminated in 2006. 
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 Constrained by the RPS, an investor has to develop a site that is not profitable in the socially optimal 
situation. To compensate the losses resulted from the investment in renewable energy, the investor has to 
obtain more profits from conventional capacity. To serve this goal, the investor can only set spot prices higher 
than the level under socially optimal capacity configuration – which induces a lower capacity margin (i.e., the 
level by which available electricity generation capacity exceeds the maximum expected level of demand) in the 
conventional technology. 
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3.5.1.1 Thermal-power Plants 
For the generation prices of electricity generated by thermal-power plants, the NDRC 
employs benchmark prices based on estimates of generation costs and recommendations 
from local pricing bureaus. Due to the different proximity to coal mines, generation prices for 
thermal-power plants differ between regions and provinces. In general, east China has the 
highest prices, followed by south China, north China and middle China, with northwest China 
as the lowest. 
Within a province, generation prices for thermal-fired electricity vary by technology types. For 
instance, coal-fired plants with the same desulphurisation enjoy the same price but differ 
from the price for other technologies such as hydropower. 
NDRC considers the changes in coal prices when determining prices for coal-fired electricity. 
Coal dominates the thermal-power plants due to the coal-intensive feature of China’s 
resources. Contrastingly, the price of coal fluctuates having been liberalised whereas there 
are fixed wholesale prices for electricity still being regulated. Therefore, a conflict between 
the liberalised coal price and the regulated electricity price arises. To solve this problem, in 
2004 the central government approved a price link between coal and electricity generated by 
coal-fired plants. According to this policy, the generation prices as well as retail prices of 
electricity will increase if the average price of coal increases by five percent or more in the 
previous a six-month period. However, NDRC only allowed a couple of co-movements over 
the whole of the past decade. 
3.5.1.2 Hydro-power Plants 
Prices for electricity from hydrogenation are not set in the method of benchmark. Instead, the 
price is set subject to costs and differs from project to project. Factors influencing prices 
include the hydrological and geological condition of plants, water adjustment capabilities of 
reservoirs, and specific requirements for possible resettlement during construction. The 
prices of large hydrogenation plants are approved by the NDRC and those of the smaller 
plants determined by provincial governments. 
Overall, the price of electricity from hydrogenation plants is much lower than that generated 
from other energy. Compared to the price of electricity generated from coal, wind and 
nuclear, and hydropower are lower by 30%, 60% and 44% respectively.74 Although it has 
been suggested for a while that electricity connected to the same grid should enjoy the same 
tariff.  Furthermore, the generation price of hydropower generated electricity remains very 
stable, partly because that coal price fluctuations do not influence hydropower much. 
3.5.1.3 Other Renewable Energy Plants 
China implemented a feed-in tariff (FiT) for electricity generated from renewable energy such 
as wind, solar and biomass.  The benchmark price for electricity from coal-generation plant 
provides the basis for the FiT, which differs across different techno-economic performances 
of renewable energy technologies, geographic locations, and availability of renewable 
energy resources. The FiT aims to reduce the risks of renewable electricity investment and 
to make it more competitive. 
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There are four fixed benchmark price regions for wind power generated electricity based on 
wind intensity regions, ranking in order from highest to lowest wind intensity: 
1. 0.51 RMB/kWh region includes northwest Inner Mongolia and northwest Xinjiang 
2. 0.54 RMB/kWh region includes east Inner Mongolia, north Hebei and west Gansu 
3. 0.58 RMB/kWh region including southern Xinjiang, southern Gansu, Ningxia and 
parts of Jilin and Heilongjiang 
4. 0.61 RMB/kWh region including regions not listed elsewhere 
There are three regionally based FiT for solar generated electricity: 0.9, 0.95 and 1 
RMB/kwh. Distributed solar generation has further subsidy of 0.42 RMB/kwh. 
The FiT for electricity generated from biomass plants is the 2005 benchmark price of 
desulfurized coal-fired plants in each region plus a subsidy of 0.25 RMB/kwh. 
The current FIT scheme fails to consider the vast variety of renewable source across 
different regions, as the richness of resources differs greatly in various areas (Zhang, S & He 
2013). 
3.5.1.4 Nuclear-power plants 
The generation prices for nuclear-power plants built after mid-2013 are based on a national-
wide benchmark, which is set at 0.43 RMB/kwh. This contrasts with the previous method 
with which the price of nuclear-power generated electricity is set subject to the costs of 
individual plants similar to electricity from hydrogenation plant discussed above. 
3.5.2 Transmission and Distribution Prices 
For a few decades, China used alternatives to basing its T&D prices on costs-of-service. 
T&D prices are the residual between generation prices paid to generators and retail prices 
charged to end users by the grid companies. Following the latest reforms launched in March 
2015, China has run trials in several places to set T&D prices based on cost-of-service, with 
Shenzhen as the leading city. 
3.5.3 Retail Prices 
China regulates its retail electricity prices and calculates them using a cost-plus principle that 
is quite similar to a cost-of-service regime (Teng, Wang & Zhiqiang 2014). Retail electricity 
prices comprise on-grid tariff (65-70%), variable taxes and surcharges (10-15%) and T&D 
charges (Edwards 2012; Teng, Wang & Zhiqiang 2014).  Surcharge examples at the national 
level include (1) Three Gorges Dam construction, (2) relocation subsidies for peoples 
displaced by the Dam project, (3) rural power grid maintenance, (4) urban public utility 
services and (5) for renewable energy project subsidies.  The NDRC determines retail prices 
for three types (1) residential, (2) agricultural and industrial and (3) commercial or other.  
These prices also consider voltage requirements 110V or 240V. In general, residential and 
agricultural prices are lower than the average price. 
To alleviate the pressure for installed capacity by phasing out inefficient companies, in 2004 
a differentiated electricity price scheme was implemented for six energy-intensive industries, 
including aluminium, ferroalloy, calcium carbide, caustic soda, cement, and steel.  
Companies based on their energy intensity within these industries were categorised as (1) 
encourage, (2) permit, (3) restrict, or (4) eliminate. The electricity prices for category (1) and 
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(2) companies were the normal electricity price for industry in their areas and category (3) 
and (4) companies were the normal electricity price for industry in their areas plus a 
surcharge. The 2006 revision of the pricing scheme included the phosphorus and zinc 
smelting industries.  The 2007 revision of the pricing scheme allowed local governments to 
receive the surcharge revenue to encourage provincial authorities to apply the scheme. 
Excepting the differentiated pricing scheme for the eight industries discussed, retail prices 
for the three categories of consumer are uniform within each province. In 2013, progressive 
electricity tariffs were introduced to residential consumers to encourage energy saving and 
to protect those with lower income. With the progressive tariff if total electricity consumption 
exceeds a consumption threshold, a higher fixed tariff is charged. The threshold varies 
between provinces. Only the residential consumers are subject to the progressive tariff other 
consumer receive a flat tariff. 
In price setting, the NDRC takes existing prices as the starting point rather than reviewing 
the costs in detail. This mechanism of setting retail electricity prices contributes to keep 
prices relatively low and stable, which is favourable for economic development and social 
stability but lacks transparency and poorly reflects costs, particularly environmental costs. 
However, the March 2015 reform improves price transparency and reflects costs by allowing 
large end users to transact directly with generators and generators, distributors and grid 
companies to sell electricity. 
As discussed in previous sections, the cost of generating electricity from renewable energy 
is higher and the on-grid tariffs paid by grid companies reflect this. All electricity users pay 
for the higher price of renewable energy in the form of surcharges that the grid companies 
incorporated into the retail prices. However, the grid companies lack reimbursement for the 
costs of building transmission lines and providing connections for renewable energy 
producers that are often remote and wide spread.  Moreover, the line loss for long-distance 
transmission is high. Thus, the grid companies have disincentive to integrate electricity 
generated from renewable energy.  The aim of China’s electricity reform in 2002 was to 
allow cost reflective electricity prices but renewable energy grid connection and transmission 
costs remained an issue. In response, reform in early 2015 intensifies the objective to 
introduce market mechanisms into the electricity sector. 
3.6 Financial Incentives 
We discuss other financial measures beside pricing mechanisms to incentivise energy 
efficiency and renewable energy investments including (1) capital subsidies, (2) preferential 
loans and tax incentives and (3) other support programs. 
3.6.1 Capital Subsidies 
Capital subsidies are direct financial transfers from governments to households or firms 
investing in low-emissions electricity generation such as solar PV cells or wind turbines. A 
key example allocated through annual national fiscal budget is the Renewable Energy 
Development Fund that supports research and development of renewable energy 
technologies, facilitate information dissemination, survey and investigate renewable energy 
resources and potentials, and support the development of renewable electricity projects 
particularly those in rural and remote areas. 
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3.6.2 Preferential Loans and Tax Incentives 
Preferential loans reduce the cost of borrowing to invest in low-emissions generation 
technologies. Direct tax incentives provide tax credits for investment in renewable generation, 
or for the production of renewable electricity. In China, tax incentives come from both central 
and local governments, and can be technology specific (Campbell, RJ 2014). The national 
scheme offers a reduced valued-added tax rate for electricity generated from renewable 
energy, including wind, small hydroelectricity and biomass. According to ‘The Implementing 
Regulations for Enterprise Income Tax Law’ promulgated in January 2008, companies 
engaging in projects development related to renewable energy and energy conservation 
technologies received a tax concession consisting of a three-year exemption plus three 
years of taxation at 50% of the full tax rate. 
3.6.3 Support Programs 
3.6.3.1 Top-1000 Energy-Consuming Enterprise Program 
The Top-1000 Energy-Consuming Enterprise Program (Top-1000 Program) is a national 
program launched in 2006, which aims to promote energy efficiency by setting energy-
saving targets for the largest and least efficient energy consuming companies. This program 
covers approximately 1,000 companies that consume about one-third of the country’s energy 
use in 2004. This project covers electricity generation companies, which comprise one of the 
major energy-consuming industries. 
In the 11th FYP period, the target of this program was to realise a saving of 100 million tons 
of coal equivalent (Mtce). This program allocates targets to included companies and each 
province and requires them to report their energy consumption quarterly to the National 
Bureau of Statistics. The NDRC reported a saving of over 150 Mtce surpassing the 11th FYP 
objective.75  Price et al. (2010) estimate the Top-1000 Program contributed 10% to 25% of 
the savings supporting China’s efforts to meet a 20% reduction in energy use per unit of 
GDP by 2010. 
The 12th FYP period Top-1000 Program target was set at 250 Mtce due to its success 
during the 11th FYP period. This makes the Top-1000 Program the world’s largest energy 
saving campaign, representing a contribution of approximately 38% to China’s energy saving 
goal. 76  Effectively implement such a large initiative requires the development of 
supplementary measures, including effective monitoring guidelines, a systematic means for 
gathering and disseminating energy-efficiency information such as guidebooks, database, 
software tools, and industry- or technology-specific energy efficiency reports to the 
participating companies, and so on (Price et al. 2011). 
3.6.3.2 Funding Programs Promoting Research and Technologies 
China offers a series of centrally managed programmes to fund science and technology 
research. There are three major research programmes supporting the technology 
development of energy efficiency and renewable energy (1) the National Basic Research 
Programme (Program973), (2) the National High-Tech Research and Development 
Programme (Program 863), and (3) the National Key Technologies R&D Program. 
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 http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1027/14140058.html 
76
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Program 973 initiated in 1997 to achieve technological and strategic edge in various 
fundamental and basic research includes energy as a major field.   Program topics closely 
related to the electricity sector include energy management and operational control of smart 
grid, power machinery’s efficient and clean thermal power conversion, pollutant formation 
and control of ultrafine particles formed during combustion of fossil fuels.  The State 
Programs of Science and Technology Development Annual Report states funding for the 
energy field in 2011 at CNY409.5 million that is 9.1% of the total fund of CNY4.5 billion. The 
finding was increase by CNY189.67 million in 2012. 
Program 863 established March 1986 was to stimulate the development of advanced 
technologies in a wide range of fields to strengthen China’s independent innovation capacity 
in the high-tech fields. Program 863 supports advanced energy technologies such as 
magnetic hydrodynamic generation and advanced nuclear reactors. The Chinese Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MoST) Annual Report states total funding in 2011 at CNY10.64 
billion with 18.4% allocated to energy research. In 2012, the total fund increased to 
CNY10.96 billion with 8.2% allocated to energy research. 
The National Key Technology R&D Program, initiated in 1982, is the first national program to 
address major science and technology issues. In contrast to Program 863, this key 
technology program focuses on industrial needs and innovation related to environmental 
pollution control and supports energy efficient. The total fund of this program was 
approximately CNY14.34 billion and CNY16.72 billion in 2011 and 2012 and the topics 
related to energy, resources and environment received 18.4% (i.e., 3.2% for energy, 6.6% 
for resources, and 8.6% for environment) and 14.1% (i.e., 3.7% for energy, 4.3% for 
resources, and 6.1% for environment), respectively. 
Another program focusing on Chinese small and medium enterprises (SME) in the field of 
energy conservation and emission reduction is the EU-China SME Energy Conservation and 
Emission Reduction Research Collaboration Fund, which supports collaboration with EU 
enterprises and research institutes to carry out joint research, technology transfer, re-
innovation and commercialisation of research results.77 
3.6.4 Review of Financial incentives 
Renewable energy subsidies contribute to increasing the share of renewables in energy 
consumption, improving energy efficiency, and addressing the remoteness of renewable 
energy generation from demand (Ouyang & Lin 2014). However, to alleviate energy poverty 
and to facilitate economic growth, the Chinese Government provides substantial subsidy and 
low interest loan to fossil fuels, which offsets the effect of China’s efforts to promote energy 
efficiency and renewable energy (Ouyang & Lin 2014; Reddy 2013). Using the price-gap 
approach to estimate energy subsidies Lin and Jiang (2011) find China’s energy subsidy 
amounted to CNY 356.73 billion in 2007, equivalent to 1.43% of GDP.  This approach 
quantifies the gap or subsidy as the difference between world energy prices and domestic 
end-user prices. 
Regarding the implementation of subsidies to renewable energy, payment delays by grid 
companies to renewable generators is common. This strains the cash flow of generators and 
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increases the risk and the overall cost of a project. According to NEA, the amount of delayed 
subsidy payments due to renewable generators by 2014 has reached over CNY 14 billion.78 
China’s research fund management and allocation features four key problems.  (1) 
Fragmented research fund management caused by many government departments, at both 
central and local levels, managing research-funding applications, leading to severe 
overlapping and inefficient use of fund. (2) The funding is not assigned to the competitive 
applicants. (3) Research applications consume half of researchers’ time. (4) Rent seeking as 
well as fund abuse is common. In early 2015, MoST announced two key research funding 
reforms eliminating Programs 973 and 863 by 2017 and establishing an independent 
institute to manage research funding. 
3.7 Pilot Incentive Measures 
3.7.1 The Energy Saving Power Dispatch (ESPD) 
Long-term contracts signed between generators and grid companies dominate electricity 
dispatch in China where the grid companies are obliged to allocate roughly equal operating 
hours to each contracted generator.  This ‘equal-share-dispatch’ mode rewards and allows 
inefficient plants to operate as much as the efficient ones, contrary to sound economic 
principles (Teng, Wang & Zhiqiang 2014). 
The NDRC, SERC and MEP jointly introduced Energy Saving Power Dispatch (ESPD) in 
2007 as an alternative and more efficiency dispatch method to equal-share-dispatch. ESPD 
divides generators into seven classes based on their carbon intensity. 
1. Inflexible dispatch renewable energy generators including wind, solar, tidal and 
hydro-power 
2. Flexible dispatch renewable energy generators including hydro-power, biomass 
and geothermal power and solid waste fired generators meeting environmental 
protection requirements 
3. Nuclear power plants 
4. Coal-fired cogeneration units running in terms of ‘electricity upon heat’ and units 
with comprehensive use of resources including residual heat, residual gas, 
residual pressure, coal gangue, coal bed/coal mine methane 
5. Natural gas and coal gasification based generation units 
6. Other coal-fired generators, including cogeneration units without heat load 
7. Oil and oil product fired generation. 
The ESPD applies to all the generators connected to the grid, except the generation units 
contracted in international agreement. ESPD ranks the units according to their energy 
efficiency within the seven classes and if units have the same energy efficiency, pollution 
emissions level determines the ranking. The order of dispatched is rank order from one to 
seven.  
Determining the power dispatching order in terms of efficiency and pollutant emission indices 
of generating units, the ESPD facilitated the full use of high efficiency units and renewable 
energy source. Nevertheless, the ESPD is essentially a centralized dispatch mechanism and 
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lacking a market mechanism (Ciwei et al. 2010; Yen-Chiang & Nannan 2010). Any national 
ESPD rollout stalled following the 2007 five province trial. 
The ESPD has many merits over equal-share-dispatch but does present the problem where 
coal generators take on a fast-ramping role that is both environmentally and efficiently 
suboptimal; coal generators running at a constant output operate both more efficiently and 
with fewer emissions per unit output.  A market dispatch approach with carbon pricing would 
minimise such suboptimal use of coal generation.  All generators would submit their marginal 
cost to supply electricity in five minutes intervals and the bids ranked with the cheaper bids 
accepted until supply met the demand.  The marginal cost of the generator in last bid where 
supply met demand would determine the price for electricity trade during those five-minutes. 
Under such a system, the faster ramping capable dispatchable hydroelectricity would take 
on the fast ramping role to take advantage of the higher prices obtained during peak 
demand leaving the more efficient and less emissions intensive coal plants to run even more 
efficiently at full capacity at a lower price.  This system would displace the less efficient and 
more emissions intensive coal plant. Additionally, the time dependent pricing signal 
incorporating a sufficient carbon pricing would encourage more investment in the flexible 
dispatchable renewable energy and energy storage and renewable energy generally and 
discourage investment in coal generation.  Note coal generates would generally submit two 
bids to supply electricity (1) a lower bid for supplying electricity up to their minimum 
operating level and (2) a higher bid for electricity supplied between their minimum operating 
level and maximum capacity. 
3.7.2 Demand Side Management 
By increasing the flexibility of electricity consumption, demand side management (DSM) 
provides a cost-effective method both for energy saving and accommodating renewable 
energy generated electricity. 
The main measure for DSM in each pilot city is peak load management. To capture the 
peak-shifting potential, the following methods are employed: widening the price between 
peak and off-peak loads; setting interruptible load protocols with customers; implementing 
special policies for energy-storing equipment; and so on (Hu, Z, Moskovitz & Zhao 2005; 
Zeng et al. 2013). However, it is not easy for China to move from pilots to national wide DSM 
(Yu 2012). Two key factors limit the application of DSM in China. (1) The setting of electricity 
prices do not reflect actual cost that is no real market prices or real time pricing exist (Kat 
2011). Hence, there is little space for price signals to motivate demand changes. For 
instance, lacking real-time pricing, the Jiangsu Province DSM pilot used two or three pricing 
periods to match the daily peak and off-peak load cycle. This coarse approximation to real 
time pricing reduces the effectiveness of DSM. (2) There is also a lack of a long-term, stable 
and sufficient funding (Yu 2010). (3) The relative size of residential electricity demand in 
China is less than 20%. This compares with over 30% in the US.  Therefore, using DSM on 
such a small portion of the demand reduces the effectiveness of DSM.  Chinese industrial 
electricity demand lacks the strong daily or seasonal cycles apparent in residential demand.   
Despite the limitations DSM, the margin for energy efficiency improvement by technical 
innovation is large (Yu 2010). 
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3.7.3 Carbon Emission Trade 
The emission-trading scheme is an instrument, which internalises the environmental 
externalities of carbon emissions through a market mechanism. Under this scheme, 
companies are assigned an emission quota and will profit from selling excess permits to 
other firms if their carbon emission is lower than the quota. China’s pilot carbon emission 
trading system was initiated in 2008.  An expanded pilot scheme included Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Hubei, covering 2000 businesses in 
energy-intensive industries. In 2014, about 15.68 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent 
were traded under these schemes, with a value of CNY570 million.79 The planned start date 
for the national emission-trading scheme is 2017. Relevant work has already started in 
several provinces, including Jiangxi. 
The electricity sector is China’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases and plays a crucial role 
both directly and indirectly in pricing carbon, so covered by the compulsory carbon-trading 
scheme. The carbon trading scheme or ‘cap and trade’ has two major components (1) 
determining the total allowable amount of carbon to be emitted known as the ‘cap’ and (2) 
and creating tradeable certificates for the right to emit carbon dioxide to the total allowable 
amount. Government gives or requires emitters to buy certificates for their current emissions. 
Emitters who reduce their emissions can sell their spare certificates.  This provides a profit 
motive for emitters who can reduce their emissions for less than the value of the certificate.  
Theoretically, the mechanism provides the least cost method to reduce emissions.  The price 
of carbon passes through to the end consumer with the more carbon intensive goods 
becoming relatively more expense. This induces the consumer to use less carbon intensive 
goods or swap to cheaper less carbon intensive alternative. Over time, the government can 
reduce the size of the cap or total emissions, which will raise the value of the certificates and 
make it more profitable for companies to reduce emissions. 
However, the highly regulated wholesale and retail electricity prices and the equal-share-
dispatching policy in China’s electricity sector mutes the intended effect of an emission 
trading scheme on prices (Teng, Wang & Zhiqiang 2014). This in turn limits the impact of 
emission trading system on the development of energy efficiency and renewable energy in 
the electricity sector.  
For example, one of the three main mechanisms for carbon emission trading is the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) that is defined in Kyoto Protocol to assist developing 
countries to achieve the sustainable development through technologies provided by 
developed countries aiming to reduce emissions. Schroeder (2009) and Lewis, JI (2010) 
investigate CDM’s role in promoting China’s renewable energy. They find CDM has provided 
useful subsidy for renewable energy projects in China but CDM cannot be consider to be the 
main driver of renewable energy deployment, as the total amount of emission reduction 
achieved through the CDM is just about three percent in China, which is a small share of 
total annual greenhouse gas emissions. 
3.8 Reform in 2015 
The growth in the Chinese economy and electricity demand are slowing and the installed 
capacity and supply of electricity exceeds demand. This situation offers time and space for 
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China to undertake new electricity sector reforms. Inefficiency in the grid monopoly is a 
major source for criticism. The State Council electricity reform in 2015 aimed to introduce 
competition into the wholesale and retail electricity sectors, key examples include (1) bidding 
for the connection of electricity generation to the electrical grids, (2) private investors will be 
allowed to access electricity retail, and (3) an electricity trade centre established for the 
large-users.80  
The State Council discussed the separation of transmission and distribution but the State 
Grid Corporation continues to maintain its monopoly over both transmission and distribution.  
Additionally, the newly established dispatch centre lacks independence and central planning 
continues to control electricity dispatch. There lacks consensus on whether government 
driven industrial policies can promote the development of certain industries and which 
policies are the most effective in the energy transformation. Finally, whether consumers will 
benefit from retail price competition is questionable, as retail competition does not seem to 
deliver lower electricity prices to retail customers across the board or over time (Su 2015). 
3.9 Conclusion 
China’s transition from a centrally planned economy to a more market based economy is 
occurring during a period of increasing global inequality and the requirement to address 
climate change.  Both inequality and climate change issues are relevant to the energy sector. 
Additionally, the transition to what form of market-based economy China wishes to become 
is also relevant to the electricity sector. There are an array of choices forming a continuum 
from a mixed economy like Norway or Denmark with higher human development indices and 
social cohesion but lower GDP per capita to a more market orientated economy like the USA 
with a lower human development index and social cohesion but higher GDP per capita. 
China has successfully introduced the world’s largest emission trading scheme to ready 
China’s adaptation to climate change but as discussed the centrally planned electricity 
pricing mutes the transformative effect of a carbon price on people’s decision making.  
However, both the Energy Saving Power Dispatch (ESPD) and Jiangsu Province DSM pilots 
provide examples of central planned schemes that mimic a market price signal.  While both 
schemes have flaws, they do provide the opportunity to transition China to more market 
orientated schemes and develop some of the technology required for a market base 
approach, such as metering for time of use and time of supply. 
Countries around the world are grappling with the issues of higher penetrations of renewable 
energy.  While high penetrations of renewable generation are technically feasible, they 
difficult to realise because market design presents a barrier to cost-effective integration of 
variable power generation (Riesz, Gilmore & Magnus 2013). The requirement for institutional 
structure and regulations that promote allocative efficiency is particularly pertinent to the 
complex electricity sector, which is essential to the national economy and living standards of 
people. The balance between market mechanism and government intervention deserves a 
careful consideration in developing a mixed economy.  For instance, there is a strong 
positive correlation between the promulgation of relevant policies and the increasing rate of 
projects promoting energy efficiency and renewable energy (Zhao et al. 2011). 
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Five major challenges facing the Chinese electricity sector include (1) failure to connect 
renewable energy to the electricity grids causing a significant spillage, (2) incomplete 
financing systems for renewable energy projects, (3) inadequate investment in the technical 
research and development for renewable energy, and lack of (4) policy coordination and 
consistency and (5) the government’s capacity in policy implementation. 
Pricing mechanisms require rationalisation and development (Jiang, Sun & Liu 2010; Zhang, 
H, Pu & Zhang 2013). Expanded financing channels are preferable to support the investment 
in renewable energy projects and to facilitate renewable energy related technology 
innovation (Liu et al. 2014). Policy coordination and implementation processes also require 
more attention as they have become obvious barriers to efficient regulation of the electricity 
sector. 
Xu (2010) identifies a lack of government capacity in policymaking and implementation in 
many areas such as energy and environment sector. Notably, in the last 17 years the 
Chinese electricity sector underwent four major institutional restructures but retains the 
central planning mechanism.  While countries around the world are grappling with the 
integration of higher penetrations of renewable energy into their electricity grids by improving 
existing market design, China has developed an emissions trading scheme but still lacks any 
other market mechanisms to help coordinate the integration. 
  
   
 
 
page77 
 
 
4 Australia’s electricity sector: oversold and poorly implemented 
neoliberal policies and uncoordinated climate and energy policies 
China’s new low-carbon policies will have a profound effect on Sino-Australian relations.  
The overall effect of these policies and China’s transition to a more services based economy 
on Australian economy and the interrelationship between climate change adaptation and 
mitigation and inclusive growth were discussed in Chapter 2.  In contrast, this chapter 
discusses barriers to transitioning to a low carbon future with inclusive growth in the 
Australian energy sector and in particular the electricity sector.  We also contrast Australia 
and China’s electricity systems transition to a low carbon future. 
China and Australia rank among the top three countries in the world for solar and wind 
resources (Drew 2016).  The land areas of mainland China and Australia are comparable at 
9.6 and 7.7 million square kilometres.  The Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) 
stretches 5,000 km from far north Queensland to Tasmania involving a remarkable 
geographical (AEMO 2016). In comparison, a straight-line journey between Chengdu-
Ulaanbaatar-Pyongyang-Busan-Fukuoka-Osaka is 5,000 km.  Importantly, Georgilakis (2008) 
finds that increasing geographic spread increases the predictability, reduces variability and 
minimises near-zero or peak output events of variable renewable energy such as solar and 
wind (Bell et al. 2015).  The abundant solar and wind resources and geographic spread 
presents China and Australia’s electricity systems with similar renewable energy integration 
challenges and advantages.  Additionally, both China and Australia’s electricity systems 
heavy reliance on coal generation presents a similar challenge to transitioning a low carbon 
future. 
China’s electricity sector is experimenting with moving away from its command-and-control 
approach towards using a market based approach and some privatisation, as discussed in 
Chapter 3.  Teng, Jotzo and Wang (2017) calculates that if China’s electricity sector adopted 
a market-based approach, it would half the price of China’s Emissions Trading Scheme.  
These savings provides a motivation for China’s electricity sector to adopt a more market-
based approach.  Informatively, Australia adopted neoliberal policies in the 1980s, which 
lead to adopting a market-based approach within its energy sector, including deregulation 
and privatisation.  Noting, this deregulation and privatisation is partially incomplete in some 
states. 
However, prior to deregulation and privatisation, Australia had some of the cheapest 
domestic energy prices in the world but afterwards Australia’s domestic energy prices rose 
rapidly and Australia had a gas supply crisis (CWA 2017).  Consequently, the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC 2017) is conducting a major investigation of 
the NEM.  An OECD international comparison of retail electricity prices saw Australia’s 
domestic electricity price ranking move from fourth to tenth cheapest between 2004 and 
2016 (ACCC 2017).  The OECD calculations most probable underestimates the price 
increase because the OECD uses the average of lowest tariff advertised by each retailer in 
each jurisdiction weighted by the number of customers.  In a more realistic appraisal, Carbon 
Energy Markets find retail prices in the states of South Australia, Victoria, Queensland and 
NSW are among the six most expensive countries in the OECD (ACCC 2017).  These price 
rises saw Australia’s economy lose cheap domestic energy as a competitive advantage and 
prompted a major political debate.   
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Implementing the neoliberal policies in the energy sector also contributed to increased 
inequality with Australia’s income Gini index increasing from 0.302 to 0.323 between 1994-
95 and 2016-17 and wealth Gini index increasing from 0.573 to 0.605 between 2013-14  and 
2016-17 (ABS 2017d).  Australia’s implementation of neoliberal policies in the energy sector 
has reduced inclusive growth (MRC 2017). 
China will have the world’s largest Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) once implemented.  In 
contrast, Australia became the first country in the world to dismantle an ETS despite the 
success of the scheme in mitigating emissions and providing least costs abatement.  Prior to 
implementation, financially vulnerable individuals were overcompensated via tax breaks and 
increases in transfer payments for any pass-through of a carbons price to retail prices.  
Australia has lacked a credible and coherent national climate policy since the Abbott 
Coalition Government dismantled the ETS in 2014 (Butler 2017; Turnbull 2009).  The 
Australian Department of Energy and Environment (DEE 2017) published emissions 
projections showing Australia will clearly fail to meet its Paris commitment and emissions 
targets.  The projections forecast Australia’s 2020 and 2030 emissions at 551 and 570 Mt 
CO2-e, which are respectively 5% and 29-33% above the 2020 and 2030 targets. 
The Australian Climate Change Authority and Australian Electricity Market Commissions 
(CCA & AEMC 2017) recommend bringing together energy and climate change agendas 
and observe the lack of cohesion between energy and emissions policy places considerable 
pressure on the Australian National Electricity Market’s (NEM) ability to supply secure and 
low cost electricity for Australian businesses and consumers.  Heeding these calls, the 
Turnbull Coalition Government commissioned Australia’s Chief Scientist Finkel to review and 
make recommendations on integrating climate and energy policies.  However, the Finkel 
Review (Finkel et al. 2017) reframed the emissions debate from an economy-wide issue 
under the ETS to an electricity sector only issue.  Turnbull rejected the Finkel Review’s 
recommendation for a Clean Energy Target to mitigate emissions and instead outlined a 
National Energy Guarantee (NEG) policy without crucial details.  Australia still lacks a 
creditable national policy to mitigate emissions to reach the 2020 and 2030 targets. 
In addition to bringing together energy and emissions policies, the OECD (2017e) 
recommends bringing together the growth and climate agendas, calculating that integrating 
measures to tackle climate change into regular economic policy will have a positive impact 
on economic growth over the medium and long term, claiming the transition to zero 
emissions can produce inclusive growth (OECD 2017a), as discussed in Chapter 1. 
This chapter has two subsections.  Subsection 1 evaluates Australia’s implementation of 
neoliberal policies to electricity sector and reviews the success and failures.  In this 
evaluation, we consider the pre-existing faults in the NEM before investigating the 
modification required for the transition to a low carbon future in Subsection 2.  Subsection 2 
discusses integrating the climate change policy with energy policy to improve inclusive 
growth (OECD 2017a) and the pivotal role of the electricity sector in the transition to a low 
emission economic (TAI 2017b). 
4.1 Poor implementation and overselling of neoliberal policies 
We discuss the aims of the neoliberal policy and provide a description of the NEM.  
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Neoliberal Policies 
Quinn (2008) finds countries with high levels of public ownership have high levels of 
corruption. This situation favours privatisation.  However, there are countries with moderate 
levels of public ownership and public provision of service that have higher levels of HDI than 
those with extreme levels of privatisation and public service provisions through the private 
sector (UNDP 2016).  We contend that these two factors indication some optimal level of 
privatisation and private provision of public services between two extremes but tending to 
favour privatisation and private provision of public services.  This observation is consistent 
with Ostry, Loungani and Fureceri (2016) who conclude that neoliberalism has been 
oversold and there is a requirement for an evidence-based approach to decision making 
rather than faith.  We review the success of the neoliberal polices implemented in the 
Australian electricity sector to inform any potential privatisation in Chinese electricity sector 
and to assess the institutional readiness of Australia’s electricity system for climate change 
(Foster et al. 2013). 
Ostry, Loungani and Fureceri (2016) define neoliberalism’s two main planks.  
1. Smaller role for the state through privatization and limits on the ability of governments 
to run fiscal deficits and accumulate debt’ 
2. Increased competition through deregulation and the opening up of domestic markets, 
including financial markets, to foreign competition 
We specifically discuss privatisation and competition in relation to the electricity sector and 
the observation by Ostry, Loungani and Fureceri (2016) that FDI associated with knowledge 
transfer increases inclusive growth.  Goodman and Loveman (1991) state that the pros and 
cons of privatization can be measured against the standards of good management—
regardless of ownership and make three conclusions. 
1. Neither public nor private managers will always act in the best interests of their 
shareholders. Privatization will be effective only if private managers have incentives 
to act in the public interest, which includes, but is not limited to, efficiency. 
2. Profits and the public interest overlap best when the privatized service or asset is 
in a competitive market. It takes competition from other companies to discipline 
managerial behaviour. 
3. When these conditions are not met, continued governmental involvement will likely 
be necessary. The simple transfer of ownership from public to private hands will not 
necessarily reduce the cost or enhance the quality of services. 
Stone (2017) finds both neither public nor private provision inherently efficient or inefficient 
and he stresses that three efficiencies technical, allocative and dynamic be evaluated over 
the short and long term in any decisions to privatise or outsource government services. 
The National Electricity Market (NEM) 
The NEM has five major institutions: 
 The Council of Australian Government (CoAG) Energy Council provides broad policy 
direction for rule setting within the NEM.   
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 The Australian Energy Market Commissions (AEMC) oversees the development of 
new rules.  
 The Australian Energy Regular (AER) oversees the enforcement of the rules.   
 The Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), the independent systems operator, 
oversees the day-to-day running of the NEM. 
 Energy Security Board – established on the recommend of Finkel Review to 
coordinate the other institution and ensure long-term energy security. 
Figure 20 shows the topology of the five states comprising the Australian National Electricity 
Market (NEM): Queensland (QLD), New South Wales (NSW), South Australia (SA), 
Tasmania (TAS) and Victoria (VIC).  The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) is located within 
NSW.  The number of lines between each state represents the number of interstate 
transmission lines or interconnectors. Both the Northern Territory (NT) and Western 
Australia (WA) have their own independent electricity markets and networks unconnected to 
the NEM and both are relatively small compared to the NEM. 
Figure 20: Topology of the states and interconnectors comprising the National Electricity Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implementing neoliberal policies required the separation of Australia’s vertically integrated 
State electricity monopolies into four parts retail, transmission, distribution and generation 
(Newbery 2018).  Intending, competition within the deregulated and privatised retail and 
generation sectors would promote innovation and efficiency to reduce prices and regulation 
of the privatised natural monopolies in the distribution and transmission sectors would act 
similarly.  This plan fits with Goodman and Loveman (1991). 
The neoliberal polices progressed at differing rates in each state, as each state is an 
independent jurisdiction.  In the late 1990’s, Victoria became the first state to implement a 
competitive wholesale electricity market modelled on the UK’s energy system.  In 1998, the 
NEM formed allowing the interconnection of states and the trading of electricity in the 
wholesale electricity market. 
As discussed, the electricity retail price rises are under investigation by the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC 2017).  One measure of the effectiveness 
of the neoliberal policies in each sector is the contribution of each sector to price increases 
in domestic electricity prices.  Figure 21, the estimated increase in average residential bill 
per customer from 2007-08 to 2016-17, shows that the bill increased by 43.7% and the 
contributions to the increase are network 40%, retail 26%, wholesale 17% and 
environmental or green charges 16%.  This bill increase of 43.7% between 2007 and 2017 
provides an annual compound rate of 8% per cent more than twice the growth in wages (3.1 
per cent) and inflation (2.4 per cent).  In contrast, there was a 63.4 per cent increase in 
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c/kWh between 2007-08 and 2016-17. The increased bill and c/kWh rates differ because 
retail customers reduced electricity demand between 2007-08 and 2016-17.   
Figure 21: Estimated increase in average residential bill per customer from 2007-08 to 2016-17, NEM 
mainland, - real value in 2015-16 dollars, excluding GST 
 
(Source: ACCC 2017, fig. 2.5 ) 
We discuss five major issues that require addressing in the NEM.  (1) There is a lack of 
competition in both the generation and retail sectors exacerbated by three large vertically 
integrated retail-generators.  (2) The half-hourly settlement period allows gaming of the 
wholesale spot market.  (3) Unpredictable outages in the ageing coal generators and the 
requirement to extend the frequency control market to include shorter response times.  (4) 
There is ineffectual competition in the retail sector – lots of customer churn but little 
innovations and the three lager retail-generators remain dominate.  (5) There is a 
misalignment of the incentives in the network sector with the public good and missing 
economies of scale.   
4.1.1 Market power and the vertically integrated retail-generators 
As Goodman and Loveman (1991) discussed, the alignment of profits and the public good 
requires competition but the NEM has three vertically integrated retail-generators AGL, 
EnergyAustralia and Origin Energy that dominate both the retail and generation sectors in 
VIC, NSW and SA, see Figure 22, Figure 24 and Figure 23.  These three retail-generators 
dominate QLD’s retail sector but other companies dominate in QLD’s generator sector.  
Importantly, capacity constraints on the interconnector between the states provide for 
separate market prices for each state, which amplifies the ability to exercise market power 
within each state (Bell et al. 2017).   
Two factors further amplify the market power of the retail-generators.  (1) The usual 
requirement to make financial ‘hedge’ contracts to manage the risk of future wholesale 
prices of electricity between retailers and generators is internally managed within a retail- 
generator company.  This internal hedging reduces cost and risk to retail-generators, which 
provides a competitive advantage to the retail-generator and presents a barrier to new 
entrance to the industry.  The internal hedging also reduces the number of potential hedging 
contracts for the retail only or generation only companies, which also provides a competitive 
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advantage to the retail-generator and presents a barrier to new entrance to the industry.  (2)  
Companies seeking finance to build new generators require power purchase agreements 
(PPA) from retailers.  The retail-generators can purchase their own PPA.  This internal PPA 
transaction reduces the number of potential retailers to purchase PPA, which presents a 
further barrier to entry for new generation companies.  However, there is a recent trend to 
bypass retailers and negotiate PPAs directly with customer (ACCC 2017). 
Figure 22: Retail Electricity Market Share (residential customers), March 2017 
 
(Source: ACCC 2017, fig. 3.9) 
Figure 23: Market share by generation capacity 
 
(Source: ACCC 2017, fig. 3.2) 
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Figure 24: Market share by generation dispatch, 2016-17 
 
(Source: ACCC 2017, fig. 3.3) 
Splitting the retail-generating companies into separate retail and generating companies with 
the requirement that all hedge contracts go via the Australian stock exchange would help 
improve competition and make it easier for new retail only and generation only companies to 
enter the NEM.  Similarly, building a high capacity transmission backbone through the states 
in the NEM would also promote competition between the generators to reduce wholesale 
market prices (Bell et al. 2017). 
Notably, reducing market power within the NEM by splitting the retail-generators and 
improving transmissions would also help reduce the cost of integrating renewable energy 
into the NEM.  Three key reasons include. (1) PPAs would be easier to obtain for new 
renewable generation installations.  (2) The high capacity transmission backbone through 
the NEM would also allow for the integration of higher penetrations of variable renewable 
energy (Bell et al. 2017).  (3) Currently, the retailer-generators can profitably circumvent their 
Large Renewable Energy Target obligations of the retail side of the business.  Providing 
motivation to circumvent their obligations, the retail-generators are the largest owners of coal 
generators and introducing further renewable energy into the NEM reduces the profitability of 
the coal generators.  Additionally, the retail-generators can extract extra profits from the 
NEM for their coal generators using strategic bidding to increase wholesale spot prices 
detailed in Section 4.1.2.  The increased profits for generators covers any penalties the retail 
side of the business pays for failing to meet its LRET obligations.  The wholesale spot price 
increases are passed onto the retail customers.  In effect, the retail customers are paying for 
the penalties imposed on the retail-generators for failing to meet their LRET obligations. 
However, the absence of market power alone is insufficient for competition to align with the 
public good.  We discuss the unique features of the household retail sector in section 4.1.4. 
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Furthermore, the “to big to fail” issue arises whenever a retailer or generator become a 
significant portion of the market.  This issue becomes even more problematic for retail-
generators affecting both markets.  A potential source of financial stress is the rapid decline 
in renewable energy prices, which reduces the asset value of the fossil fuel generators.  The 
three retail-generators own the largest portion of NEM’s fossil fuel generation making them 
potentially susceptible to financial stress.  Therefore, sufficient financial provision for the 
closure and clean-up costs of the fossil fuel generation should be transferred into the newly 
formed generation company if a retail-generator is split. 
Similarly, foreign ownership of crucial energy infrastructure, such as the electricity system, 
presents an economy wide risk as many of these energy companies are exposed to a 
decline in fossil fuel asset values. 
4.1.2 The half-hourly settlement period allowing gaming of the market 
Exacerbating the market power within the generation sector is the way that the NEM 
calculates the half-hourly settlement price paid to each generator. The settlement price is the 
weighted average of six 5-minute periods dispatch prices determined by last generator’s 
dispatch bid to meet electricity demand.  Under the current rules, any generator can rebid a 
5-minute interval at a higher price prior to dispatch without providing enough time for 
competing peaking gas generators to ramp up to meet higher price interval.  This strategic 
bidding or “market gaming” provides above normal profits for the fossil generators (ACCC 
2017). 
The gaming allows a transfer of wealth from the electricity consumers to the shareholders 
and management of the retail-generators to reduce inclusive growth.  The gaming is legal 
and the retail-generators are only acting in the best interest of their shareholders albeit 
damaging to other businesses and exacerbating inequality. 
The AER took proceeding against the generation company Stanwell for strategic bidding in 
February 2008 when spot prices reached $9,000 per MWh but the Federal Court dismissed 
the AER’s case in August 2011.  Following this dismissal, AEMC replaced the rule “bids are 
made in good faith” with a rule specifically prohibiting strategic bidding (ACCC 2017) 
commencing 1 July 2016.   
However, this rule change prohibiting strategic bidding did not deter the strategic bidding in 
SA in July 2016.  The Melbourne Energy Institute (MEI 2016) found evidence of strategic 
bidding in South Australia when wholesale electricity prices reached record levels in July 
2016 shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Number of high price settlement period in each of the four mainland NEM regions for the 
financial years FY10 through FY16, and July 2016 
 
(Source: MEI 2016) 
Contributing to the situation are four factors.  (1) Market power exercised by the generation 
companies in SA discussed in the above section.  (2) The increase in gas prices related to 
the LNG exports and SA being heavily reliant on gas generation.  (3) The disorderly 
sequence if station withdraws and mothballing and interconnector upgrades.  (4)  SA having 
the highest penetration of wind generation in any liberalised energy-only markets.81 
The increase in domestic gas prices induced by LNG exports is a consequence of reliance 
on neoliberal polices rather than planning an energy strategy.  The AEMO has predicted a 
major gas shortage in 2018 and there is discussion of market intervention to restrict exports 
if the energy companies fail to reserve more gas for domestic use.82  Chapter 2 discussed 
the lack of planning in the gas sector. 
The Finkel Review recommended that three years notice of generation closure be given to 
allow construction of new generation.  The Federal Government accepted this 
recommendation. 
The AEMC is changing the settlement period from 30-minutes to 5-minutes commencing 1 
July 2021.83  This change will reduce the ability of the generators to engage in strategic 
bidding. 
Both the three-year advance notice of closure and the 5-minute settlement period remedy 
existing faults in the NEM.  Moreover, both changes help reduce the cost and improve the 
stability of the NEM in the transition to zero emissions.  The 5-minute settlement is 
fundamental to integrating variable renewable energy and storage to rewards dispatchable 
renewable energy and storage for matching the supply of variable renewable energy with 
electricity demand.  The three-year advance notice of closure would provide time to replace 
the retiring coal generation stations with pump-hydro storage or equivalent storage.84  The 
only misgiving is that the change to a 5-minute period will take over three years allowing the 
generators to continue gaming the market and acting as a barrier to the integration of 
renewable energy.  The delay will cost the public more and exacerbate emissions. 
                                               
81
 http://reneweconomy.com.au/sa-power-prices-inflated-generators-gaming-market-says-report-87163/ 
82
 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09-25/gas-shortfall-could-be-worse-than-expected-accc-aemo-report-
says/8984306 
83
 http://www.aemc.gov.au/Rule-Changes/Five-Minute-Settlement 
84
 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-16/pumped-hydro-sites-identified-in-sa/8623758 
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4.1.3 Frequency control and unpredictable outages in the ageing coal 
generators 
In addition to the incident of generators gaming of the market in July 2016 discussed above, 
South Australia had a blackout that covered the entire state in September 2016. 85  
Consequently, the South Australia Government entered into a contract with Tesla to build 
the world’s largest lithium battery at a South Australian windfarm called the Hornsdale Power 
Reserve (HPR) to provide price and system stability. 86   HPR also provides Frequency 
Control Ancillary Services (FCAS) with response times as fast 200 milliseconds.  However, 
the AEMO offers payment for FCAS in three response times 5 minute, 60 second and 6 
seconds. Tesla claims that ’30 to 40%’ of its fast response service is unpaid as HPR 
responds too quickly to register for the fastest rate of 6 seconds.87 
Traditionally, the coal and gas generators provided FCAS but The Australia Institute (TAI 
2017a) finds the age of these generators is increasing their susceptibility to severe weather 
and making them more prone to unpredictable failure.  Exacerbating this susceptibility is the 
increase in intensity and number of severe weather events.  Additionally, as the penetration 
of renewable energy increases, there will be fewer coal and gas generators to provide FCAS, 
making the NEM even more susceptible to their failure. 
The Finkel Review recommended changing rules to better incentivise distributed energy 
resources in providing FCAS and voltage control.  The Federal Government has accepted 
the recommendation and the AEMO is currently reviewing the FCAS market with a view to 
introduce shorter response times, which would smooth the transition to zero emissions.88 
4.1.4 The retail sector 
The ACCC (2017) provides an extensive review of the retail sector.  (1) The evidence shows 
that privatisation and deregulation has been a costly failure for customers in the NEM but 
profitable for companies operating in the NEM.  (2)  The retailers cite customer churn as an 
indication of competition.  However, customer churn is a misguided indication of competition 
aligning with the public good as it only adds to the cost of the service with little evidence of 
innovation and the three large retail-generators have maintained their dominance in the 
sector.  (3) Retail domestic customers are largely disengaged from selecting from the 
multiple offers made by the retails, which allow retailers maintain higher profits.  (4)  The 
retail tariffs largely fail to reflect the underlying drivers for investment in generation and 
network infrastructure, so fail to provide a price signal to promote behavioural change in 
customers to reduce these drivers for further investments.  The wholesale spot price is a 
driver for generation investment.  Peak demand is a driver for network investment.  Section 
4.1.5 discusses network investment further. 
Figure 25 shows the increase in retail electicity index adjusted for inflation.  Electricity prices 
rise were far in excess of wage growth and price rises in other sectors of the economics.  
Between 2007 and 2017, electrcity compound annual growth rate was 8 per cent.  In 
comeparison wage and consumer price index were 3.1 and 2.4 per cent repectively. 
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Figure 25: Retail electricity price index (inflation adjusted) Australian capital cities 
 
(Source: ACCC 2017, fig. 1.2)  
Figure 26 shows the progressive deregulation process by state with Victoria leading the way 
to full deregulation retail prices and Tasmania lagging all other states.  However, Victoria has 
highest retail costs.  Compounding the failure of privatisation and deregulation in Victoria is 
the fact that Victoria has the highest population density making network operation relatively 
cheaper per person.  The lowest retail prices are in regulated Tasmania. 
Figure 26: Full retail contestability and prices regulation by state 
 
(Source: ACCC 2017, fig. 3.8) 
Figure 27 shows the number of residential disconnections by NEM region from 2010 to 2016.  
Notable Victora proportionaltly had the largest increase in disconnections.  NSW had a 
significant increases in disconnection in 2014 when the retail sector was deregulated.  The 
shape of disconnection profile for VIC and NSW follows the shape of the electrcity retail 
price index for Melbourne and Sydney in Figure 25. The shape rise in disconnections show 
that privatisation and deregulation has been particularly harsh for the most financial 
vulnerable. 
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Figure 27: Residential disconnections by NEM region (2010-2016) 
 
(Source: ACCC 2017, fig. 4.2) 
As part of the neoliberal policies being implemented in Australia, the AEMC’s introduced the 
“Power of choice” 89  that ‘provides more opportunities for consumers to make informed 
choices about the way they use electricity based on the benefits that end use services 
provide. Ultimately, consumers will be in the best position to decide what works for them.’ 
There was an expectation that retail domestic customers would engage with the multiple 
choices on offer in a privatised and deregulated market and so align competition with the 
public good.  However, any engagement was slight.  What went wrong with the AEMC’s 
“Power of Choice”? 
The “Power of choice” assumes the mainstream neoclassical economics’ view of humans as 
utility maximising agents that has been shown to be at odds with psychology for over 40 
years.  Bounded rationality presents a more realistic version of human psychology that is 
people have limited time and computational ability and use heuristics or short cuts in making 
decisions.  Chapter 5 discusses and compares neoclassical economics’ view of humans as 
utility maximising agents with psychology and behavioural economics’ view of humans as 
bounded rationally.  We discuss the “Power of choice” and contrast its neoclassical 
economics’ view of human behaviour against the more realistic bounded rationality. 
There are over 1,600 offers available to small customers in the NEM and retailers present 
offers in ways that makes them difficult to compare (ACCC 2017).  However, people can 
usually only hold seven options in working memory at one time.  A solution to a limited 
working memory is websites that compare offers but the (ACCC 2017) found the comparison 
sites misleading the public, which served to undermine faith in the comparison sites.  
Additionally, the (ACCC 2017) has found misleading and deceptive adverting among the 
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retailers, including the big three retail-generators, and subcontractors.  The courts 
prosecuted these retailers, including the big three, and a comparison website company for 
misleading and deceptive adverting.  A government comparison website was developed but 
this also drew little interest from retail customers. 
Furthermore, one needs to consider that the privatisation and deregulation of the electricity 
sector was part of the neoliberal policies implemented throughout the Australian economy, 
including privatising health insurance, schools, superannuation and telecommunications.  
There are far more choices to make across a range of sectors.  Notably, both private schools 
and health insurance are undergoing major price increases similar to electricity retail prices.  
Privatisation and competition working in the public good to hold down prices has also failed 
in these sectors.  The privatisation of health, education and retail electricity has served to 
concentrate wealth and perpetuate inequality. 
While the price increases in the electricity retail sector are under investigation by the ACCC 
(2017), the price increases in the private health insurance sector are under investigation by 
the Australian Senate Community Affairs Reference Committee (CARC 2017).  The 
Australian Government subsidises private health insurance.  There are approximately 
46,500 private health insurance products.  This presents amazing choice.  However, private 
health insurance is similar to the electricity sector with its deceptive advertising and complex 
to understand and difficult to compare policies.  Two factors further exacerbating decision-
making difficulty in the medical insurance sector. (1) Medical goods and services are more 
complex and diverse than electricity, making the comparison of policies even more difficult 
for the public.  (2) The 46,500 health insurance products compared to the 1,600 offers in the 
retail electricity would make decision making in health insurance relatively more difficult.  In 
addition to policy price increases, there has been an increase in “junk” policies, out-of-pocket 
expenses and exclusions.  Chapter 5 discusses the poor cost effectiveness and outcomes of 
the US health system that Australia is imitating with its privatisation of health insurance. 
The Australian education has undergone privatisation to provide people with more “Power of 
choice”.  The privatised schools are subsidised by the Government.  However, the cost of 
education has doubled since 1988 and Australian student performance in national and 
internal assessments has decline in real and relative terms.90  The Federal Government 
commissioned Gonski to lead a major review of Australian education.  Australia is imitating 
the US with its mediocre, unequal and expensive education system.91  As well as being 
expensive and leading to overall mediocre results, a privatised education system 
institutionalises intergenerational poverty and privilege. 92  The privatisation and diverting 
government funds from public to private schools is undermining inclusive growth.  Tax 
breaks for school donations exacerbate the situation.  
Privatisation and competition works well in many areas of the economy but in the retail 
electricity, health insurance and education sectors the neoliberal policies are failing.  Chapter 
5 discusses the limited domain of applicability of neoclassical economics and its relationship 
to neoliberal policies. 
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4.1.5 Networks: misaligned incentives and inappropriate regulations 
The ACCC (2017) discussed how network costs are the largest part of the retail bill and 
contributed to the largest increase in costs from 2007 to 2016 see Figure 21.  The 
transmissions distribution networks are natural monopolies, so privatisation without the 
prospect of competition requires ongoing regulation. Goodman and Loveman (1991) state 
the simple transfer of ownership from public to private hands will not necessarily reduce the 
cost or enhance the quality of services.  Neither public nor private managers will always act 
in the best interests of their shareholders and managers require incentives to act in the 
public interest, which includes, but is not limited to, efficiency.   
We consider three aspects. (1) Why did the regulation of network fail to prevent massive 
cost increases?  (2) What are the right incentives for managers of a network?  (3)  What 
options are there to reduce the ongoing financial burden of overbuilding in networks?  
There are at least five reasons for the massive cost increase of networks. (1) The NEM 
provides network companies with a guaranteed return on their assets.  This guaranteed 
return incentivises them to build more network infrastructure and provided little incentive to 
become efficient or use methods to defer investment in infrastructure such as demand side 
management, virtual generators or energy storage.  The ACCC (2017) notes a deterioration 
in network efficiency. (2) The 2006 National Electricity Rules were prescriptive allowing the 
network companies to justify the building of new infrastructure and disempowered the 
Australian Energy Regular (AER) to limit network building.  (3) Furthermore, the AEMO was 
constantly over forecasting demand for electricity, which justified the network companies to 
build more infrastructures.  This over forecasting exacerbated the overbuilding of network 
infrastructure.  The underutilised network and decreasing electricity demand lead to an 
increase in cost per unit of electricity consumed.  (4) Limited merit reviews provided the 
networks companies with the ability to contest any decisions made by the AER.93  There was 
great incentive for the network companies to contest any decision.  The tribunal overseeing 
the contested decisions quite often found in favour of the network companies to build more 
infrastructure.  (5)  The uptake of air conditioning drove peak demand that required the 
building of further capacity in the network. This extra building also exacerbated inequality 
because more affluent household installed the largest air conditioners and the cost of the 
additional network is shared among all consumers. 
There are at least four ways to reduce further cost increases or network overbuilding.  (1) 
The peak demand drives the requirement to build more network infrastructure.  Using a cost 
reflective tariff would provide a price signal for customer to modify their behaviour to avoid 
using electricity during these peaks.  As discussed above, cost reflective tariff in conjunction 
with solar PV and energy storage provide customers with considerable flexibility to manage 
their demand to defer investment in new network and generation infrastructures.  However, 
this would require a rollout of smart meters and there has been a limited rollout other than in 
Victoria.  (2) Additionally, the cost reflective tariffs are currently opt-in, which require 
changing to opt-out.  (3) There is a requirement to align the remuneration for networks more 
closely with demand side objectives rather than purely a guaranteed return on asset. (4) 
Remove the Limited Merit Reviews, which the Australian Government is implementing.  (5) 
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Include the ability for networks to control air conditioners remotely to reduce their power 
during periods of peak demand. 
Customers are bearing the cost of the network overbuilding for the life the asset.  This 
situation has reduced inclusive growth both reducing productivity and increasing inequity.  
There are at least two ways to reduce the cost burden of the overbuilt network on customers.  
(1) Stakeholder have asked for the value of the networks to be written down (Finkel et al. 
2017).  This could be readily justified for any network build because of network owners using 
a Limited Merit Review to overrule an AER decision.  The write down would certainly 
improve inclusive growth.   (2)  Amalgamating and nationalising the networks to gain 
economies of scale.  The NEM covers seven jurisdictions and contains 25 network service 
providers (NSP) (AER 2016). These multiple jurisdictions and NSPs serve only 19 million 
residents (AEMO 2016) and presents a costly duplication of overheads and regulatory 
burden.  Foster et al. (2013) and Quiggin, J (2017) have discussed the advantages of 
renationalising the grid.  These include  
 providing the cheapest finance rate for the network from the Federal Government, 
 reducing coordination costs between networks, 
 reducing expenditure on administration, sales, marketing and managers to hire more 
technicians and engineers to ensure the physical security of supply, 
 replacing the guaranteed return on asset remuneration with demand side 
management incentive payments,  
 enabling whole NEM grid planning within one entity, which becomes more pressing 
with the introduction of more distributed variable renewable energy,  
 providing spread of risk, a single company owning the NEM’s network has a an 
incredible geographic spread, and 
 reducing the financial risk from private and foreign ownership of one of Australia’s 
major strategic assets.  
4.2 Integrating the climate change and energy policies to improve 
inclusive growth 
The previous section discussed numerous faults in the implementation of the neoliberal 
policies in the NEM that if remedied would reduce costs for customers and improve the 
stability of the NEM.  These remedies would also allow a much less costly transition to zero 
net emissions and cheaper source of electricity.  However, the overbuilding of networks will 
be an ongoing expense unless the asset value of the network is written-down or the network 
nationalised. 
There is agreement between the AEMC, ACCC and Gatton Institute that environment cost 
add about 7% to the retail bill.  This is the smallest component of the retail bill.  There is 
consensus among scientists on the requirement to address climate change. There are three 
factors making the electricity sector pivotal in the whole of economy transition to zero net 
emissions.  (1) The electricity sector in China and Australia contributes the largest share of 
emissions in each country.  (2) There is a requirement for the electricity sector to lead the 
other sectors to reduce emission intensity to allow electrification of other sectors of the 
economy (TAI 2017b).  (3)  It is relatively cheaper and easier for the electricity sector to 
transition to zero net emissions because the technology already exists and is rapidly 
becoming cheaper.  However, there is generally agreement that uncertainty about climate 
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change policy in the electricity sector has contributed to increase the cost of electricity 
because of the reluctance to make generation investment (ACCC 2017; Finkel et al. 2017).  
Butler (2017) provides a history of the climate policy changes causing this environment of 
uncertainty.  We discuss (1) the equity effects of environmental costs directly added retail bill, 
(2) the dynamic efficiency of the subsidising the transition to zero net emissions, (3) the 
allocative efficiency of the NEM to facilitate the transition to zero net emissions and (4) the 
integration of climate policy into the national electricity rule. 
The addition of environment cost to the retail bill has equity implications because the cost 
disproportionality falls on lower income households since higher income households can 
afford solar PV and solar water heating (Bell & Foster 2017).  The previous section 
discussed how Australia’s neoliberal policies implemented within the electricity sector have 
failed to constrain electricity prices increases with associated increases in disconnections 
being the most obvious indicators of induced financial stress for lower income households.  
The environmental costs are small but add stress to already financially stressed households, 
so require attention.  The government directly funding renewable energy would remove this 
inequality provided the tax system is progressive and there is exists sufficient revenue to 
fund the renewable energy.  However, Australia’s tax has become exceptional porous at the 
top end with tax breaks for the wealthy.  Exacerbating the tax breaks is the international tax 
dodging using tax havens indicated by the Panama and Paradise papers.  There is also 
pressure for an international race to the bottom on company tax rates.  Chapter 5 discusses 
these tax issues and relations to political donations and corruption. 
The green costs reflect investment in renewable energy.  This investment is having a major 
dynamic efficient effect creating a rapid decrease in renewable energy generator prices.  
Newbery (2018) provides a proof of the dynamics efficiency overwhelming the green cost of 
the investment in renewable energy.  Reality supports Newbery’s proof in Germany building 
wind generator without subsidy.  The investment in renewable to induce dynamic efficiency 
has worked as intended. 
Additionally, renewable energy’s nearly zero marginal cost of producing energy is having a 
major allocative efficiency effect to reduce wholesale spot prices (Bell wind).  However, the 
previous section discussed five reasons why the full effect of renewable energy fails to flow 
through to retail prices. (1) There is concentration of market-power by the three retail-
generators.  (2) The “Power of choice” has proven largely ineffectual in the retail market.  (3) 
The generators game the market to inflate the wholesale spot prices.  (4) The short notice of 
closure of old fossil fuel generators provides insufficient time to build new generation.  (5) 
The unpredictable failures of the ageing and increasing unreliable fossil fuel generators 
exacerbated by increasing severe weather events causing higher wholesale spot prices. TAI 
(2017a) distinguishes between the predictable variation of renewable energy and 
unpredictable failures of fossil fuel generations.  The previous section also discussed 
solutions to these market failures.  
However, the issue of the nearly zero margin cost of variable renewable energy causing the 
wholesale price to decrease requires consideration since the generators would be unable to 
recuperate the investment costs of new generation.  This situation makes investment 
decisions in new generation particularly sensitive to policy supporting renewable energy.  
The NEM has an energy only market and there is discussion of introducing capacity markets 
to supplement energy only markets (Newbery 2018).  However, the energy only market is 
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having the desired effect of fossil fuel generators exiting the market and a capacity market 
would cost consumers more and prolong the fossil fuel generators, paying more to produce 
more emissions.  Alternatively, the accelerated introduction of the 5-minurte rule would help 
facilitate the introduction of dispatchable renewable energy generation and these 
dispatchable renewable energy sources would provide the higher market bids to maintain a 
wholesale market price were generator would find sufficient return on investment.  Section 5 
discusses the uncertainty surrounding climate change policy and its relationship to political 
donations and the fossil fuel industry manipulating the public debate and undermining 
Australia’s democracy. 
Three years after dismantling Australia’s function economy wide Emission Trading Scheme 
(ETS) in 2014, the Coalition Government outlines a replacement called the National Energy 
Guarantee (NEG).94  In the interim emissions have grown.  Notably the NEG only applies to 
the electricity sector, so fails to take advantage of a whole of economics response to mitigate 
emissions at least cost abatement via an ETS.  Additionally, the NEG unlike an ETS fails to 
provide a tool to control an economy wide carbon budget.  These two factors make the NEG 
second best to an ETS.  Exacerbating second best policy status of the NEG’s is the 
Coalition’s use of the NEG to provide a sectorial equal share of emissions abatement.  As 
discussed, there is a requirement for the electricity sector to lead the rest of the economy in 
the transition zero net emission and the technology already exist for the electricity sector to 
make the transition.  The NEG comprises a reliability guarantee and an emissions guarantee. 
 An emissions guarantee will be set to contribute to Australia’s international 
commitments. The level of the guarantee will be determined by the Commonwealth 
and enforced by the AER. 
 A reliability guarantee will be set to deliver the right level of dispatchable energy—
from ready-to-use sources such as coal, gas, pumped hydro and batteries—needed 
in each state. It will be set by the AEMC and AEMO. 
The emission guarantee set by the federal government will perpetuate investment 
uncertainty because this setting could change each election or whenever a party changes 
the Prime Minster.  Additionally, the Federal Government setting the emission guarantee and 
the AEMO and AEMC setting the reliability guarantee perpetuates the lack of coordination 
between climate and energy policy in the NEM that has exacerbate price increases. 
Climate change mitigation and energy polices need integrating to enable a smooth, reliable 
and low cost transition to zero net emissions.  To that end, writing Australia’s commitments 
to address climate change into the National Electricity Rules would provide more investment 
certainty and align energy policy with climate policy as recommended by the OECD. 
The NEG looks like a well-designed political wedge rather than a serious attempt to mitigate 
emissions or merely second-rate policy.  Chapter 5 discusses political wedges undermining 
the credibility of Australian democracy and its politicians and Australia’s ability to solve 
wicked problems. 
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4.3 Conclusion 
The Australian energy sector provides an excellent case study of how not to implement 
neoliberal and climate change mitigation policies.  The fact that Australia went from one of 
the cheapest places in the OECD for domestic energy to one of the more expensive raises 
the questions about both the efficacy of neoliberal policies and the decisions making 
capability of Australia’s Parliamentary system to solve wicked problems.  Similarly, the 
disarray in the health insurance and education sectors both requiring major investigations 
raises the questions about both the efficacy of neoliberal policies and the decisions making 
capability of Australia’s Parliamentary system.   Section 5 discusses these issues. 
As discussed, Teng, Jotzo and Wang (2017) calculates that if China’s electricity sector 
adopted a market-based approach, it would half the price of China’s ETS.  However, as the 
NEM shows there is a large gap between the theoretical predictions of neoclassical 
economics and market-based approaches implementation in the real world.  Mainstream or 
neoclassical economic theory provides at best an approximation to limited domains within an 
economy. Outside these limited domains, mainstream economics hinders thinking and 
misguides policy development.  Section 5 discusses neoclassical economics supporting the 
neoliberal polices and their limited domain of applicability and why alternative schools of 
economic thought are absent from policy development. 
The neoliberal policies implemented in the electricity sector have exacerbated inequality and 
reduced productive.  The poor implementation of neoliberal policies requires remedying to 
enable a lower cost transition to zero net emissions.   
Additionally, the conflict of interest in taking political donations from the fossil fuel sector and 
the failure to develop coherent and credible policy to meet Australia’s commitments to 
climate change mitigation requires consideration.  Section 5 discusses political donations 
and the conflict of interest in addressing inequality and climate change mitigation.  
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5 Removing barriers to solving wicked problems 
Two of the biggest issues facing Australia and the world today are climate change and 
decreasing inclusive growth. The latest data shows that Australia is failing to meet its Paris 
commitments for climate-change mitigation and to address the decline in inclusive growth.  
The section discusses the issue of why the Australian political system is unable to solve 
these wicked problems and other interrelated wicked problems, including reforms in taxation 
and political donations.  Acknowledging, Australia’s adversarial political system is functioning 
reasonably well in solving less challenging problems. 
The Australian Department of Energy and Environment (DEE 2017) published emissions 
projections showing Australia will clearly fail to meet its Paris commitment emissions targets 
by 5% and 29-33% above the target for 2020 and 2030.  The projections forecast Australia’s 
emissions at 551 and 570 Mt CO2-e, respectively.  The report also announced the Coalition’s 
plans to roll over the emission reduction fund (ERF) and loosen the safeguards mechanism 
that sets emissions baselines or limits for big polluters.  The ERF uses general tax revenue 
to pay for emissions reduction and loosening safe guards allows the polluters to increase 
pollution without paying for their pollution.  The government is subsidizing an increase in 
pollution from general tax revenue.  These actions are likely to increase inequality, as the 
government will have less general tax revenue left to fund education, health and other 
services.  Additionally, the ERF is a less efficient and more expensive command-and-control 
approach than the polluter-pays market-based carbon price approach.  Using an ERF 
without support from a carbon price to meet Australia’s emissions targets may well be 
financially unfeasible but prove favorable to the sectors making political donations to the 
Coalition.  These actions are consistent with the Coalition’s track record for opposing, 
delaying or minimizing action on climate change mitigation and advantageous to its political 
donors (Butler 2017; Turnbull 2009). 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS 2017d) announced that inequality has remained 
stable since 2013-14. This respite is welcome news as Australia’s income Gini index 
increased from 0.302 to 0.323 since 1994-5 peaking at 0.336 and the wealth Gini index 
increased from 0.573 to 0.605. However, Sheil and Stilwell (2017) discuss how the ABS 
requires to update their Gini index calculation method to international best practice adopted 
by the OECD, as the ABS current calculation will underestimate inequality.  Sheil and Stilwell 
(2017) claim the stability of ABS’s Gini appears anomalous, given the large increase in the 
value of houses in Australian cities during recent years and the fact that few among the 
poorest 40 per cent own one. Most of the wealth the ABS apportions to the bottom of the 
distribution comprises non-income earning items such as cars, furniture and clothing.  
Additionally, ABS (2017d) shows the largest increase in household expenditure was in 
housing and accommodation.  These factors are consistent with the increase in the number 
renters and concentration of wealth with property owners discussed in Chapter 2.  Tax 
reform, abolishing negative gearing and capital gains concessions, is part of the solution to 
addressing increasing inequality.  However, the Coalition has resisted making any such tax 
reforms. The current situation benefits the Coalition’s political donors.  Importantly, a major 
reasons for concern over increases in inequality is the association with increases in violence, 
as the ABS (2017b) shows the Australian adult prisoner numbers continue to rise with the 
national imprisonment rate, the number of prisoner per capita, increasing by 4% from 2106 
to 2017. Most of the increase related to violence and drug related offences.  
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Australia adopted neoliberal policies in the 1980s.  However, the neoliberal policies have 
had mixed results lifting millions out of poverty in some developing countries and incidences 
of successful privatisations but there has been a prominent increase in inequality that has 
stifled economic growth (Ostry, Loungani & Fureceri 2016).  Neoliberalism has also 
challenged national sovereignty and labour and environmental protection by placing 
companies in a position to move operations to countries with the lowest environment and 
labour protection (IMF 2000). The deregulation of cross boarder financial markets challenges 
national sovereignty over the ability to tax the companies, as discussed in Chapter 5. Again, 
this calls for tax reform that may be unbeneficial to many of those making political donations. 
The four wicked problems climate change adaption and mitigation, inclusive growth, tax 
reform and political donations are strongly interrelated.  Additionally, domestic surveys show 
that both the level of confidence and trust in Australia’s political system has fallen 
significantly.  Factors cited include a lack of integrity and clear guiding values on the part of 
elected representatives and disaffection with the adversarial nature of parliaments (Essential 
Research 2017; Productivity Commission 2017a). 
This section discusses four barriers to solving the wicked problems (1) political donations, (2) 
adversarial political system including political wedging, (3) the absence of academic 
economists informing the public debate and (4) the lack of real world applicability of 
academic economics highlighted by its failure to predict the global financial crisis.  Noting, all 
four barriers hinder Australia’s ability to develop and implement policies to solve complex 
problem, so eliminating these barriers would place Australian in a better position to address 
the four wicked problems discussed and others such as population ageing. 
5.1 Political donations hampering Australia’s ability to promote 
inclusive growth and address climate change 
Lewis, C (2016) provides a comprehensive discuss of the tension between the ideals of a 
democracy and ability of the rich being able to usurp power by using donations to gain direct 
access to politician to influence decision making. Hamilton (2018) provides a more recent 
discussion focused on foreign political donations in Australia.  Leading the country in 
addressing the corrupting influence of political donations, the Victorian Labor Government 
has proposed a ban on foreign donations with a two-year imprisonment term for violations 
and proposed other laws tightening domestic political donation. The Victorian Green Party 
has criticised the proposals as insufficient and containing potential loopholes for politicians to 
exploit (Willingham 2017).  However, these proposals only apply to the state of Victoria and 
the focus of this report is the corrupting influence of political donations at the federal level of 
government.  Following recommendations from the Australia Security Intelligence 
Organisation and popular calls within Australia, the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral 
Matters recommended that the Federal government ban any foreign citizens and entities 
from making political donations.  If implemented, this ban would only bring Australian law 
closer to foreign political donations laws in other countries.  Still outstanding, the Federal 
Government has yet to address the lax domestic political donation laws. 
As Chapter 2 discussed, the Coalition is the major recipient of political donations from the 
mining industry and industries benefiting from perpetuating the housing construction boom.  
Despite a consensus of economists not on the payroll of business benefiting from the 
housing bubble, the Coalition has failed to heed their calls to eliminate or modify capital 
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gains concessions and negative gearing both taxes breaks work against inclusive growth.  
Consistent with the Coalition’s corporate donations, sixty five percent of Australian voters 
surveyed believe Liberal, the largest party within the Coalition, is too close to the big 
corporate and financial interests and sixty six percent believe liberal is out of touch with 
ordinary people (Essential Research 2017).  In contrast, forty-two percent of those surveyed 
believe Labor is too close to big business and fifty-eight percent believe Labor looks after the 
interests of working people. These results are consistent with Labor’s donations from the 
corporate sector being smaller than Liberal’s.  However, given Labor’s founding principle is 
social progress for working people, these survey results showing a considerable shift toward 
corporate interests.  Acknowledging, Labor requires the corporate donations to match the 
Coalition’s donations to fund advertising and think tanks used to form public opinion.  This 
interrelated dynamic of Labor’s increasing corporate donations and shift in focus from 
Labor’s historical foundations on social progress to meeting the interests of the corporate 
sector is undermining Labor’s unique perspective in problem solving and a loss of diversity 
within Australia’s political landscape.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, despite a consensus about anthropogenic induced climate 
change amongst climate scientists not on the payroll of mining or fossil fuel companies, the 
Coalition has eliminated the standard policy tools to effect least cost climate change 
mitigation, namely a carbon price (Productivity Commission 2017a). The Coalition has also 
failed to extend the renewable energy target that would enable the electricity sector to take 
its pivotal role in leading the economic transition to zero net emission by 2050.  
Acknowledging, the Coalition did implement several climate change mitigation policies after 
abolishing a price on carbon, but these policies have been described as inadequate and 
window-dressing (Turnbull 2009).  However, the Coalition’s mitigation policies could serve as 
a useful adjunct to a carbon price and renewable energy target(s). Noting the Coalition’s 
mitigation policies involve paying businesses from the general tax revenue, which is 
regressive and counter to inclusive economic growth. Finally, consistent with donations form 
the mining sector, the Coalition still favours the building of more coal fire power stations, 
arguing that newer coal power stations have lower emissions intensities, approximately 80% 
of older stations.  However, this small reduction in intensity is well short of the required zero 
net emissions and the generation companies are unwilling to build any more coal fired power 
stations.  This unwillingness is consistent with the UK’s announcement of the closure of all 
power stations by 2025 (Cockburn 2017). 
In additional to political donation to directly influence political decisions, the corporate sector 
already has considerable power through media ownership and advertising to indirectly 
influence political decisions by confusing and shaping public opinion.  For instance, 
spreading misinformation among the public that their lacks consensus among climate 
scientist over climate changes and its anthropogenic causes.  There is also corporate 
funding of university research that is oblique to climate change mitigation that acts to drown 
mitigation research in a sea of irrelevant information (Oreskes & Conway 2011).   
Replacing political donation with taxpayer funded political active can be argued from a purely 
financial perspective without ethical arguments by comparing political donations revenue 
from vested interested versus the loss of tax and royalty revenue from political decisions 
made in favour of the vested interest.  Relevant to addressing both mitigation and equitable 
growth are loss of government revenue from the carbon price, Mineral Resource Rent Tax, 
capital gain tax concessions and negative gearing versus the revenue from political 
   
 
 
page98 
 
 
donations from the mining industry and finance a construction industries.  If the political 
donation revenue is less than the loss of government revenue, taxpayer funded political 
activity would be more profitable for the Government.  The Productivity Commission (2017a) 
is well positioned to analyse the efficacy of government with political activities funded by the 
taxpayer in the public interest versus political donations from vested interests.  
Additionally, the Australia Institute (TAI 2017c) has already formed a National Integrity 
Committee of corruption fighters and retired judges that have launched a blue print of best 
practice for an anticorruption watchdog.  Furthermore, Transparency International (TI 2017) 
has already analysed corruption in the mining countries, including Australia, and have 
developed a raft of policy recommendations to minimise the corruption.  
5.2 Adversarial politics’ inability to solve wicked problems 
The four interrelated wicked problems have stretched the limits of the problem solving ability 
of Australia’s century old adversarial political system (Popper 1999).  However, despite 
Australia’s limited ability to solve wicked problems, Australia’s natural resources enable 
Australia to feature in the top 10 countries for HDI (UNDP 2016). 
The adversarial politics between Australia’s two main federal parties, the Coalition and Labor, 
has failed to solve the two wicked problems facing Australia namely, inclusive growth and 
climate change mitigation. Relatedly, the Productivity Commission (2017a) recommends 
urgent action to fix Australia’s energy markets, urging the Australian governments to 
cooperate to reform the national electricity market and specifically stop the piecemeal and 
stop-start approach to emissions reduction and adopt a single effective price on carbon. The 
latest climate change related political wedge is the Nation Energy Guarantee, discussed in 
Chapter 4.  Additionally, the Productivity Commission (2017a) discusses the inclusive growth 
related unresolved wicked problem that is Australia’s national tax system, regarded as one 
of the most complex in the world, is costing the community more and raising relatively less.  
Similarly, the discussion within Houses of Parliament on political donations reform has been 
ongoing since 2007 when a core commitment of the Rudd Government was political 
donation reform but there has been effectively no progress at the federal level other than the 
proposal to ban foreign political donation. 
One key feature of adversarial politics that prevents solutions to wicked problems is political 
wedging where politicians take a position on an issue that drives a wedge between the 
different wings of the other party (Gittins 2017). Consistent with the effectiveness of wedging 
are the following electoral survey results being 68 and 51 percent believe the Liberal and 
Labor parties are divided (Essential Research 2017).  In addition to the destructive effects of 
wedging on Australia’s productivity, other adverse effects are undermining confidence in 
politicians and democracy generally.  These adverse effects include such perceptions that 
Liberal and Labor will promise to do anything to win votes 67 and 69 percent, are trustworthy 
34 and 32 percent, clear about what they stand for 40 and 45 percent and out of touch with 
ordinary people 66 and 52 percent.  
There solutions to the wedging problem found in Australia’s adversarial binary system 
include to simplify the system that is using a single party system and to increase complexity 
that is proportional representation.  Using a single party system would solve the wedging 
problem but create a severe form of groupthink and every single party systems country 
underperforms Australia with its adversarial system in terms of corruption and HDI.  
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Alternatively use proportional representation to increase the complexity of political wedging.  
Noting, some countries with proportional representation outperform Australia in terms of HDI 
and corruption.  The complexity of proportional representation systems can make wedging 
difficult to implement and multiple perspectives engenders a more consolatory approach to 
favour solution to wicked problems. 
Lastly, the world has undergone tremendous change since foundation of the Commonwealth 
of Australia Commonwealth over a century ago.  The adversarial system adopted from 
Britain and the Federal Systems form the US were thought best practice at the time.  The 
wicked problems facing Australia today are less suited to the adversarial approach.  There is 
a requirement to consider best practice electoral systems to improve the Australia’s problem 
solving efficiency (Popper 1999).   
The Productivity Commission (2017a) is well positioned to perform a comparative analysis of 
the efficacy of electoral and federal systems, having partially completed the analysis.  Any 
constitutional change to enhance the ability of Australia’s political system to solve wicked 
problems could consider the performance of political systems of other countries in solving 
wicked problems ranked by their HDI adjusted for their natural resource endowments. For 
instance, given New Zealand’s comparatively low endowment of natural resource, it has a 
relatively high HDI and low corruption compared with Australia. In addition, any changes 
require restoring Australian’s confidence in their political system, including putting in place 
measures to ensure the integrity of the elected official. 
5.3 Disengagement of the academic profession from the public debate 
There has been a gradual reduction the number of academic economists in the public 
debate to lift the quality of the debate and provide impartial advice (Garnaut 2013).  There 
are at least three reinforcing factors contributing to this disengagement, the academic 
publication requirements, the higher kudos given to theoretical economics over applied 
economics or economic policy and the decline in the number of Australians teaching in 
Universities. 
University economic school’s performance is judge by the number research papers 
published in highly ranked journals. The teaching performance is a lesser consideration.  
Therefore, the school hirers staff who publish in the highly ranked journals.  These journals 
are predominantly theoretical international/American journals within two subfields of 
economics.  None of the Australian economic journals ranks highly.  It is easy to see how the 
situation is self-reinforcing to both disengage academics from the Australian public debate 
and eliminate Australian graduates from the academic staff to replace them with US 
graduates.  A further interesting result is Australian University teaching staffs becoming 
increasingly culturally diverse but increasingly and invisibly more academically similar, which 
presents a form of cultural façadism.   A consequence of a more academically similar staff is 
a reduction width of economics taught undermining Australia ability to solve wicked problems.  
This issue is discussed in the next section.  
The decline of academic economists from the public debate has left a void that is filled by 
consultants, think tanks, newspapers and government bodies.  Consultants can frame their 
research and results to suit the expectation of the client, creating a ‘guns for hirer’ culture 
(Denniss 2012; Gittins 2012).  The news media’s reporting of climate change is divided on 
one side the ‘The Australian’ represents the pro-coal and anti-renewable energy agenda and 
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ABC represent a scientific basis to their research and reporting of climate change. However, 
the Coalition lead government has cut their funding for both ABC and CSIRO.  As discussed, 
there are coal and tobacco fund think tanks sponsoring research that floods the public space 
with extremely framed research.  Counter balancing coal/tobacco sponsored think tanks are 
‘The Australian Institute’ sponsored by individuals. 
Australia’s Chief Scientist is endeavouring to encourage public engagement of academics by 
measuring the impact factor of their research on Australian society. 95,96  However, the 
existing journal publication ranking system and academic staff’s interest in international 
journal publications presents a large inertia to Chief Scientist’s endeavours within economics 
schools particularly.  Linking academics’ promotion and pay increases to publishing in 
Australian journals could help overcome the inertia and simultaneously improve the quality of 
the Australian journals and interest in the public debate. 
The Chief Scientist is also endeavouring to encourage academic collaboration with industry 
to improve productivity.  This collaboration proves successful in overseas countries, such as 
Germany and Sweden.  To that end, the Australian Centre for Research Collaboration 
Program was developed specifically to foster collaboration between universities and industry.  
However, Germany and Sweden contain a larger number of head offices whereas Australia 
has many branch offices that lack the depth or interest to support research collaboration to 
the same extent. 
5.4 Economic and political ideas hampering Australia’s ability to 
promote inclusive growth and address climate change 
“…the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and 
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood… the power of 
vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared to the gradual encroachment of an 
idea.” 
(Keynes 1936) 
Economic thought develops as a succession of economic and political philosophies being 
unable to solve or contributing to a major crisis with another economic and political 
philosophy emerging to address and solve the crisis.  For instance, the Great Depression 
saw the displacement of classical economics with Keynesianism.  The great stagflation saw 
neoliberalism replace Keynesianism.  The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) saw the failure of 
neoliberalism and the economic theories underpinning neoliberalism. Theories underpinning 
neoliberalism both helped ferment the GFC and were unable to predict the crisis or at best 
distractions from studying the real economy. (Bell 2009, sec. 3.1; CEDA 2017; Dow et al. 
2009; Ostry, Loungani & Fureceri 2016).  
Ostry, Loungani and Fureceri (2016), staff at the IMF, define neoliberalism’s two main planks. 
‘The first is increased competition—achieved through deregulation and the opening up of 
domestic markets, including financial markets, to foreign competition. The second is a 
smaller role for the state, achieved through privatization and limits on the ability of 
governments to run fiscal deficits and accumulate debt.’  Ostry, Loungani and Fureceri (2016) 
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claims the positives of freer trade are a reduction in global poverty and transfer of technology 
and knowledge associated with foreign direct investment. Additionally, there are instances of 
privatised state-owned enterprises delivering efficient provision of services. Ostry, Loungani 
and Fureceri (2016) analyse two specific policies of the agenda (1) removing restrictions on 
the movement of capital across borders and (2) reducing fiscal deficits and debt levels or 
fiscal austerity.  Ostry, Loungani and Fureceri (2016) make three conclusions about these 
particular policies rather than the whole agenda.  (1) It was difficult to determine any positive 
effect on economic growth when looking at a broad range of countries but (2) the cost in 
terms of inequity is prominent and (3) the increase in inequality has hurt the level and 
sustainability of growth.  Removing restrictions on the movement of capital across borders 
was associated with exacerbating the size and frequency of boom-bust cycles.  The boom-
bust cycles provide a mechanism to increase inequality. 
Section 1 relates the economic theories supporting neoliberalism and their role in the global 
financial crisis, decreasing inclusive growth and exacerbating emissions.  Theories 
supporting neoliberalism include game theory and neo-classical economics and its general 
equilibrium models, including computable general equilibrium (CGE), General Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE).  These 
general equilibrium models were introduced in Chapter 2. 
Section 2 also discusses factors hampering the transition of the academic economics 
profession from teaching economic theory supporting neoliberalism to developing theory 
more suited to promoting inclusive growth and potential pathways to developing newer 
theories of economics that are more coherent with the requirements of evidence based 
policy and inclusive growth (Bell 2009; CEDA 2017; Dow et al. 2009). 
5.4.1 Neoliberalism oversold and its supporting economic theories flawed 
Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006) and Farmer and Geanakoplos (2008, p. 5) discuss the 
hard-core assumptions within neoclassical and equilibrium economics shown in Table 4.  
Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006) note that other assumptions such as agents with 
complete knowledge are usually attributed to the neoclassical framework.  This assumption 
of rational expectation or unbounded rationality in neoclassical economics provides for 
individuals with complete knowledge and unlimited computing power, but Farmer and 
Geanakoplos (2008, p. 12) state that some neoclassical theory relaxes the rational 
expectation assumption by introducing some form of bounded rationality (Simon 1972).  
There are two points to note about neoclassical economics relaxing rational expectation 
assumptions; the incremental move toward more realistic assumptions and the fact that the 
framework is blurring at the edges that makes it difficult to create a sharp definition.  
However, the main general equilibrium models used in policy development, including CGE, 
GTAP and DSGE, use rational expectations assumptions.  Rational expectations assume 
that people behave in a way to maximise their utility or profits but have unbounded 
computational ability and time to make these calculations.  This contrasts with bounded 
rationality (Simon 1972).  Thaler and Mullainathan (2008) provide an extensive contrast 
between bounded rationally and rational expectations. 
Additionally, rational expectations assumptions are pervasive within undergraduate 
economics courses to provide the foundation for learning the general equilibrium models in 
more advanced courses.  The undergraduates are usually unaware of this longer-term goal 
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and cease studying economics before learning about the flaws in these models but do leave 
with a clear idea of how to apply “economics” to policy problems unaware that they are 
applying neoclassic economics (Dow et al. 2009; Mitra-Kahn 2008).  Game theory is the 
other major theory that supports neoliberalism and forms part of the undergraduate 
curriculum.  Game theory makes unrealistic rationality assumptions, consequently has come 
under increasing criticisms (Kay 2005; Lucas, McCubbins & Turner 2015; Rubinstein 2012).  
These criticisms include game theory’s unrealistic narrow view of the economy and diverting 
attention and funds away from alternative approaches to study the economy that could have 
been more valuable. 
Table 4: Neoclassical Assumptions 
 Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006) Farmer and Geanakoplos (2008, p. 5) 
1 Methodological instrumentalism  Agent optimisation of utility 
2 Methodological individualism Perfect competition (price taking) 
3 Methodological equilibration Market clearing 
4  Rational expectations (unbounded rationality) 
 
We discuss neoclassical economics hard-core assumptions. 
Instrumentalism 
The philosophy underlying neoclassical economics is instrumentalism; ‘a system of 
pragmatic philosophy that considers idea to be instruments that should guide our actions 
and their value is measured by their success’.97  Friedman (1953, p. 15), a major proponent 
of instrumentalism, states ‘..., the relevant question to ask about the “assumptions” of a 
theory is not whether they are descriptively “realistic”, for they never are, but whether they 
are sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in hand.  And this question can be 
answered only by seeing whether the theory works, which means whether it yields 
sufficiently accurate predictions.’  The inability to predict the global financial crisis indicates 
the assumptions in neoclassical economics are insufficiently realistic.  Later in this section, 
we discuss flaws in instrumentalism and Bell (2009, sec. 5.3) provides a more extensive 
discussion. 
1. Methodological instrumentalism 
Methodological instrumentalism explains all behaviour as a desire to maximise 
preference-satisfaction.  There is no room for philosophical question as to whether a 
person will act in such a way.  Traditionally in neoclassical economics, preference-
satisfaction is constant and determined exogenously (outside the model).  Behavioural 
economics provides substantial experimental evidences against the utility maximising 
model of an individual.  Point 4 on rational expectations (unbounded rationality) briefly 
discusses the evidence and Bell (2009, secs. 2.1.2-4 & 2.1.8) provides a more extensive 
discussion. 
In contrast, preferences in neoclassical economics depend on utility maximising, 
preferences in ‘complexity economics’ depend on behavioural rules and the structure 
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and history of interaction between agents in the model.  The UK Treasury current uses 
such a model for forecasting, which Section 5.4.2.2 discusses. 
2. Methodological individualism 
Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006) note that methodological individualism has two forms 
(1) explanation in terms of individuals alone or (2) explanation in terms of individuals plus 
relations between individuals.  We use the first form to describe neoclassical 
methodological individualism, so that explanations for socio-economic processes are to 
be found by studying individuals interacting via a price signal only, where the individuals 
retain independent and constant preferences.  This approach serves to isolate the 
individual from other non-price interactions and any influence that structure may have on 
interactions and on individuals and vice versa.  This approach does allow modelling a 
complicated system with a simple system and consequently reduced computational 
requirements. However, the cost to neoclassical economics for using such 
oversimplification is its failure to link microeconomic to macroeconomic. This 
phenomenon is known as the ‘micro-foundation problem’ (Bell 2009, sec. 2.1.4). 
In comparison, complexity economics studies the relationships among structure, 
interactions and individuals to explain macro socio-economic processes as an emergent 
process. The wetness property of water provides an example of emergence as the 
interaction of water molecules via Van der Waals forces; water molecules as individuals 
lack a wetness property.  The Bank of England model (Baptista et al. 2016; Haldane & 
Turrell 2017) discussed in section 5.4.2.2 uses emergence (Bell 2009, secs. 2.1.4 & 
2.2.1) (Sections 2.1.4 and 2.2.1) via financial transactions between individuals and firms 
with differing behavioural rules to link the micro and macro level.  This approach solves 
the micro-foundation problem found in neoclassical economics. 
3. Methodological equilibration 
Methodological equilibration is the imposition of equilibrium or market stability.  Once the 
neoclassical agent’s utility function and constraints are postulated, to develop predictions 
at the macro level the aggregate behaviour of the individuals has to be sufficiently 
regular.  Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006) reduce the equilibration process to three 
steps: 
1. Discover an equilibrium 
2. Assume that agents or their behaviour will find themselves at equilibrium 
3. Demonstrate that any small perturbations are incapable of dislodging self-
interested behaviour from the discovered equilibrium. 
This simple approach provides for elegant analytical mathematical solutions to predict 
economic variables, albeit inaccurately, for example missing the GFC.  Relatedly, the 
neoclassical micro-foundations project failed to find a price vector for a unique 
equilibrium.  Importantly, multiple equilibrium indicate that markets are prone to sudden 
large changes, such as the GFC, with intervening periods of milder volatility (Bell 2009, 
sec. 2.1.4; Mitra-Kahn 2008). Neoclassical economists’ solution to the lack of unique 
equilibria is just to assume one exists.  Neoclassical economists ignore the micro-
foundation problem.   Events, such as the GFC, are considered ‘Black Swan’ event and 
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unpredictable within the neoclassical.  However, at least six economists outside the 
neoclassical school did predict the GFC (CPA Australia 2001). 
In contrast, the imposition of equilibration within ‘complexity economics’ is unnecessary, 
which provides a more realistic model of the economy and treats the economy as an 
evolutionary system without the requirement for a unique equilibria or equilibrium.  The 
economy being an evolutionary system has been known since the late 19th century 
(Veblen 1898) when neoclassical economics’ analytical mathematical approach could be 
justified due to their insufficient computing power to model the economy as an 
evolutionary system.  However, relaxing the equilibrium assumption creates modelling 
calibration and predictions issues for complex systems and evolutionary models (Bell 
2009, sec. 2.2.3).  The Bank of England (Baptista et al. 2016; Haldane & Turrell 2017) 
model overcame the calibration issue by combing a complex systems and evolutionary 
modelling technique called Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) with a quadruple-entry 
bookkeeping method using the system of national account called Stock Flow Consistent 
(SFC) models. 
4. Rational Expectations (unbounded rationality) 
 
Simon (1984, p. 36) considers the rational expectation or unbounded rationality 
assumption a fundamental part of neoclassical economics, which is also implicit in the 
neoliberalism’s justification for competition achieved through privatisation and 
deregulation.  The unbounded rationality assumption is that consumers make optimal 
decisions over what to buy from many options across all goods and services available to 
find an optimal bag or goods and services.  This unlimited ability to optimize or 
unbounded rationality assumption exists in game theory and the general equilibrium 
models.  Importantly, the results of these models help justify the neoliberal agenda.  The 
literature generally refers to unbounded rationality as rational expectations.  van der Sar 
(2004, p. 432) notes that for nearly half a century rational choice theories have been 
tested against individual behaviour but repeatedly the underlying assumptions and 
predictive value appear descriptively false.  Rational expectations assume that people 
behave in a way to maximise their utility or profits but Thaler and Mullainathan (2008) 
state that these maximisers in the neoclassical framework ignore virtually all the findings 
of cognitive and social psychologists.  Bell (2009, sec. 2.1.2.1) discusses the 
inconsistencies between neoclassical economics’ behavioural assumptions and the 
findings of cognitive and social psychologists in more detail.   
All modelling involves simplifying assumptions but the assumptions in neoclassical 
economics have major problems that go well beyond the normal simplification.  Salzano and 
Colander (2007, p. X) comment, ‘The problem with [neoclassical] economics is twofold[:] the 
first is the simplicity of the model assumptions do not allow the complexity of the common 
sense interactions that one would expect; the second is the failure of the models to fit the 
data in an acceptable way.’  Similarly, Blaug (1992) observes, ‘The history of general 
equilibrium theory from Walras to Arrow–Debreu has been a journey down a blind alley ... 
because the most rigorous solution to the existence problem by Arrow and Debreu turns 
general equilibrium into a mathematical puzzle applied to a virtual economy that can be 
imagined but could not possibly exist, while the extremely relevant ‘stability problem’ has 
never been solved either rigorously or sloppily.’  Section 5.4.2.2 discusses the Bank of 
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England model (Baptista et al. 2016; Haldane & Turrell 2017) and other advances in 
economics that can address these issues.  
Important to understanding the failure of neoclassical economics and instrumentalism is the 
distinction between mathematics and science.  Therefore, we explain the distinction between 
a mathematical and a scientific approach to economics and between neoliberal and 
evidence-based policy by the example of the simple mathematical rule that the three internal 
angles of a triangle add to 180 degrees (Zaman 2016).  The 180-degree rule holds true for a 
small sheet of paper on a flat surface. However, if the triangle is enlarged and with careful 
measurement, one finds the 180-degree rule no longer holds because the earth’s surface is 
curved.  The 180-deree rule is mathematics and the careful observation and measurement is 
scientific that falsifies the original rule.  Ideally, the scientific observation is incorporated by 
expanding the original rule to apply over a wider domain that is developing spherical 
geometry and the realisation that earth is not flat is an important discovery.   
Alternatively, we can reject the observation and protect the internal logical consistency of the 
rule by assuming the earth is flat or accept the observation and limit the domain of 
applicability to a small sheet of paper.  Importantly, the set of mathematical economic tools, 
including game theory and neoclassical economics general equilibrium models that support 
the neoliberal policies display similarity to the latter flat earth or limited domain case.  Finally, 
neoclassical economics and game theory are branches of mathematics and like all 
mathematics are tautologically true as the conclusions are contained within the premises or 
assumptions.  Therefore, the garbage in-garbage out rule still applies despite logically 
consistent mathematical proofs.  If the behavioural assumptions are insufficiently realistic, 
any conclusions may or may not be applicable in the real world, so could well misinform 
policy development. 
Notably, these general equilibrium models strongly support the neoliberal agenda for 
financial deregulation and the deregulation of capital flows between countries.  
Notwithstanding the strong theoretical support, the IMF has shifted from the neoliberal view 
that any financial intervention was counterproductive to a more nuanced view that longer 
term foreign direct investment can beneficially support knowledge transfer whereas short-
term capital flows serve to increase the risk of greater volatility and crisis (Ostry, Loungani & 
Fureceri 2016).  This IMF evidence based policy is consistent with the multiple equilibrium 
observation. 
In summary, the failure of the neoliberal economic theories to incorporate observation such 
as bounded rationality, multiple equilibria and role of money in credit expansion show that 
neoliberal economics has failed to advance as a science and devoid of foundation.  These 
neoliberal economic theories are only a set of mathematical rules applicable at best to a 
small domain within the economy. We discuss the partial success of neoliberalism before 
discussing reasons for the slow speed at which the economics profession is transitioning 
from neoliberal economics supporting neoliberalism to newer more realistic models and 
theories supporting evidence based policy.   
Despite neoliberal economics lacking any scientific foundation, there have been some 
successes in neoliberal policies.  This occasional or partial success of neoliberalism does 
require explanation and reconciling with scientific approaches to economics and evidence 
based policy.  For instance, Ostry, Loungani and Fureceri (2016) claim that there are 
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instances internationally of state enterprise privatisations that have been successful in 
improving services without specific examples or description for whom the privatisation has 
been successful.  The fact that neoliberal economic theory only applies to a small domain 
within an economy helps reconcile this partial success, but being a small domain theory also 
limits its usefulness, so these neoliberal theories require augmenting.  Specifically, the 
neoliberal economic models focus on the theoretical efficiency of market economies to 
allocate goods and services, so of little use in comparing the actual efficiency of private and 
public ownership and service provision (Stone 2017).   
Favouring privatisation, Quinn (2008) discusses the high level of corruption and bureaucratic 
inefficiency in countries with high levels of state ownership.  This privatisation effect on 
reducing corruption would favour the neoliberal agenda in countries with high levels of state 
ownership, such as, the ex-communist countries who are managing the transition with 
varying degrees of success.  However, the applicability of the neoliberal prescription for 
further privatisation becomes less clear for a group of 10 countries, including Australia, that 
have higher HDI and state ownership and provision of services and lower corruption than the 
USA (UNDP 2016). Transparency International provides a corruption perception index.98 
This situation implies an optimal level of state ownership and service provision above that in 
the USA where transparency of government plays more important role in increasing HDI 
than further privatisation. Therefore, we consider two aspects transparency and privatisation. 
Regarding transparency, the Australian National Electricity Market Integrated System Plan 
(AEMO 2017) provides a good example of transparent government and the plan brings 
together the energy and climate change agendas.  Similarly, Infrastructure Australia brings 
together the climate and growth agendas within good governance, including transparency 
and independence, but many legislatures lack independence, which in turn undermines the 
effectiveness of Infrastructure Australia’s independence and transparency. To rectify this 
situation, Consult Australia (2018) recommends establishing an independent body to plan, 
assess, and prioritise infrastructure projects across all legislatures.  This independent body 
could bring together the inclusive growth and climate agendas in a consistent way to ensure 
a lower cost and smoother transition to a low emissions economy.  Importantly, in addition to 
reducing corruption, transparency of government provides a mechanism to adopt best 
practice.  This adoption of best practice in government plays a counterpart to competition in 
the private sector (McKinsey 2017).  
Regarding privatization, we consider the issue of when further privatisation becomes 
counterproductive and augment neoliberal economics with bounded rationality (Simon 1972) 
to help identify counterproductive privatisations.   
In a more pragmatic business school perspective on privatisation, Goodman and Loveman 
(1991) state that the pros and cons of privatization can be measured against the standards 
of good management—regardless of ownership and make three conclusions. 
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1. Neither public nor private managers will always act in the best interests of their 
shareholders. Privatization will be effective only if private managers have incentives 
to act in the public interest, which includes, but is not limited to, efficiency.99 
2. Profits and the public interest overlap best when the privatized service or asset is 
in a competitive market. It takes competition from other companies to discipline 
managerial behaviour. 
3. When these conditions are not met, continued governmental involvement will likely 
be necessary. The simple transfer of ownership from public to private hands will not 
necessarily reduce the cost or enhance the quality of services. 
We also contend in addition to a competitive market stipulated in Goodman and Loveman 
(1991) that bounded rationality requires consideration in any planned privatisation.  For 
instance, in medical service privatisation, the individual has the choice of numerous 
insurance policies from different insurance companies, so meeting the privatisation 
requirement for competition.  However, these numerous insurance policies are complex, 
opaque and forever changing and contain a list of medical treatments that takes trainee 
doctors seven years to understand.  This situation requires considering bounded rationality 
where the inability to make optimal insurance selections reduces the effectiveness of 
competition to hold down prices. Consistent with this bounded rational analysis, the US’s 
privatised health system is the most expensive in the world and consistently underperforms 
countries with publically owned medical systems in many dimension, including efficiency 
(BBC 2010; TCF 2010).  Similarly, Australia’s foray into the privatisation of medical 
insurance has led to price escalation and inefficiency, both factors undermining inclusive 
growth.  Additionally, Stone (2017) discusses the efficiencies from the economies of scale in 
Medicare.  Chapter 4 discussed the privatisation of Australia’s energy sector failing to meet 
the conditions in Goodman and Loveman (1991) and bound rationality problems in the retail 
sector where prices went from some the cheapest in the world to the most expensive. 
We have discussed situations where privatisation, part of the neoliberal agenda, undermines 
inclusive growth.  We now consider four mechanisms through which free trade and 
deregulation, another part of the neoliberal agenda, undermine inclusive growth and climate 
change mitigation.  This situation highlights requirement for new international institutions and 
agreements. 
First, free trade exacerbates emissions as companies manufacturing in countries with stricter 
emissions and pollution controls either move their manufacturing operations to countries with 
weaker emissions and pollution controls or lose sales to the companies operating in 
countries with weaker controls.  Countries operating stricter emissions and pollution controls 
are subsidising companies operating under weaker controls.  In addition, the employees at 
companies operating in countries with weak controls are also subsidising the companies via 
diminished health.  Climate Works Foundation (CWF 2017) discusses how the Europe Union 
(EU) is on goal to reduce emissions by 20% in 2020 but if the emissions of imported goods 
are factored, the EU emissions have actually increased 11%.  Australia is in a similar 
situation of importing more emissions intensive goods rather manufacturing goods.  This 
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situation highlights a major loophole in the accounting for emissions and pollution, requiring 
modification of international carbon accounting.  These pollution subsidies to countries with 
weak pollution controls provides justification for countries operating stricter controls to 
impose carbon tariffs on imports from countries with weaker emissions and pollution controls; 
otherwise, companies will continue to engage in a global race-to-the bottom on pollution, 
emissions and employee health.  
Second, extending the period of time a patent is applicable as part of a “free” trade 
agreement provides a monopoly to the patent holder who can extract above normal profits.  
This situation prevents competition so reduces the public good of the trade agreement 
(Goodman & Loveman 1991).  This term “free” becomes a misnomer a better terminology 
would be “monopoly” trade agreement.  For instance, extending pharmaceutical patent 
periods works to impoverish a country’s health system that could otherwise buy much 
cheaper generic versions, as was the case in the Australia-US free trade deal undermining 
Australia’s Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme. 100   Patents can also function as a tax 
minimisation device by holding patents in companies registered in tax havens.   
Third, we discuss how the combination of free trade and unregulated international capital 
flows undermines inclusive growth.  The comparative advantage argument acknowledges 
that there are winners and losers from free trade but claims that there is an overall increase 
in wealth from the specialization within each country (Ricardo 1817).  However, there are 
counter arguments to comparative advantage being wealth creating.  For instance, there is 
the abandonment of existing factories and equipment as each country specialises to engage 
in comparative advantage, which leads to the destruction of capital (Keen 2011).   
Nevertheless, let us assume that comparative advantage does lead to a net increase in 
wealth.  Ideally, the government in each country would use some of the extra wealth 
generated from comparative advantage to help those adversely affected by free trade to 
relocate and retrain for other employment and to invest in R&D to improve productivity.  
However, the increase in free trade and unregulated capital flows creates an environment 
where tax dodging becomes easier, as discussed in Chapter 2.  The Panama and Paradise 
papers confirm wide spread tax dodging (ICIJ 2017).  Tax dodging allows entities to 
concentrate wealth and leaves governments less financially able to help those adversely 
affected by free trade and investment in R&D.101 
For instance, Case and Deaton (2017) identified a sharp increase in “deaths of despair” 
among those most adversely affected by free trade in the US, namely those white non-
Hispanic Americans without a college education.  Members of this group previously filled 
many of the high-paying manufacturing positions.  The US health system of employers 
paying for health insurance exacerbates the situation.  Notably, Australia saw an increase in 
“deaths of despair” from 2000 to 2015 but the undifferentiated statistics hide which group is 
most affect.  Unlike the US health insurance system, Australia’s universal health insurance, 
Medicare, would help moderate any “deaths of despair” effects of free trade.  The lack of 
assistance for people unemployed because of a free trade deal, tax dodging and capital 
destruction all reduce inclusive growth.  There lacks a global tax account regulator and anti-
tax dodging agreements to ensure all companies are paying their fair share of taxes in the 
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countries they operate.  There are indications that a global tax institution and framework is 
starting to develop albeit slowly.102 
Fourth, there are calls to reduce company tax rates, arguing that there is a requirement to 
compete in free trade with countries with lower tax rates.  As discussed in Chapter 2, this 
argument is flawed, because many companies are already pay zero company tax and few 
companies pay the full company tax rate.  Additionally, Australian taxpayers receive full 
imputation credits on company dividends hence only pay their individual marginal tax rate on 
dividends. 
Assuming fiscal responsibility that is a lower tax rates equates to a cut in government 
services.  This would entail the private sector taking over the role of the government service.  
The provision of services via the private sector may well be less efficient than through the 
public sector (Stone 2017), for example health insurance and energy sector.  Additionally, 
Australia is at a level of HDI where any cuts in government service would likely reduce the 
HDI to that of the USA or even lower. Acknowledging, the whole the Australian tax system 
does require restructuring, including company taxes.  Unfortunately, Australia’s adversarial 
politics are unable solve wicked problems, such as major tax reform, as discussed in Section 
5.2.  However, simply cutting taxes and government services will only reduce inclusive 
growth, as Ostry, Loungani and Fureceri (2016) found in countries exercising such austerity 
measures. 
Ostry, Loungani and Fureceri (2016) concludes the neoliberal agenda has been oversold.  
This conclusion raises questions about the roles of countries and companies within the 
globalisation process beyond the neoliberal agenda.  Profit maximisation behaviour of 
companies features highly in both the neoliberal agenda and the economics underpinning 
the agenda.  This raises two issues (1) aligning profit maximisation with the public good and 
(2) the existence of a company beyond a purely profit maximising agent. 
Goodman and Loveman (1991) note the profit motive of a firm best aligns with the public 
good in restricted set of circumstances.  However, this profit motive alignment with the public 
good within a global setting becomes even more restrictive when one considers 
concentration of wealth, employee health, pollution and emissions.  Rectifying these market 
failures within the neoliberal agenda would require international agreements and accounting 
for tax dodging and embodied emissions and pollution in traded service and goods to 
prevent a race-to-the-bottom on taxation, emissions and pollution. 
A major focus of neoliberal economics is the profit maximisation of firms to such an extent 
that it underemphasises other reasons for the existence of a company.  Obviously, 
companies are required to make a profit to survive.  Similarly, people are required to breathe 
to live.  Both are truisms but ignore the wider issues of existence.  Beinhocker (2006) 
discusses neoclassical economics’ focus on the action of firms maximising profits to moving 
the economy toward allocative efficiency toward a general equilibrium and considers this 
misses the more important wealth generating effect of innovation or dynamic efficiency of a 
firm.  This shift would redefine economics away from ‘allocation of scarce resources’ toward 
‘creating wealth through innovation’.  Beinhocker (2006) illustrates the limitation of 
neoclassical economics’ focus on allocative efficiency with an example from a preindustrial 
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country.  The number of oxen and ploughs can be distributed in an allocatively efficient way 
to maximise food production but any large jump in food production takes innovations such 
tractors.  Notably, neoclassical economic modelling considers any innovation external to the 
model, a residual, and lumps together innovation and modelling errors (Solow 1956). 
Innovation is a distinctly non-equilibrium process and neoclassical economics is particularly 
ill equipped to usefully model innovation. 
Additionally, Stone (2017) finds neither public nor private provision inherently efficient or 
inefficient but stresses that three efficiencies technical, allocative and dynamic be evaluated 
over the short- and long-term in any decisions.  For instance, Korea initially followed an anti-
neoliberal agenda by protecting its manufacturing sector from overseas’ competition and 
maintaining a high degree of financial regulation.  This anti-neoliberal policy denied Korea 
international allocative efficiency in the short-term but now Korea has some of the world’s 
largest and dynamically efficient companies, notably, Samsung Electronics and Hyundai 
Heavy Industry shipbuilding and electric and hydrogen vehicles.  In another example, the 
European Union’s support of the Airbus sacrificed short-term allocative efficiency for long-
term dynamic efficiencies.  In contrast, many of the countries forced into accepting the 
neoliberal agenda as a condition of loans from the World Bank performed less well. 
We have shown the economic theories supporting the neoliberal agenda are seriously 
flawed and at best only applicable to a small domain within the economy under certain 
conditions.  Musgrave (1981) notes that Friedman and neoclassical economics fail to 
acknowledge or clearly specify the domain of their assumptions and when the model is 
operating outside the domain of the assumptions, so the modelling results may well be 
misleading or simply incorrect.  The gap between the real economy and the domain 
assumptions of neoclassical economics makes it inappropriate for policy development 
unless used with great caution (Bell 2009, sec. 5.3.2; Keen 2001; Quiggin 2010; WEA 2017).  
Colander (2000, p. 3) equates neoclassical economics ‘to the celestial mechanics of a non-
existent universe’ for using theory outside its domain assumptions.  There is considerable 
evidence that following the neoliberal agenda and using the supporting economics theories 
have undermined inclusive growth and served to shift manufacturing from countries with 
strict pollution and emissions controls to countries with lax controls. Policy makers, and 
institutions such as the IMF that advise them, must be guided not by faith, but evidence of 
what has worked (Ostry, Loungani & Fureceri 2016).  
5.4.2 Transitioning from faith based to evidence based economics 
A major flaw in equilibrium economics has been known since 1972-4 when the 
Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu theorem showed there lacks a unique equilibrium, proving 
neoclassical economics is theoretically unsound (Mitra-Kahn 2008). There have been 
numerous verified accounts of how the unbounded rationality assumptions within game 
theory, neoclassical economics and general equilibrium theory are at odds with phycology 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Simon 1972, 1979; Smith, VL 1991; Thaler & Mullainathan 
2008; Tversky & Kahneman 1974; van der Sar 2004).  Finally, the inability to predict the 
global finical crisis, the biggest economic event this century, questions the value of 
neoclassical economics in informing policy decisions. 
Economics consists of a number of schools of thought but the teaching in universities fails to 
reflect this diversity of thought (Dow et al. 2009; Krueger 1991).  The predominant 
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neoclassical/game theory school of thought are taught with its equilibrium approach and 
unbounded rational.  The lack of diversity of thought taught reduces the questioning of the 
basic premises of neoclassical economics and game theory. Importantly, university 
economics courses provide decision-making tools for tomorrow’s decisions makers within 
business and government.  The near all disappearance of courses in the “history of 
economics” or “comparative systems” from the curriculum of economic schools exacerbates 
the narrow worldview.  There has been a tendency to replace diversity of thought with 
mathematics supporting the neoclassical and game theoretic approaches. 
This situation leaves most economics graduates with a limited set of tools to solve problems 
and a lack of awareness of other economic schools of thought that both offer alternative 
tools and perspectives.  In addition, the situation stultifies the ability for economics to 
progress beyond the neoliberal toolset (Dow et al. 2009; Kay 2005; Krueger 1991). 
Subsection 1 discusses why the mainstream economics failed to transition from its 
equilibrium and unbounded rational based assumptions with poor predictive performance to 
a more realistic and evidence based foundation.  Section 2 discusses developments beyond 
mainstream neoclassical economics and game theory. 
5.4.2.1 Factors preventing the transition to evidence based economics 
The factors preventing the transition to evidence based economics include:  
(1) the usual general causes of inertia within an academic profession, 
(2) self-selection process of focusing on theoretical mathematical rigor within 
neoclassical economics and game theory, ignoring empirical irregularities making 
them imperious to change and eliminating courses not perceive as possessing 
mathematical rigor, 
(3) Nobel prizes in economics rewarding and reinforcing the focus on mathematical 
economic theory,  
(4) Large organisations, such as the World Bank and IMF, continue to use neoclassical 
economics.  This usage supports the global neoliberal agenda. 
(5) Neoclassical economics helps justify concentrates of wealth as the “natural” outcome 
of the economy as people are paid what they are worth.  Therefore, popular with the 
wealthy that can more readily fund think tanks and make political donations to 
perpetuate neoclassical economics and neoliberalism.  Supporting this view, 
neoclassical economics has a “natural” rate of unemployment, so justifying poverty 
as “natural”.  An alternative simpler explanation is that policy decisions, corruption, 
inheritances and network effects largely determine concentrations of wealth. 
Acknowledging, there are true innovators who gain incredible wealth but these 
people are an incredibly small percentage of the population. 
(6) Methodological individualism in neoclassical economics fits well with people holding 
political beliefs containing extreme versions of individualisms.  Importantly, climate 
change mitigation requires collective action as well as individual action.  This 
collective action does not fit well with many people holding such extreme versions of 
individualism.  A notable exception is the ex UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
who held extreme individualism beliefs but supported climate change action. 
However, Thatcher completed a Chemistry Bachelor of Science degree, which could 
account for understanding and accepting and the science behind climate change. 
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There are the usual reasons for general inertia to change within any academic field. In that, 
every professional academic has devoted considerable time to developing a career.  This 
inertia comes from the sunk costs in the form of time invested in courses developed, 
publications in relevant journals and textbooks written. Noting, academia necessitates a 
certain degree of inertia to avoid faddism, which does warrant slower progress.  Consistent 
with slower progress, Max Planks observed “science progresses one funeral at a time” or 
more fully, “A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making 
them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation 
grows up that is familiar with it”.  However, as discussed, the Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu 
theorem showed a critical flaw in general equilibrium economics in 1972-4 (Mitra-Kahn 2008).  
Over forty years later, these general equilibrium models are still taught in universities to 
inform policy decisions and trade agreements.  The inertia within the economics profession 
requires more explanation than the retirement of academics. 
Comparing two papers on the state of economics education in 1991 and 2009, Krueger 
(1991) and Dow et al. (2009) respectively, highlights the progressive narrowing of academic 
economics towards theoretical mathematical rigor at the expense of empirical relevance and 
eliminating courses without theoretical mathematical rigor.  Krueger (1991) is a study 
published by a commission initiated by the American Association of Economics focusing on 
“the extent to which graduate education in economics may have become too removed from 
real economic problems.”  The commissioners reported, “that it underemphasise the 
‘linkages’ between tools, both theory and econometrics, and ‘real world problems’ that is the 
weakness of graduate education in economics,” and that both students and faculty sensed 
“the absence of facts, institutional information, data, real-world issues, applications, and 
policy problems.”  Concluding, “The commission’s fear is that graduate programs may be 
turning out a generation with too many idiot savants skilled in technique but innocent of real 
economic issues.” 
Dow et al. (2009) found nineteen years later that little has been achieved to address the 
issues raised in the American Association of Economics report (Krueger 1991) and the 
production of idiots savant’s helped set the stage for the global financial crisis.  Perversely, 
the retirement of academic economists, has seen a decrease in the diversity of schools of 
thought taught.  The retiring non-mainstream economists are replaced with neoclassical 
economist and games theorist who either disregard the nonmainstream course or keep the 
course title and replace the content with neoclassical economics and game theory.  For the 
academic economics profession, Max Planks’ observation would be ‘science regresses one 
funeral at a time’.  
Reinforcing the regression is the ‘Nobel Prize’ in economics that provides the ultimate 
recognition for work in economics.  The prize bestows the work of the Laurette with extreme 
credibility for referencing in other academic work.  Understandably, the prize provides a 
strong direction for the development of economics curriculum, as people want to study or 
research in the Laurette field.  The international university ranking systems that factor the 
number of Laurates associated with the university reinforces the importance of the prize.  
Universities use their ranking in student marketing to increases profits and to obtain research 
funding that helps maintain international ranking.  There is a clear motive to emulate or clone 
the wining universities. 
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Reinforcing the above effects is the Nobel Prize legacy.  Syll (2016) cites Offer and 
Söderberg (2016) out of the 76 economics laureates awarded 28 (37%) have been affiliated 
to The University of Chicago. Of all laureates, 80% have been from the US (by birth or by 
naturalisation). Only 7% of the laureates have come from outside North America or Western 
Europe and only one woman ever received the prize. The University of Chicago is the clear 
winner by Nobel Prize count for Economics.  This university is also the epicentre of 
neoclassical economics.  Offer and Söderberg (2016) finds that ‘the ascendancy of market 
liberalism with Reagan (US President 1981-89) and Thatcher (UK Prime Minister 1975-90) 
coincides with the creation and establishment of the prize in 1969.  Especially, during the 
long chair of Assar Lindbeck (1980-94), when the newly established economics prize derived 
credibility from the original Nobel prizes, which helped market neoliberalism to the world.  
Although, not all economists who received the prize are proponents of neoliberalism, it is still 
an undeniable fact that neoliberal and conservative leaning male economists are highly over-
represented among the laureates. Their often ideologically biased doctrines have largely 
motivated the neoliberal economic policies for more than forty years.’ 
Perversely, the legacy of the Nobel Prize is perpetuating economic theories long since 
falsified; Quiggin (2010) discusses some of these theories in his book titled ‘Zombie 
Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk among Us’. Importantly, the frequency of Nobel 
Prizes awarded outside neoclassical economics and game theory has increased in recent 
years. 
5.4.2.2 Developments in evidence based economics 
The previous section discussed factors locking the academic profession into neoclassical 
economics and game theory, which helped support he neoliberal agenda.  We discuss 
alternatives schools of thought to the current mainstream to develop a more evidence-based 
approach to economics.  There lacks a clear alternative and gaining consensus between the 
numerous schools of economic thought is unlikely.  Therefore, putting in place a process to 
encourage dialogue is preferable to selecting an alternative to the current mainstream for the 
following reasons. 
Recognising, each school of thought, including the mainstream, represents an alternative 
theoretical framework or belief system.  The scientific approach of measurement and 
observation and falsification to select among the belief systems could be used.  However, 
the same set of observations may support more than one belief systems, which presents the 
issue that each of the frameworks may capture a part of the economies’ underlying structure.  
This situation presents the possibility of a synthesis, requiring dialogue. 
Equally, if the same set of observations or measurements can falsify a belief system, the 
measurements maybe rejected as spurious or inconsequential to the hard-core of a belief 
system but the observations may falsify a minor hypothesis within the theoretical framework.  
These minor hypotheses provide a protective-belt for the hard-core beliefs (Lakatos 1976). 
This situation is known as the under determination of scientific theory103.  Popper (1972a, 
1972b, 1972c) considers theoretical frameworks or belief systems adept at avoiding 
falsification as unscientific.  The schools of economic thought resemble religions with each 
school having strong followings, containing at least some useful insights and major 
disagreements. 
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The solution to resolve this situation between the school of thought bears similarities to 
Locke’s (1689) proposal for religious tolerance, as the solution to the fear of an invasion by 
Catholicism in 17th century England might provoke religious persecution.  He argued that 
tolerance was the only sensible solution. Importantly, this tolerance provided a peace, which 
was one factor enabling England to lead the world in the Industrial Revolution. Similarly, 
there is a requirement for toleration between the alternative schools of thought, including 
mainstream economics, to promote an evolution of economics. 
We discuss three developments spurred by the global financial crisis, which embody Locke’s 
(1689) call for tolerance and a scientific approach to provide economics’ with a more 
empirical evidenced–based foundation and the potential for synthesis (1) the Curriculum in 
Open-access Resources in Economics, (2) World Economics Association and (3) the Bank 
of England’s macroeconomic modelling. 
The Curriculum in Open-access Resources in Economics (CORE 2016) project, launched in 
October 2013, developed a new approach to economics teaching for undergraduates.104  
The CORE (2016) project developed by a consortium of universities addresses many of the 
issues raised by Krueger (1991) and Dow et al. (2009).  The curriculum contains elements 
from many schools of thought, views theories within their historical context and tests the 
usefulness of the theory against current world problems such as climate change and 
inequality.  The CORE (2016)  project provides an empirical evidence–based foundation and 
potential for synthesis.  The course text is free. 
The World Economics Association (WEA 2017) launched in 2011 promotes a pluralistic 
approach to economics to foster dialogue between the various schools of thought.  WEA’s 
key principles include worldwide membership and governance, and inclusiveness towards 
the variety of theoretical perspectives and applications of economics. WEA welcomes, as 
members, non-economists interested in economics and its relationship with their own field of 
interest. WEA is registered under UK law as a non-profit community interest company.  
There is a voluntary membership fee.  The WEA provides free access to its peer reviewed 
journals. 
The Bank of England (BoE) (Haldane & Turrell 2017) discusses how ‘Macroeconomic 
modelling has been under intense scrutiny since the Great Financial Crisis, when serious 
shortcomings were exposed in the methodology used to understand the economy as a 
whole. Criticism of the assumptions employed in the dominant models, particularly that 
economic agents are homogeneous and optimising and that the economy is equilibrating. 
BoE seeks to explore an interdisciplinary approach to macroeconomic modelling, with 
techniques drawn from other (natural and social) sciences. Specifically, it discusses agent-
based modelling, which is used across a wide range of disciplines, as an example of such a 
technique. Agent-based models are complementary to existing approaches and are suited to 
answering macroeconomic questions where complexity, heterogeneity, networks, and 
heuristics play an important role.’ 
BoE (Baptista et al. 2016) used an agent-based model of the UK housing market to study 
the impact of policies on key housing market indicators. This approach enabled the BoE to 
‘tackle the heterogeneity (differences in stakeholders) in this market by modelling the 
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individual behaviour and interactions of first-time buyers, home owners, buy-to-let investors, 
and renters from the bottom up, and observe the resulting aggregate dynamics in the 
property and credit markets.  The agent-based model was calibrated using a large selection 
of micro-data, mostly from household surveys and housing market data sources. BoE 
performed a series of comparative statics exercises to investigate the impact of the size of 
the rental/buy-to-let sector and different types of buy-to-let investors on housing booms and 
busts. The results suggest that an increase in the size of the buy-to-let sector may amplify 
house price cycles and increase house price volatility. Furthermore, in order to illustrate the 
effects of policies on several housing market indicators, the BoE implement a loan-to-income 
portfolio limit. The BoE find that this policy attenuates the house price cycle.’ 
Australia and China could adapt the BoE model to model the Australian and Chinese 
housing market bubbles with the aim to test stabilisation policies and policies to address 
inequality.  The BoE model combines two major modelling traditions Agent-based Modelling 
(ABM) and Stock Flow Consistency (SFC).  The ABM/SFC model overcomes many of the 
problems inherent in neoclassical economics’ DSGE model; these include. 
 The ABM allows a more realistic non-linear evolutionary modelling of the economy.  
This allows sectors of the economy to be in disequilibrium for instance labour market 
disequilibrium that is unemployment.  In contrast, DSGE is a series of equilibrium 
snapshots overtime.  The equilibrium assumption requires all sectors of the 
economics are in equilibrium. This assumption requires labour market equilibrium 
that is either people are employed or on vacation.  Involuntary unemployment does 
not exist.  Following this DSGE logic through, the “Great Depression” was many 
people simultaneously taking extremely long vacations more of a “Great Vacation” 
than a “Great Depression”. 
 ABM allows heterogeneous agent to model effects on small groups within the 
economy. In contrast, DSGE lacks the resolution.  ABM and SFC seamlessly link the 
macro and micro component of the economy; the macroeconomic emerges from the 
microeconomic.  For instance, business cycles emerge from the transactions 
between agents.  In contrast, DSGE just imposes equilibrium, as discussed the 
neoclassical models lack micro-foundations.  The SFC model links the system of 
national accounts with quadruple accounting system to ensure consistent modelling 
of credit expansion.  In contrast, DSGE treats money as a bartered asset without the 
ability to model any credit expansion.  The inability to model credit helped blind 
neoclassical economists to the GFC.  The BoE’s ABM/SFC model overcomes this 
credit blindness.  The BoE’s ABM/SFC model provides an opportunity for both 
Australia and China to better understand and manage their housing bubbles and the 
role of credit in the formation of the bubble. 
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6 Conclusion 
This report has studied the pivotal role of the Australian and Chinese electricity sectors in 
climate change adaptation and mitigation and maintaining inclusive growth in the transition 
to low carbon economies.  There has been a rapid development and decrease in the costs of 
renewable energy, and associated technologies, which make the transition to zero net 
emission in the electricity sector both technically and economically feasible.  These 
developments will allow the electricity system to fulfil its pivotal role in transitioning the 
economy to zero net emissions (TAI 2017b).  Showing commitment and technical feasibility, 
twenty countries in the Powering Past Coal Alliance announced the elimination of coal by 
2030.105 The alliance has grown to 50 nations, states and businesses as at January 2014.106  
Similar international commitments to phasing out internal combustion engine vehicles are 
also appearing, notably in China, France, Norway, UK, and California. 
However, the Australian Department of Energy and Environment (DEE 2017) published 
emissions projections showing Australia will clearly fail to meet its Paris commitment 
published emissions projections showing Australia will clearly fail to meet its Paris 
commitment emissions targets by 5% and 29-33% above the target for 2020 and 2030.  The 
projections forecast Australia’s emissions at 551 and 570 Mt CO2-e, respectively.  If 
embodied emissions from imported goods were considered, Australia would be faring much 
worse (CWF 2017). 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS 2017d) announced that inequality has remained 
stable since 2013-14. This respite is welcome news as Australia’s income Gini index 
increased from 0.302 to 0.323 since 1994-5 peaking at 0.336 and the wealth Gini index 
increased from 0.573 to 0.605. However, Sheil and Stilwell (2017) discuss how the ABS 
requires to update their Gini index calculation method to international best practice adopted 
by the OECD, as the ABS current calculation will underestimate inequality.  Sheil and Stilwell 
(2017) claim the stability of ABS’s Gini appears anomalous, given the large increase in the 
value of houses in Australian cities during recent years and the fact that few among the 
poorest 40 per cent own one. Most of the wealth the ABS apportions to the bottom of the 
distribution comprises non-income earning items such as cars, furniture and clothing.  
Notably, Ostry, Loungani and Fureceri (2016) and OECD (2017c) found increasing inequality 
a prominent feature of the neoliberal policies that permeated the world since the 1980s. 
Australia is failing to meet its Paris agreement and to address increasing inequality.  We 
discuss the reports key findings. 
6.1 Australia’s poorly implemented electricity sector liberalisation 
confounding its pivotal role in the transition 
Contributing to Australia’s decline in inclusive growth was the poorly implemented neoliberal 
polices in the electricity and energy sector, which saw Australian energy prices move from 
some of the cheapest in the OECD to the most expensive and Australia lose its competitive 
advantage in energy.  Consequently, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC 2017) was directed to conduct an inquiry into the price rises.  The interim report 
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discusses two major causes, being the overbuilding of network infrastructure and market 
power exercised by three retail-generators.  The overbuilding of infrastructure reduces 
productivity and presents an ongoing transfer of wealth from electricity users to network 
owners, increasing inequality.  The dominance of the retail and generator sectors by three 
large retail-generators has allowed significant market power to shift wealth from electricity 
users to the owners of the retail-generators.  The electricity sector provides an example of 
neoliberal policies being oversold (Ostry, Loungani & Fureceri 2016) and their supporting 
neoclassical economics used beyond the domain of its assumptions.  Section 4.1 discusses 
these issues in more detail. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, China is experimenting with market-based approaches in its 
electricity sector.  Teng, Jotzo and Wang (2017) calculate that a market-based approach 
could half the cost of the China’s new Emissions Trading Scheme.  The ACCC inquiry into 
Australia’s market-based implementation confirms that adopting a market-based approach 
presents considerable risk to energy prices and inequality.  The inquiry will provide useful 
insight for China on what to avoid in its market-based implementation.  Notably, two major 
classifications of policy failure include the failure to implement market reforms in accordance 
with the underlying economic theory and implementing reforms in accordance with the 
theory but the theory departs from reality, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Exacerbating both stability and price problems caused by the poorly implemented neoliberal 
polices in Australia are the Coalition’s uncoordinated climate change and energy policies.  
To address this lack of leadership, the Australian Energy Market Operators (AEMO 2017) 
initiated an ‘Integrated Systems Plan’ consultation to coordinate the transition to zero net 
emissions in the electricity system.  The options outlined in the consultation plan would go a 
long way to smooth the integration of renewable energy but ideally, the National Energy 
Objectives needs rewriting to include climate change mitigation and adaption objectives.107  
Noting, the collaborative Integrated Systems Plan is a move toward transparent central 
planning and so acknowledges limitations to the market-based approach to co-ordinate the 
development of the gas and electricity systems.  Additionally, the political donations from the 
mining industry provide a conflict of interest in implementing mitigation policies. 
6.2 Australia’s Parliament’s record of failing to solve wicked problems 
The neoliberal failures in the energy sector and the failure to address climate change 
mitigation at the Federal level are not isolated occurrences of the failure to address wicked 
problems adequately.  Australia has a growing list of unaddressed or unresolved wicked 
problems including.108 
 Obesity 
 Indigenous disadvantage 
 Land degradation 
 Population ageing 
 Evidence versus opinion: The attack on science 
 Increasingly complex tax system that has become increasingly porous at the top but 
driving less income – little of the Henry Tax Review was implements  
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 The negative gearing and capital gains concessions for properties 
 The private education and health insurance discussed in Section 4.1.4 
 Tax havens and tax dodging 
 Increasing prison population and violent crime usually associated with increases in 
inequality 
Solving these problems requires collaboration and complex evaluations, which are unsuited 
to adversarial politics. 109   For instance, the ‘Integrated Systems Plan’ (AEMO 2017) is 
seeking collaboration to solve the wicked problem of coherently integrating climate and 
energy policy but is occurring outside the political domain that has made tangled progress 
over 5 years. 
6.3 Forming common objectives to simplify wicked problems 
Solving the wicked problems requires interconnect thinking to ensure that any solutions add 
to the country’s long-term objectives to benefit the electorate.  Notably, political donations 
are likely to undermine any consensus over long-term objectives.  We consider three 
objectives and confounding political donations. 
Garnaut (2008) envisioned breaking the link between GDP and carbon emissions in his 
foundational document to shape Australia’s future.  This vision provides a shape to the 
economy other than a pure focus on GDP.  Donations from the mining sector have made this 
objective difficult to reach. 
Denniss (2017) seeks to break the link between GDP and accelerating waste to shape a 
circular economy rather than have a waste driven GDP.  Importantly, from 1997 to 2012 the 
population rose by 22 per cent and gross value added increased 64 per cent but waste 
increased 145 per cent (ABS 2013).  Addressing this waste problem would require 
considerable behavioural change and at odds with taking donations from the fashion industry 
or makers of disposable items. 
The human development index (HDI) comprises three major components (1) long and 
heathy life, (2) knowledge and (3) a decent standard of living.  HDI provides an objective 
more conducive to inclusive growth over the long-term (OECD 2017c).  Donations from the 
farming sector would make raising the HDI and life expectancy by reducing obesity via a 
sugar tax difficult. 
The decision to take no action over Australia’s existing policies and political donations is 
likely to increase inequality and continue Australia’s increase in violent crime (ABS 2017b).  
This trend would take Australia closer to the social environment prevalent in the USA and 
reduce Australia’s HDI to that of the USA.  Removing political donations will make it easier to 
solve wicked problems. 
6.4 Removing four barriers to solving wicked problems 
Australia and China face many of the same wicked problems but each country has its own 
unique political system.  Chapter 5 found four major barriers to solve wicked problems in 
Australia.  The first two barriers are unique to Australia but the latter two barriers are 
applicable to Australia and China.  The first two barriers diminish and corrupt parliament’s 
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information processing ability, being (1) political wedging & adversarial politics and (2) 
political donations.  The second two barriers relate to the quality of the information 
parliament uses whether directly or indirectly via public opinion, including (3) mainstream 
economics’ unrealistic models of the economy and human behaviour and (4) the absence of 
academic economists informing the public debate, with industry and political funded think 
tanks filling the void. 
6.4.1 Political wedging and adversarial politics 
On federation, Australia based its political system on the UK Westminster and the US federal 
systems that were two of the best performing democracies at the time.  The adversarial 
system performed well solving problems using the didactic approach.  However, Australia’s 
list of unresolved wicked problems is increasing and the adversarial approach is proving 
unsuitable.  These unresolved wicked problems include climate change, declining inclusive 
growth, increasingly complex tax system that drives less income and has become 
increasingly porous at the top and political donations and corruption concerning the 
construction and mining sectors.110  The inability to solve these problems has diminished the 
electorates’ confidence in Australian adversarial systems and its politicians.  Specifically, 
political wedging has become a major barrier to addressing these wicked problems and 
undermining the electorate’s confidence.  The House of Representatives’ electoral voting 
system supporting the adversarial or binary politics perpetuates either Labor or the Coalition 
in Government and effectively locks out the minor parties in the House of Representatives, a 
house unrepresentative of the electorate.  The adversarial or binary politics operating in the 
unrepresentative House of Representatives both makes political wedging easier and 
reduces the diversity of thought and collaboration required to solve wicked problems. 
Notably, Australia and the USA are exceptional among OECD countries as regressing in the 
pursuit of climate change mitigation. Additionally, there are a number of countries 
outperforming the UK and USA in terms of HDI (UNDP 2016), a commonality of these higher 
performing countries is proportional representation.  Australia has an unusually large natural 
resource endowment for the size of its population, which inflates its HDI.  It is time to review 
these country’s political systems with a view to updating Australia’s political system to 
enhance its problem solving ability.  The electoral cycle and the regular political wedging 
within the houses of parliament would make any long-term constitutional reform planning 
unlikely to succeed (Garnaut 2013).  Outsourcing to the private sectors presents a conflict of 
interest and any political reform would necessarily be a transparent long process involving 
consultation with the electorate.  To initiate the process, the Productive Commission, 
building on existing work, would be in a position to provide an independent international 
comparative performance appraisal of Australia’s political system for public discussion.  As 
discussed, indicators of success could include HDI, climate change mitigation and circular 
economy.  Importantly, these indicators focus on the shape of GDP rather than only size 
(Denniss 2017). 
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6.4.2 Political donations 
Political donations are both one of the outstanding wicked problems and a major barrier to 
solving the other wicked problems.  Relatedly, both Labour and Liberal Parties are drifting 
away from their original roots of representing unionised employees and the middleclass, 
respectively, and towards representing the interests of the national and international 
corporate sectors.  The distinctions between the parties diminish as both parties take 
donations from the same corporate sectors and in some cases from the same sponsors.  
This convergence represents a loss of diversity in the political landscape for the electorate 
and loss of integrity.  The dissatisfaction with the two big parties has seen an historical fall in 
the big party vote and an increase in the size of the smaller parties.111   Additionally, the 
competition for political donations between Labor and the Coalition helps explain the inability 
and reluctance to make substantial political donations and tax reform.112  
Notwithstanding the recent Coalition proposal to ban foreign donations presents another 
political wedge.  The Coalition has reframed the original intent to ban foreign donations to 
politicians to include a ban on donations to charity registered advocacy groups that 
encourage electoral participation in the political process to promote a health democracy.  
This reframing diminishes support for individual democratic involvement but leaves in place 
major donations from the corporate sector to influence government.  This foreign donations 
political wedge maintains the Coalition’s political donators and undermines the minor parties.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, the “Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters” has taken 
10 years over political donation reform without success.  The time has come for independent 
advice on political donations.  There is a conflict of interest to outsourcing such work to the 
private sector.  To initiate the public discussion process with an options document, the 
Productivity Commission could make an international comparison of political donation 
systems against two performance indicators HDI and climate change mitigation.  Beside the 
ethical concerns of political donations, any costs in taxpayer funded political activity options 
need comparing against the loss of government revenue from the various tax breaks given 
to political donators, including capital gain tax concessions, negative gearing, abolition of the 
carbon price, Mineral Resource Tax, Petroleum and superannuation tax breaks for the 
wealthy. 
6.4.3 Absence of academic economists informing the public debate 
Confounding solutions to wicked problems is the withdrawal of academic economists from 
the public debate to provide an independent expert voice.  In their place are politically 
funded think tanks and consultant economists or guns for hire113 where there is a tendency 
to frame any research results in a way favourable to their sponsor.  The tobacco industry 
provides an example of how askew industry funded research can become.  The tobacco 
industry’s research legacy is the pejorative term “tobacco science”.  More rec
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ently, the sugar industry is behaving similarly to prevent a sugar tax.114   
One of the major causes of the withdrawal of academic economists from the public debate is 
replacing the academic staff with American PhD graduates based on their publications in 
international journals and with the requirement for them to publish in international journals.  
One solution would be to make it a condition of employment to publish in Australian journals 
on Australian policy issues.  Section 5.3 discusses other causes and solutions in more detail. 
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6.4.4 Unrealistic models of the economy and human behaviour 
The importance of economics theory in misguiding policy development is significant. The 
failure to predict the global financial crisis (GFC) is the most prominent indicator of the failure 
of mainstream economics to produce a realistic model of the economy.  However, less 
visible is the formal training economist goes through that inculcates the same general 
equilibrium theory misinforming the prediction of the GFC.  Notably, the same neoclassical 
theory underlies most of the modelling to justify free trade agreements.  A major flaw in 
neoclassical economics has been known since 1972-4 when the Sonnenschein–Mantel–
Debreu theorem showed there lacks a unique equilibrium, proving neoclassical economics’ 
general equilibrium approach is theoretically unsound (Mitra-Kahn 2008). 
Remarkably, the GFC has not lead to a major re-evaluation of mainstream economics.  Post 
GFC, Dow et al. (2009) discuss the progressive narrowing of academic economics towards 
theoretical mathematical rigor at the expense of empirical relevance and eliminating courses 
without theoretical mathematical rigor.  Eighteen years earlier, the same faults were found by 
the American Economic Association’s review of university education Krueger (1991).   
Importantly, the mainstream or neoclassical economics supports the neoliberal policies 
introduced into Australia in 1980s.  However, Ostry, Loungani and Fureceri (2016), staff at 
the IMF, find that neoliberalism has been oversold after analysing two specific neoliberal 
policies (1) removing restrictions on the movement of capital across borders and (2) 
reducing fiscal deficits and debt levels or fiscal austerity.  
 Removing restrictions on the movement of capital across borders was associated 
with exacerbating the size and frequency of boom-bust cycles.  The boom-bust 
cycles provide a mechanism to increase inequality. 
 For austerity, it was difficult to determine any positive effect on economic growth 
when looking at a broad range of countries but the cost in terms of inequity is 
prominent and the increase in inequality has hurt the level and sustainability of 
growth. 
Section 5.4 discusses these issues further, the use of mainstream economics theory outside 
its domain of applicability, and the lock-in of neoclassical economics within the academic 
economics profession. 
Constructively, there are three significant developments outside mainstream economics 
spurred by the GFC, which could help Australia and China in developing more realistic 
economics models by taking a more pluralistic approach to economics. 
 The World Economics Association (WEA 2017) promotes a pluralistic and 
international approach to economics, which complements the older American 
Economic Association that promotes neoclassical economics with a strong North 
American influence. 
 The Curriculum in Open-access Resources in Economics (CORE 2016) project, 
launched in October 2013, developed a new approach to economics teaching for 
undergraduates. 115   The CORE (2016) project developed by a consortium of 
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universities addresses many of the issues raised by Krueger (1991) and Dow et al. 
(2009). 
 As an alternative to neoclassical general equilibrium models, Australia and China 
could adapt the Bank of England (Baptista et al. 2016) model to model the Australian 
and Chinese housing market bubbles with the aim to test stabilisation policies and 
policies to address inequality.  The Bank of England model combines two major 
modelling traditions Agent-based Modelling (ABM) and Stock Flow Consistency 
(SFC).  The ABM/SFC model overcomes many of the problems inherent in 
neoclassical economics’ general equilibrium models. 
Section 5.4 discusses the above three post GFC developments in more detail. 
6.5 Long term plan to restore confidence in Australia’s democracy 
Crucially, these four barriers to solving wicked problems are interrelated and solving them 
would require farsighted leadership and putting aside the immediate short-term interests of 
the party for the long-term health of Australia’s democracy.  Meanwhile, Australia’s 
adversarial political norm of serial political wedging in conjunction with domestic and foreign 
corporate political denotations continues to diminish Australia’s ability to solve problems in 
the interest of the electorate and undermines the electorate’s confidence in Australia’s 
political institutions and politicians.   
Removing the four barriers to improve Australia’s ability to solve wicked problems are long-
term but any inaction over climate change mitigation and the inclusive growth exacerbates 
both chronic problems where early action would make lighter work.  The next Federal 
election could see a change in party leading the government.  The Coalition has 
underperformed in addressing both climate change mitigation and inclusive growth issues.  
In contrast, Labor’s suite of policy options looks more promising to address both issues. 
Regardless of the next federal election outcome to address climate change mitigation and 
inclusive growth, it should not detract from completing a comprehensive upgrade of 
Australia’s underperforming US Federal-UK Westminster Houses of Parliament hybrid and 
unique political donations system.  The four barriers to solve wicked problems require long-
term solutions and Australia will undoubtable face other wicked problems in the near future.  
Two emerging wicked problems are the obesity epidemic and the inability to apply a sugar 
tax and the decline in revenue from fuel excise to fund transport infrastructure and inability to 
implement road user charges. 
6.6 Bring together the climate change mitigation and inclusive growth 
agendas 
In addition to bringing together energy and emissions policies, the OECD (2017e) 
recommends bringing together the growth and climate agendas, calculating that integrating 
measures to tackle climate change into regular economic policy will have a positive impact 
on economic growth over the medium and long term, claiming the transition to zero 
emissions can produce inclusive growth (OECD 2017a), as discussed in Chapter 1. 
Bring together of the climate change inclusive growth agendas provides for a building boom 
in energy efficiency and renewable energy to take up the slack after the decline the housings 
and mining booms.  Fortuitously, historically low interest rates will make funding the 
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transition much easier.  However, the Grattan Institute discussed the requirement to reflect 
these historical low interest rates in ‘discount rate’ calculations for infrastructure 
investment.116  The Integrated System Plan (AEMO 2017) will help efficiently coordinate the 
separate state based renewable energy targets and the retirement of the coal generators.  
Writing the emissions targets into the National Energy Objectives to provide investment 
confidence would enable a cheaper transition.   
However, beyond the Integrated Systems Plan for the electricity system, Australia lacks an 
integrated long-term response to climate adaptation and mitigation for other major 
infrastructures. This situation is particularly concerning with Australia’s rapid population 
growth being amongst the fastest in the developed world.  Compounding the rapid 
population growth, developing a fully integrated system of infrastructure is extremely 
challenging with Australia’s multiple layers of government and private sector ownership of 
infrastructure.  To overcome these challenge and deliver interconnected, integrated, and 
sustainable infrastructure strategy incorporating climate change, Consult Australia (2018) 
recommends establishing an independent body to plan, assess, and prioritise infrastructure 
projects.  Acknowledging, Infrastructure Australia does provide independence but many 
legislatures lack independence, which in turn undermines the effectiveness Infrastructure 
Australia’s independence to prioritise projects.  Importantly, independence with transparency 
can help reduce corruption and facilitate the adoption of best practice (McKinsey 2017). 
Ostry, Loungani and Fureceri (2016) found one successful neoliberal policy for increasing 
economic growth was foreign direct investment (FDI) if associated with knowledge transfer 
but found the removal of restrictions on the movement of capita across countries’ borders 
exacerbated inequality. Fortunately, the Chinese Government imposed restrictions on 
Chinese entities making FDI into unstable assets.  These restrictions will help switch 
Chinese investment from the Australian housing market where there is little knowledge 
transfer to the renewable energy sector where there is considerable more knowledge 
transfer.  The switch should be beneficial to both countries helping stabilise Australia’s 
housing market and support Australia’s transition to zero net emission while providing 
Chinese investors with a more secure income stream. 
For employment, Chapter 2 found the importance of the decline in the mining sector 
overstated and the size of the service sector increasing to generate new employment along 
with a historically high underemployment rate, indicating a ‘gig’ economy.  The Productivity 
Commission (2017b) found Australia’s regional economy transitioning the end of the 
resources investment boom as expected without requiring any exceptional actions.  Three 
notable aspects to the transition are the requirement to develop the renewable energy zones, 
the increase in tourism and the natural resource requirements specific to renewable energy 
and storage.  Developing renewable energy zones would bear similarities to the mining 
boom with a high employment construction phase and low employment operations phase.  
The increase in tourism signifies Australia’s switch to a more service intensive economy. 
For governments, the transition to zero net emissions will include further losses of royalties 
from the extraction of fossil fuel and the fuel excise duties.  As discussed, major tax reform is 
one of Australia’s unaddressed wicked problems and the loss of royalties and fuel excise 
duty intensifies the urgency for tax reform.  Relatedly, the OECD (2013b) discusses the lack 
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of consistency between environmental damage and tax on the different forms of fossil fuels.  
The reintroduction of a carbon price on all fossil fuels could address this inconsistency but 
would need considering concurrently with the abolition of fuel excise duty and introduction of 
road user charges.  Noting, an ETS provides a carbon budgeting mechanism but lacks the 
guaranteed revenue from a carbon tax.  These tax issues require considering within any tax 
reform but as discussed, Australia’s current political system has proven unable to address 
major tax reform. 
For businesses, climate change presents a financial risk both adapting to the physical risks 
of climate change and transitioning to zero net emissions. The G20 Task Force on Climate 
related Financial Disclosures 117 , 118  is developing reporting standards for companies to 
disclose their climate change physical and transition risks, using scenario based analysis, to 
the market.  This will provide a better assessment of asset values and likely motivate 
continual improvements in adaptation and mitigation.  This development of financial 
disclosure bears similarities to the major cultural change in the development of workplace 
Occupational Safety Health (OSH) that requires continual improvement in employee health 
and safety practices.  Initially, some businesses were reluctant about introducing OSH 
practices but OSH has been accepted and created a cultural change for the better. 
For health, eliminating the burning of fossil fuels presents major health benefits and freeing 
up resources for other activities. The transition will bring about a redistribution of income and 
wealth and environmental improvements to reshape countries, which the fossil fuel 
companies are resisting.  Similarly, there are benefits to health, freeing up resources for 
other activities for smokers that stop smoking (Denniss 2017), which the tobacco industry 
continues to resists to maintain its income and wealth.  The tobacco industry misleading the 
public over the cancer causing effects of tobacco bears similarities to the fossil fuel 
companies misleading the public over the adverse effects of burning fossil fuels on 
climate.119  The class action against the tobacco industry called Tobacco Master Settlement 
Agreement totalled $206 billion.  San Francisco is to sue oil companies over misleading the 
public and expects the settlement figure with the oil companies to be in the billions of 
dollars.120  Australian entities holding the fossil fuel companies accountable for misleading 
the public provides an additional avenue to fund Australia’s climate change adaptation and 
mitigation. 
Lastly, the organisation Drawdown 121  made a comprehensive evaluation of solutions to 
reverse global warming using technologies that are already viable to calculate each solutions 
cumulative impact on reducing carbon to the year 2050 and their costs and net benefits or 
savings.  These solutions have intrinsic value regardless of their climate value.  Drawdown 
lists the top 100 solutions within a global context but these solutions require considering with 
a local context and enabling policy support, in particular a carbon price to coordinate the 
transition.  Drawdown’s “no regret” solutions bring together inclusive growth and climate 
change adaptation and mitigation.   
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